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Abstract 
Every conception of history is invariably accompanied by a certain 
experience of time which is implicit in it, conditions it, and 
thereby has to be elucidated. Similarly, every culture is first and 
foremost a particular experience of time, and no new culture is 
possible without an alteration in this experience. The original task 
of a genuine revolution, therefore, is never merely to 'change the 
world% but also - and above all - to 'change time'. (Giorgio 
Agamben)l 
In this thesis I will be looking at the work of Walter Benjamin and Luce ffigaray 
as two examples of different attempts to 'change time' in the sense given by 
Giorgio Agamben above. I will be arguing that both of these thinkers theorise this 
4genuine revolution'. I will also be arguing that there are useful Parallels in their 
work which will help to bring about a more productive thinking of the 
temporalities of history and revolution. 
The first part of the thesis consists of a reading of Benjamin's revolutionary 
philosophy of history and a study of the temporalities that emerge from his 
critique of historicism. This also involves an investigation into both Hegel's and 
Nietzsche's influence on Benjamin's thinking of time and history. His 
relationship to Hegel is explored through the nature of the dialectic at work in 
Benjamin's texts as well as through the interpretations of these texts by Adorno 
and Agamben. Nietzsche's influence is traced through the theme of tragedy. I 
compare and contrast Nietzsche's thinking of tragedy with Benjamin's thinking 
of Trauerspiel, and show the various conceptions of historical time at work in 
these forms. 
The second part of the thesis is then a reading of what I take to be Irigaray's 
revolutionary philosophy of history. I begin this section by setting out my reasons 
for considering Irigaray to be a revolutionary thinker as well as suggesting why 
she might also be considered to be undertaking a similar project to Benjamin. 
The revolutionary temporalities that I extrapolate from higaray's work are then 
also looked at in relation to Hegel and Nietzsche. The study of her relationship to 
Hegel takes place through the figure of Antigone, which also brings us back to 
the theme of tragedy. The different times that emerge in Irigaray's thinking are 
then compared to different notions of movement that take place in Nietzsche's 
thought. 
The thesis concludes with an investigation and comparison of the different 
temporalities that have been discovered in Benjamin and Irigaray. The recurring 
themes of destruction, disjunction, continuity, and rhythm are explored in order 
to suggest how each of these thinkers can provide a useful critique of, or 
supplement for, the other. 
' Giorgio Agamben, 'Time and History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum', in Infancy 
and History: Essays on the Destruction of Experience, London, Verso, 1993, p. 9 1. 
Introduction 
Every conception of history is invariably accompanied by a certain 
experience of time which is implicit in it, conditions it, and thereby has to 
be elucidated. Similarly, every culture is first and foremost a particular 
experience of time, and no new culture is possible without an alteration in 
this experience. The original task of a genuine revolution, therefore, is 
never merely to 'change the world', but also - and above all - to 'change 
time'. (Giorgio Agamben)l 
In this thesis I will be looking at the work of Walter Benjamin and Luce Irigaray 
as two examples of different attempts to 'change time' in the sense given by 
Giorgio Agamben above. I will be arguing that both of these thinkers theorise this 
4 genuine revolution'. I will also be arguing that there is a secret agreement 
between them; one that will produce a more productive thinking of the 
temporalities of history and revolution. 
Benjamin's theory of the experience of time of modernity is what produces the 
demand for a change in time as well as setting out some alternative models of 
temporality. Irigaray's theory of sexual difference is what produces the demand 
for a change in culture. I will be arguing that this change in culture can also 
produce a revolutionary change in time, as demanded by Benjamin's theory. 
The first part of the thesis is a reading of Benjamin's philosophy of history and 
his temporalities of history and revolution. In the second part I extrapolate a 
' Giorgio Agamben, 'Time and History: Critique of the Instant and the Continuum', in Infancy 
and Histoty Essqi -s on the Destruction ofExperience, London, Verso, 1993, p. 9 1. 
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theory of different temporalities of history and revolution from Irigaray's writing. 
As these temporalities are not always explicit in Irigaray's texts I will be 
uncovering, what I consider to be, the thinking of time and history that is implied 
in her writing. Part of this project is also to bring Benjamin and Irigaray's 
theories together in a productive conjunction. I will be showing that, if Ingaray is 
read in a Benjaminian light, she can be seen to be undertaking a similar project of 
'brushing history against the grain'. I will also be showing how Irigaray's work 
can supplement, enrich and fulfil some of the promise of Benjamin's theories. 
However, I will not be attempting to identify these two thinkers, or to 
homogenise their very different theories; rather, I will be showing how the 
similarities and differences between them can lead to a better understanding of 
the temporalities of history and revolution. 
Benjamin and Irigaray in Modernity 
Benjamin's work is, at least in the later writings, explicitly an attempt to 
construct a theory of modernity. In other words, it is seeking an understanding of 
the 'new' in modem society, or the experience of the new in modem society. It is 
in his studies of Baudelaire and the Paris Arcades that what he calls his 'pre- 
history of modernity' is most extensively elaborated. It will be useful then to take 
Baudelaire's own account of modernity as a working definition. In The Painter of 
Modern Life he wrote 'By 'modernity' I mean the ephemeral, the fugitive, the 
3 
contingent, the half of art whose other half is the eternal and the immutable. 
" It 
is this experience of the ephemeral, the fugitive, and the contingent that is also at 
work in Benjamin's theory. What is most significant for this thesis, and 
Benjamin's theory of modernity, is the understanding of time and history within 
modernity. David Frisby suggests that many theorists of modernity are 
4 concerned with the new modes of perception and experience of social and 
historical existence set in train by the upheaval of capitalism. Their central 
concern was the discontinuous experience of time, space and causality as 
transitory, fleeting and fortuitous or arbitrary... '. 3 It is Benjamin's understanding 
of this discontinuous experience of time that will be the primary focus here, as 
well as Irigaray's attempts to change the experience altogether. 
Modernity has often been conceived as the result of a break. This is usually 
positioned as break with tradition and accompanied by the announcement or 
promise of a new age. 4 The themes of break, disjunction or discontinuity will 
play a major role in this thesis, as will differing conceptions and uses of 
continuity. Benjamin will be shown to be a thinker of radical disjunction and 
discontinuity, while one of Irigaray's roles will be to rework a notion of 
continuity. 
' Charles Baudelaire, 'The Painter of Modem Life', in The Painter ofModern Life and Other 
Essays, trans. and ed. Jonathan Mayne, Phaidon Press, Oxford 1964, p. 13. 
3 David Frisby, Fragments of Modernity, Cambridge Mass., MIT Press, 1988, p. 4. The theorists 
that Frisby is explicitly referring to are Georg Simmel, Siegfried Kracauer, and Walter Benjamin. 
4 This theme is explored in detail in, JUrgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of 
Modernity. Oxford, Polity, 1987. While Habermas acknowledges the emergence of modernity and 
its understanding of itself as a new age 'around the year 1500' with the Renaissance and the 
Refon-nation, his own analysis really takes off from Hegel's conception of modernity as a new 
age. 
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Modernity can be seen to be strangely dependent upon both discontinuity and 
continuity. Andrew Benjamin describes modernity as 'delimited by a founding 
dislocation', which he points out is also 'one of the defining motifs of Walter 
-) 5 Benjamin's conception of modernity . However,, at the same time that modernity 
is to be understood as and through dislocation, Andrew Benjamin also draws our 
attention to the conceptions of continuity and totality at work within modernity. 
He suggests that another aspect of modernity is 'the continual attempt to efface 
the presence of this founding moment'. 7 In other words there is also a sort of 'bad 
faith' at work in modemity which constantly tries to refuse the presence of 
dislocation and disruption within itself We could say that modernity tries to 
paper over its own constitutive cracks. 
Andrew Benjamin discusses the effacement of dislocation in terms of 
particularity and universality. He identifies the inability to think particularity 
without incorporation back into universality as one aspect of the effacement of 
the dislocation of modernity. 8 This is also the basis of the dominance of 
5 Andrew Benjamin, Present Hope: Philosophy, Architecture, Judaism, London, Routledge, 
1997, p. 162. 
6 In order to avoid conftision over the two authors present in this work with the surname 
Benjamin, wherever the surname Benjamin is used without a forename it will be taken to refer to 
Walter Benjamin. 
7 Andrew Benjamin, Present Hope, p. 3. 
8 Andrew Benjamin's discussion is also focused around the question of a thinking of the Shoah as 
constitutive of the present as it is linked to modernity. While I will not be undertaking a sustained 
discussion of the status of the Shoah in the interconnection between modernity and the present, it 
must always be bome in mind in any discussion of particularity, universality, totality and 
specificity. While my focus will be on the various temporalities of revolution emerging from the 
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continuity within modernity, because a proper thinking of dislocation would be 
able to think a particularity that is not immediately taken as a moment in a 
universal continuum. Part of the philosophical task then, as identified by Andrew 
Benjamin, is to attempt to think 'a conception of particularity that cannot be 
readily reinserted into the universal/particular relation'; what is also of 
significance here is that he also identifies this task as 'a fundamental part of 
Walter Benjamin's philosophical undertaking. '9 This task will also be important, 
even if it is not always explicit, throughout this thesis, not only in relation to the 
thinking of Walter Benjamin, but also in relation to Irigaray's attempts to rethink 
both particularity and universality. 
What is interesting about these two thinkers is that they both avoid the pitfalls of 
post-Holoeaust thought, as identified by Andrew Benjamin. The first of these is 
complicity, which would involve 'the unchecked repetition of tradition'10; the 
kind of thinking that would deny the Holocaust as a constitutive disjunction in 
thinking. Neither Walter Benjamin nor Irigaray can be accused of complicity in 
an uncritical repetition of tradition although they are both concerned in their 
different ways with tradition. Benjamin is concerned with a destruction and 
rescue of tradition, and Irigaray with a subversive repetition of tradition. 
thinking of Benjamin and Irigaray, this cannot be - nor would I want it to be - divorced from a 
thinking that would take the Shoah as having 'a determining effect on thinking'. (Present Hope, p. 
6). 
9 Andrew Benjamin, Present Hope, p. 8. 
10 Ibid., p. 4. 
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The second of these pitfalls is nihilism, which involves ýa metaphysics of 
destruction'll. While it will be shown below that Benjamin's method can 
sometimes be described as nihilism, and that he even uses this label himself, this 
will be shown to be a nihilism that destroys the very tradition of metaphysics of 
destruction. I will be attempting to show that although Benjamin is greatly 
concerned with destruction,, this is an affirmative destruction - one that can even 
be described as a thinking of happiness. Irigaray will also be shown to be highly 
critical of a tradition of nihilism and of the destructive thinking that forms its 
basis. 
The dialectic of continuity and discontinuity will be most important to the 
formulation of any alternative temporalities of history or revolution. Benjamin's 
theories will be useful in criticising constructions of modernity that rely on 
conceptions of continuity and its implied totality. Andrew Benjamin draws the 
important distinction between chronology and time which allows us to see that it 
is 'the interarticulation of chronology and continuity [that] comes to be 
naturalised and, as such, is taken to be the expression of time itself. ' 12 In other 
words it is only because of this naturalisation of continuity that we experience 
temporality as a continuous process. Walter Benjamin's position is, on the other 
hand, that the real nature of modernity can only be grasped in its dislocation, 
which necessarily includes it temporal dislocation. What I will be arguing is that 
Walter Benjamin's thinking of revolution also takes the form of a temporal 
dislocation. 
11 Ibid., p. 4. 
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I will also show that Irigaray is useftil in theorising a notion of revolution that 
incorporates a refigured concept of continuity that is able to avoid Benjamin's 
well-founded and convincing criticisms of historical theories and temporalities of 
continuity. There is a thinking of continuity in Irigaray's work that can be 
extrapolated in terms that avoid positioning it as another attempt to efface the 
dislocation of modernity. It will be shown to be a continuity that can incorporate 
discontinuity. The particularity of dislocation is cherished within Irigaray's texts 
because her reworking of universality allows difference to be maintained and 
valued. Irigaray's continuity does not necessitate a closed totality. Indeed I will 
be showing that the 'incomplete present' and 'impossibility of closure' 13 that 
Andrew Benjamin derives from Walter Benjamin's work can, in a compatible 
and yet different way, also be derived from Irigaray's writing. This dialectic of 
openness and closure is what she identifies as contributing to the nihilism that 
needs to be avoided. As we will see. her temporalities of revolution are based on 
the temporalities of the body - the female body in particular - which is neither 
open nor closed, or which is both open and closed. This is linked to Irigaray's 
metaphor of 'the two lips': the openness of the female body is not based on a lack 
while its closure is not totalising and exclusive. 
The relationship between continuity and tradition will also return, in various 
forms, throughout the thesis. As well as Benjamin's attempts to destroy the 
temporality of tradition we will see Irigaray's engagement with cultural and 
12 Ibid., p. 12. 
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philosophical traditions. Irigaray will be interpreted as a revolutionary thinker, 
who breaks with traditions in her own way; at the same time, she will also be 
interpreted as working within certain philosophical traditions and even, to a 
certain extent, carrying on those traditions. This is not an attempt to position 
Irigaray as a conservative thinker, rather it is an attempt to position her within a 
recognised philosophical tradition in such a way that it revolutionises and rescues 
that tradition. 
Irigaray's project is not as firmly based on a theory of modernity as Benjamin's, 
so some justification is required for this if this pairing is to be convincing. I will 
be using an argument that suggests that the kind of radical thinking of sexual 
difference conducted by Irigaray takes place in relation to modernity's 
understanding of itself as founded on a break 14 .I will be extending this argument 
to show how Irigaray's thinking of sexual difference is not only revolutionary but 
also suggests the kind of revolutionary change in time called for by Agamben. 
Adriana Cavarero paraphrases a dominant theme of Irigaray's thinking when she 
states that the 'modem system of power ignores female sexual difference by 
absorbing it into an abstract paradigm of the individual, which is understood as 
male and universal. ' 15 In order to arrive at this conclusion she starts from the 
13 Ibid.. p. 23. 
14 This argument must be attributed to Adriana Cavarero, and is laid out in her 'Equality and 
Sexual Difference: Amnesia in Political Thought', in Beyond Equality and Difference: 
OiLenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity, G. Bock & S. James (eds. ), London, 
Routledge, 1991, pp. 32-47. 
" Cavarero, 'Equality and Sexual Difference', p. 32. 
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position of treating modernity as conceiving itself as the result of a break, and 
asks 'what was "before" modemity? ' 16 This question is the start of an 
investigation of the invisibility of sexual difference in political theory. If the 
female is ignored by the modem system of power, perhaps things were different 
before modemity. Cavarero suggests that things were in some respects different 
in political theory, but much the same in others. 
She takes Aristotle's political writings to be the theoretical touchstone for the 
majority of ancient and pre-modem political theorists. While there were 
obviously a multitude of different interpretations and formulations at work, she 
highlights two characteristics that bear on the question of sexual difference. 
These are that Aristotle's political theory alleged that there are hierarchical 
differences between individuals, and that there is a distinction to be made 
between the public politics of eudaimonic flourishing (politika) and the bodily 
survival needs of the private household (oikonomika). Cavarero argues that 
Aristotle's conception of the political sphere was based on the 'maximum 
realisation of the male essence', and that the female was confined to the domestic 
sphere and designated as 'dependant on the adult male' 17 . 
If this is what was 'before' modemity, then the theoretical and logical structure of 
modernity, or the modem state, can be said to be founded on a rejection of this 
model. Indeed this is true in terms of the political sphere. The assumed 
hierarchical differences between individuals are rejected in favour of a theory in 
16 lbid, p. 32. 
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which a state of nature is assumed. This model also confers an absolute equality 
between individuals. However it is not true in terms of the domestic sphere. 
Cavarero claims that the distinction between politika and oikonomika remains 
relatively unchallenged, even into the modem era. While there have been radical 
changes in theories relating to the political sphere, and there has been a great deal 
of discussion of repression within the domestic sphere, Cavarero argues that there 
is still a repression of the domestic sphere itself. The radical rethinking that takes 
place in thinkers such as Cavarero and Irigaray will also upset this distinction: to 
refigure the political space and time in such a way as to include the aspects of the 
'domestic' that have traditionally been considered as 'female' or 'feminine'. 
In an examination of the status of women in the literature of modernity Janet 
Wolff has argued that the distinction between the public and the private has 
become more marked in modernity'8. Along with an increasing separation, she 
also discovers increased confinement of women to the private. Wolff discovers 
that in both the poetic and sociological literature of modernity women tend to be 
invisible, or given marginal roles. Taking the model of the experience of 
modernity as Baudelaire's ephemeral, transient, and fugitive, (as given above), 
Wolff suggests that this is the experience of the, exclusively male, fldneur. She 
describes the fldneur as the hero of modernity who, as male, is free to move in 
the crowd. She contrasts this celebration of the public freedom of the male 
, 
fldneur in the literature of modernity with the ever more marginalised 
" Ibid., p. '34. 
18 Janet Wolff, 'The Invisible Fldneuse: Women and the Literature of Modernity', in Andrew 
Benjamin (ed. ), The Problems (? f Modernity: Adorno and Benjamin, London, Routledge, 1991. 
representations of women. Wolff suggests that women either remain invisible 
because they are confined to the private sphere, or else they appear as marginal 
figures such as 'the prostitute, the widow, the old lady, the lesbian, the murder 
victim, and the passing unknown woman. "9 This trend can also be seen in 
Benjamin's own theory of modernity, where the most frequently used female 
figures are, the predictably marginalised, prostitutes. 
These marginal figures, however, are never given equal status or the same value 
as the (male) writer. They are always the 'subjects of his gaze'. 20 Wolff argues 
that this is as much the case in the sociology as well as the poetry of modernity, 
because the growth of the discipline of sociology itself can be related to the 
increasing separation of public and private in modernity. Due to the industrial 
nature of western societies the separation of work from home increased, but 
Wolff suggests that the gendered consequences of this social change is, to some 
extent, exaggerated by (male) sociologists. She argues that there are many models 
of women who are visible and active in the public arena of modernity. What is 
lacking is a proper analysis of their experience of modernity. Wolff argues that 
the women who were active and publicly visible had different roles. Middle class 
women were primarily given the role of consumers and became 'public signs of 
their husbands' wealth' . 
21 Their experience of modernity therefore differed from 
that of the flineur . While his was one of fleeting encounters and detached, 
Janet Wolff. 'The Invisible Flineuse', p. 148. 
20 Ibid., p. 149. 
21 Ibid., p. 1533. 
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purposeless strolling, hers was one of consumption and the public display of 
wealth. 
It is in the political theory of modernity that Cavarero also finds the exaggeration 
of the public/private distinction. However, there would appear to be some hope 
for the political status of women in the modem rejection of hierarchical 
differences between individuals. Cavarero suggests that, even though there is an 
introduction of a conception of absolute equality through ar state of nature' 
theory, the equality does not, in practice, extend to sexual difference. She states 
that 'the minds of modem political thinkers are marked by a powerful repression 
of female sexual difference' and that this is part of what she defines as 'a 
syndrome of "universalization of masculinity" which manifests itself on at least 
two levels'. 
22 
The first of these is described by Cavarero as 'the way that modem political 
theoreticians simply fail to see women'. 23 This gender blindness is a theme that 
we will see repeated in Irigaray's work also. The second manifestation of the 
C universalisation of masculinity' Cavarero describes as the generalisation of the 
male into a neutral or universal being'. 24 In other words, although modem 
political theory has attempted to theorise notions of universal equality based on 
the model of a universal subject, the model - and as a result, this universal 
subject - is, in fact, one that privileges the male subject. The neutral and , 
22 Cavarero, 'Equality and Sexual Difference', p. 36. 
23 Ibid., p. 36. 
Ibid., p. 36. 
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universal being turns out to be a male neuter and universal 'man', not human. 
This kind of universalisation will also be a theme that we will see repeated in 
Irigaray's work. While the universalisation of masculinity can be attributed the 
best of intentions, in that, it is at least in part an attempt to create equality 
between all humans, it actually ends in what Cavarero calls a 'homologising, 
assimilating inclusion 25 which denies women the possibility to become full 
subjects in their own right. 
Cavarero, suggests that this homologisation is a repression that is not an exclusion 
- that there is no conscious attempt to exclude women from the universality of 
subjecthood. However, this homologisation, is not described in tenns of a 
misguided generosity either, Cavarero is careful to point out that the repression 
that occurs is still an 'extremely potent form of power', because it acts to strip 
women of any position from which to project their own subjectivity as women. 
While I agree with Cavarero's analysis of the homologising, assimiliation within 
modernity, I will be arguing, in relation to Irigaray's engagement with the forms 
of power at work in the repression of women, that there is also an exclusionary 
logic at work both within the homologisation and theoretical and cultural 
invisibility of women. While it may seem paradoxical to suggest an exclusionary 
homologisation, what I mean by this is that what is excluded is any form of value 
for women, the female, or the feminine. Homologisation is repressive because in 
ignoring sexual difference in favour of a male neuter, it excludes any value for 
the female/feminine. This exclusion from being valued also reflects back on the 
-' " Ibid., p. 37. 
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exclusion of any appropriate evaluation of the female/feminine, which would go 
some way to explaining the theoretical invisibility of women within modernity. 
As Cavarero herself, puts it, this homologisation creates and 'inferiorising 
condition of human existence' for women. 26 1 will be arguing that part of 
Irigaray's revolutionary strategy is to instigate an inclusionary logic that 
recognises sexual difference. This inclusionary strategy will attempt to avoid the 
problems of homologisation through a spirit of generosity that would make room 
for a proper value and evaluation to be given to all. 
I will be examining Irigaray's strategy of non-homologising inclusion in terms of 
revolution because I understand it as more than an attempt to liberate women 
from the repression of either exclusion or homologisation. Irigaray, by calling for 
a cultural shift radical enough to bring about a publicly visible, theoretical and 
symbolic capacity for the female subject to speak a language proper to herself, as 
well as theorise appropriate rights, protections and values, is undoubtedly 
embarking on a revolutionary programme. It will also be part of the task of this 
thesis however, to explore the repercussions for the concepts 'revolution' and 
ý programme' because they will also be affected by the radical change demanded. 
I will be following thinkers such as Cavarero in this interpretation by maintaining 
that a proper thinking of sexual difference is necessary in order to bring about a 
truly inclusive society and culture, and that this thinking of sexual difference 
cannot be introduced by simply making alterations or revisions to the existing 
model of society or politics. What is needed is radical rethinking of the basic 
logic of the model. I would go further than Cavarero, however, in arguing that 
26 Ibid.. p. 37. 
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this radical rethinking - this revolution - will also take into account the 
temporality enshrined in the politics of modernity. 
The Philosophy of History in Hegel and Nietzsche 
In order to show how Benjamin's and Irigaray's theories relate to modernity, and 
its variant philosophies of history, I will be reading them in relation to two 
versions of the philosophy of history - those of Hegel and Nietzsche. This will be 
a twofold gesture, that as well as investigating their readings of the philosophy of 
history, will also take account of their position within a modem tradition of 
philosophy. This is not to suggest that Hegel and Nietzsche represent the whole 
range of philosophies of history available in modernity, rather they will be taken 
as two, differing, and opposing, positions in the philosophy of history as well as 
two representative examples of outstanding thinkers of modernity. I will not be 
presuming to provide an exhaustive reading of either of these thinkers on history,, 
both of their theories are open to multiple interpretations which would provide 
subject matter for at least two other theses. Instead I will be taking what I 
consider to be fairly representative, and uncontroversial reading of both Hegel's 
and Nietzsche's philosophies of history, in order to show how both Benjamin and 
Irigaray relate to these positions. 
The reason for relating Benjamin and Irigaray to these thinkers is also to try and 
show how they relate to, at least part of, the history of philosophy or the 
16 
philosophical tradition. This question of tradition is another important element 
for both thinkers. Benjamin is concerned with trying to understand modernityýs 
relationship to tradition, whether it is a rejection of tradition, or a carrying on and 
over of tradition in a different, or perhaps similar form. For frigaray, the question 
is how tradition, and the philosophical tradition in particular, has treated the 
question of sexual difference. 
Benjamin and Irigaray will also be shown to be deeply engaged with both Hegel 
and Nietzsche in their respective attempts to 'change time'. In both cases there 
are areas where they can be seen to diverge strongly from both Hegel and 
Nietzsche as well as others where they can be seen to be indebted to the 
theoretical groundwork laid down by them. It will be useful therefore to outline 
Hegel's and Nietzsche's philosophies of history. 
I will be taking Hegel's philosophy of history as paradigmatic of Philosophical 
models of history and time in modernity. In the later considerations of 
Benjamin's and Irigaray's relations to Hegel I will not be engaging primarily with 
his lectures on the Philosophy of History. The detail of the argument in the later 
chapters will be more concerned with the nature of the dialectic and the thinking 
of time that can be extrapolated from this. In the later chapters I will be more 
concerned with the dialectic as elaborated in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 
However, in order to be able to contextualise the more general statements I will 
be making about Hegel's philosophy of history in the later chapters, I will briefly 
outline what I take to be a summary of the main points of Hegel's philosophy of 
history. 
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Hegel's philosophy of history can be taken as paradigmatically modem in that it 
is an attempt to look for a pattern, order, or meaning in history. Moreover it is an 
attempt to attribute such a pattern or meaning to the workings of reason. The 
philosophy of history is, for Hegel, nothing more than the application of reason to 
world history. As he states in his introduction to The Philosophy ofHistory: 
The only thought which philosophy brings with it, in regard to history, is 
the simple thought of Reason-the thought that Reason rules the world, 
27 
and that world history has therefore been rational in its course . 
For Hegel, history is a narrative of development. In a similar way that the 
Phenomenology of Spirit can be read as the story of the development of the 
consciousness of an individual to complete self-consciousness or absolute 
knowledge, the Philosophy ofHistory can be read as the story of the development 
of the consciousness of freedom in history. What will be important throughout 
this thesis is the teleological structure of this development in Hegel's theory. For, 
Hegel, history has a very specific final goal; 'Spirit's consciousness of its 
freedom, and hence the actualisation of that very freedom. ' 28 
27 G. W. F. Hegel, Infroduclion lo The Philosophy offfistory, trans. Leo Rauch, Indianapolis, 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1988, p. 12. Many Hegel scholars find the reliability of this text 
questionable as is it based on the lecture notes of some of Hegel's students rather than confirmed 
writings of Hegel himself. However I will be treating it as reliable enough to provide the required 
outline for his philosophy of history. 
19 Ibid., p. 222. 
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Even the study of history itself conforms to this model, for Hegel. He 
distinguishes between three methods of dealing with history: Original history. 
Reflective history, and Philosophic hiStory. 
29 These methods also follow 
chronologically. The first, Original history, is described as a sort of eyewitness 
account of history in which 'historians primarily describe the actions, events, and 
situations they themselves have witnessed, and whose spirit they shared in. ' 30 
This is the most primitive form of historical writing for Hegel because it assumes 
no differentiation between the historian and the past. This is the idea of history as 
pure description. With the next method, Reflective history, the relation between 
the present and the past; between the knowing subject and the object known is 
interrogated. This is the view of history which acknowledges the theoretical 
implications of the world becoming 'present to the mind through the mind's own 
activity. ' 31 In other words at this stage it has become apparent that there can be 
no historical knowledge that is not a form of interpretation. This moment of 
history recognises the limitations of the historian's context and the practical 
problems of having to evaluate and order historical material. 
Philosophic history is what brings the thought of the rationality of history with it. 
Hegel's dialectic brings the past and the present together as different parts of the 
same,, unfolding totality. The opposition of the positivity of original history and 
the interpretation of reflective history is also resolved in this thinking of history 
which brings explanation and understanding, immanence and transcendence, and 
") Ibid., p. 3. 
30 Ibid., p. 3. 
-- I Ibid., p. 7. 
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fact and value under one roof Philosophic history does not only deal with the 
facts of history it is also 'the application of philosophic thought to history' 32. This 
is proper philosophy of history, not mere methodology of historiography. 
Philosophic history is where the real becomes the rational in history because of 
the speculative nature of philosophy. The historically concrete coincides with the 
speculation of the dialectical philosopher when 'he is dealing with history as a 
raw material, not to be left as it is, but to be construed according to thoughts a 
priori. ' 
33 
The progression in the teleological development of the methods of history is also 
reflected in Hegel's substantive philosophy of history itself. It is the absolute 
commitment to progress in his model of history that will be of primary relevance 
to the discussions of Hegel throughout this thesis. The development of the 
consciousness of freedom is necessarily progressive for Hegel. 'World history is 
the progress in the consciousness of freedom-a progress that we must come to 
know in its necessity. ' 34 Hegel attempts to show how this progress has actually 
taken place through four different world views that he identifies in world history. 
The first of these he identifies as the 'Oriental World' in which the only freedom 
is that of the ruler who is 'also a high priest or God himself 35 . Spirit's 
consciousness of freedom is very obviously limited in this case. In the next 
moment, which he identifies as the 'Greek world% this consciousness of freedom 
32 Ibid., p. 10. 
13 Ibid., p. 10. 
34 Ibid., p. 22. 
35 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy ofRight, trans. T. M. Knox, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1967, p. 220. 
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is extended as 'the principle of personal individuality arises'. The 'Roman world' 
again increases the consciousness of freedom as personal individuality is taken to 
the extreme. It is in the 'Roman world' that Hegel diagnoses the greatest split 
between the public and the private. Hegel describes abstract universality and 
private self-consciousness coming together again in Spirit's final manifestation of 
its consciousness of freedom, in which that freedom is truly realised: the 
'Germanic World'. Here is Hegel's controversial 'end of history' in which 
heaven and earth come together in the 'true reconciliation which discloses the 
state as the image and actuality of reason'. 36 
In any discussion of the philosophy of history there is an ambiguity that must be 
attended to so that we do not become confused by the use of the word 'history' 
itself 'History' can be taken to mean either the phenomenon of the past course of 
human events - res gestae - or the representation of those events by the writers 
of 'history' - historiam rerum gestarum. While it is impossible to divorce one 
aspect of this ambiguity from the other in any analysis of history, we will be more 
concerned with res gestae in this thesis - 'History' with a capital 'H'. However 
Hegel confuses this distinction when he points out that the German term for 
36 G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, p. 222. At this stage I am merely setting out what I take to 
be the most straightforward reading of Hegel's Philosophy of History and Philosophy of Right. 
There are of course many different readings about the force and status of Hegel's 'end of history' 
thesis. These range from Francis Fukuyama's triumphalist reduction in his The End of History and 
the Last Man, Harrnondsworth, Penguin, 1992, to Lutz Niethammer's, sober survey of the 
question in Posthistoire: Has History Come to an End?, trans. Patrick Camiller, Verso, London, 
1992. See also Peter Osbome, The Politics of Time: Modernity and Avant-Garde, London, Verso, 
1995, pp. 36-44 for an analysis of both of these responses. 
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'history' (Geschichte) 'is derived from the verb 'to happen' (geschehen) 37 . He 
argues that it then combines both the objective and subjective; the res gestae and 
their narration, historiam rerum gestarum, and that 'We must therefore say that 
the narration of history is born at the same time as the first actions and events that 
38 
are properly historical'. This refusal to fully divorce the events of history and its 
ontology from the narratives in which these events are represented is a useful 
thought to bear in mind when we venture down the more abstract paths of 
investigations into the nature of time at work in history. For Hegel history could 
be viewed as a 'gallery of images 39 , and what gives these images their shape is 
the 'muse of memory (Mnemosyne) 00 . The shapes of history, as moments in the 
teleological progress of Spirit's consciousness of freedom, depend on memory to 
give them form. 
On the other hand, I will be taking Nietzsche's critique of this type of Hegelian 
philosophising, and its variant philosophies of history, as influential in 
Benjamin's and Irigaray's different attempts to allow for difference to emerge 
from and in history. Nietzsche will be taken as the first to theorise the attempt to 
efface the dislocation of modernity that is so central to Benjamin's theory. He 
will also be taken to be influential in Irigaray's criticism's of modernity's 
constructions of the subject, and subject-centred reason. 
37 G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to The Philosophy ofHistory, p. 64. 
1 Ibid., p. 64. 
G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, trans. AN. Miller, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1977. - 
492. 
40 G. W. F. Hegel, Introduction to The Philosophy offfistory. p. 64. 
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Nietzsche's early essay 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life'(1 874) is 
far removed from the Hegelian project of finding a pattern, order or meaning in 
history. It does not set out any guide to a comprehensive understanding of history 
in order to clear up any ambiguities by proposing both a proper means of 
representation as well as a triumphant ontology. It is instead a disturbing 
challenge to the many variations of history. It is an attempt to transgress history 
and philosophies of history such as Hegel's. 
In this essay Nietzsche's polemic is aimed primarily at the condition of German 
culture at the time. His more specific targets are Eduard von Hartmann who can 
be taken as a representative of, what Nietzsche would consider to be, the sterile 
and cynical results of Hegelianism and its absolute historicism. In this text which 
announces the uselessness of a substantive philosophy of history, Nietzsche even 
reflects Hegel's own text on the Philosophy of History. Where Hegel has 
presented us with three methods of dealing with history; 'Original history', 
'Reflective history', and 'Philosophic History 941 , Nietzsche 
distinguishes 
between 'a monumental, an antiquarian, and a critical kind of history'. 42 
What is important for Nietzsche is that these three types of history all correspond 
to the life of human individuals. Monumental history 'pertains to the living 
41 Ibid., p. 3. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life', in Unfashionable 
Obsen, ations, trans. Richard T. Gray, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 96. 
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persoW... 'as one who acts and strives 43 because this kind of history celebrates 
the acts of great individuals. Antiquarian history pertains to life 'as one who 
preserves and venerates'44 because this kind of history 'looks back with loyalty 
and love on the origins through which he became what he is'. 45 Critical history - 
which will be our main concern here - relates to life and to the human being "as 
one who suffers and is in need of liberation' 46 . It is in this last type of history that 
we can discern the seeds of Benjamin's reading of history as well as Irigaray's 
historical stance. Nietzsche claims that critical history enhances life, because 'in 
order to live, [the human being] must possess, and from time to time employ, the 
strength to shatter and dissolve a past... '. 47 
Nietzsche's emphasis on life is at the same time a denial of Hegel's assumption 
that 'reason rules the world'. Even though Hegel took 'life' to denote the 
dynamic, concrete, organic, and dialectical, it remained for him, a teleological 
-- 48 and imperfect mode of spint. For Nietzsche, on the other hand, the only guiding 
principle of human existence should be life itself. (Although it is, more 
accurately, an anti-authoritarian an-archia. ) In this early essay on history (1874) 
we find in embryonic form the first presentation of many of the major themes of 
his later work. His insistence that 'life and life alone, that dark, driving, insatiable 
43 Ibid., p. 96. 
44 Ibid., p. 96. 
45 Ibid., p. 102. 
46 Ibid., p. 96. 
47 Ibid., p. 106. 
See, Hegel, Phenomenoloiýv ofSpirit, especialiv the beginning of the chapter on Self- 
Consciousness, pp. 104-111. 
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power that lusts after itself 49 is all that can sit in judgement on history. will later 
be extrapolated into his theory of the 'will to power'. The invigorating power of 
the great individual in monumental history can be seen as the germinating seed of 
his theory of the Ubermensch. The treatment of the Pythagorean belief 'that when 
an identical constellation of the heavenly bodies occurs, identical events - down 
to individual minute details - must repeat themselves on the earth as well )50 
signals the emergence of his thinking of eternal recurrence. 
Life defies reason for Nietzsche; the real does not identify with, or even 
reciprocate, the rational. However this is not an outright rejection of knowledge 
and the rational, it is a warning to consider the life enhancing and life 
diminishing aspects of knowledge and reason. Nietzsche insists that life requires 
the service of history, and can be hanned by an excess of it. Because the 
judgement of life is 'merciless, always unjust, because it has never flowed from 
the pure fountain of knowledge"' it refuses the teleological structure of absolute 
historicism. Life is not a final goal it is the ever present judge of the usefulness of 
knowledge in the here and now. Nietzsche's materialism is counterposed to 
Hegel's idealism when he states that 'knowledge that destroyed life would 
simultaneously destroy itself Knowledge presupposes life; hence it has the same 
interest in the preservation of life that every creature has in its own continued 
Nietzsche, 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life', p. 106. 
50 Ibid., p. 99. 
51 Ibid., p. 106. 
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existence'. 52 This materialist critique will also be seen to be influential in 
Irigaray's engagement with philosophy and philosophers. 
If Nietzsche's radical Lebensphilosophie is considered in conjunction with his 
unchecked criticism of German culture, we can only conclude that he is also 
rejecting the necessary progress assumed in Hegelian historicism. Rather than the 
optimistic faith Hegel theorised as the necessary progression of Spirit's 
consciousness of freedom, Nietzsche paints a picture of a moribund and decadent 
culture. He suggests that this state of affairs has come about through the very 
excess of history of the Hegelian theory which has 'allowed the Gennans to grow 
accustomed to speaking of the "world process" and justify their own age as the 
necessary result of this world process. ' 53 Nietzsche laments the fact that this has 
become a faith; a 'religion of historical power'. 54 This dogma refuses critical 
thought in favour of 'that admiration for the "power of history" that in almost 
every moment reverts to naked admiration of success and leads to the idolatry of 
the factual -) . 
55 
What is of primary significance in Nietzsche's criticism of this kind of 
triumphant historicism is his diagnosis of the dangers lurking in its refusal to 
think difference. His affirmation of life is also a championing of heterogeneity 
i ') Ibid., p. 164. 
53 Ibid., p. 143. 
54 Ibid., p. 144. 
55 Ibid., p. 143. 
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and difference against the totalisation of dialectical closure. 56 1 will be arguing 
that both Benjamin and I ference, in their -rigaray are exemplary thinkers of 
dif 
own ng , and as readers of Nietzsche. Benjamin's notion of 'brushing history 
against the grain' can be taken as part of a critique of the 'naked admiration of 
success'. Irigaray's concentration on sexual difference in the cultural omissions 
of history and philosophy's gender amnesia, will be read as her own version of 
brushing history against the grain. 
The cure for what Nietzsche calls, this 'historical sickness' 57 is to come through 
the rejuvinating forces of the 'ahistorical', and the 'suprahistorical'. The 
'ahistorical' designates 'the power to be able to forget and to enclose oneself 
within a limited horizon', and this contrasts with Hegel's description of history as 
a gallery of images inspired by Mnemosyne. We can also see the embryonic form 
of Nietzsche's perspectivism at work here. It is this active forgetting that allows 
us to draw these limited horizons, therefore enabling us to create distinctive 
idenitities. Such limited horizons would free us from the weight of history and 
from the status of mere epigones. This perpectivism is again to be contrasted with 
the universalism and totality of Hegelian historicism. Nietzsche likens the 
ahistorical to an enviable, bovine existence, 'tethered... to the stake of the 
56 It is important to note here that it is not totalisation itself that is the problem, but the way in 
which it operates. As Peter Osborne states in The Politics of Time, London, Verso, 1995, 'The 
problem with Hegelianism derives not from totalization as such, but from its specific mode: the 
combination of the positing of an immanent narrative end to history with the claim to absolute 
knowledge. ' (p. x) In his book Osborne provides a convincing argument for a different mode of 
historical totalisation through a reading of Heidegger and Ricoeur. However throughout this thesis 
ýtotalisation' xvill refer to the Hegelian model, and therefore as something to be challenged. 
57 Nietzsche, 'On the Utility and Liability of History for Life', p. 163. 
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moment' 58 in which only the present is known. Ahistorical forgetting is a means 
of concentrating on 'genuine needs' which, for Nietzsche, are the needs of an 
authentic culture, as opposed to 'cultivated' needs. 59 
The 'Suprahistorical' provides a much different remedy, being 'those powers that 
divert one's gaze from what is in the process of becoming to what lends existence 
the character of something eternal and stable in meaning'. 60 For the 
suprahistorical teleology is redundant, because 'the world is complete and has 
arrived at its culmination in every individual moment. ' The suprahistorical 
individual has no need for a Hegelian religion of history which seeks 'salvation 
in a process' 61 Again the emphasis is on the moment rather than the totality of the 
process of history. The living, present moment must take priority over knowledge 
of the dead past. 
However, Nietzsche should not be interpreted as rejecting history altogether, 
merely its excessive abuses. He was clear that 'life requires the service of 
history' 62 , so long as we remember that history should provide a service to the 
enhancement of life, rather than vice versa. Indeed there is a certain amount of 
historicism at work in Nietzsche's writing, if we take historicism to mean a 
recognition of the role played by the historical situation in which an individual or 
culture is situated. Nietzsche's later attention to historicity is played out in terms 
58 Ibid., p. 87. 
59 Ibid., pp. 163-167. 
60 Ibid, p. 163. 
61 Ibid, p. 94. 
62 Ibid., p. 96. 
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of genealogy. Indeed Nietzsche also advocated 'historical philosophising' as a 
remedy to the 'lack of historical sense' of the philosophers who he accuses of 
63 
mummifying knowledge 'when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeterni' . 
Historical philosophising is more concerned with becoming than being and this 
would also suggest some agreement with Hegel. Hegel's inversion of Plato not 
only brought history, but metaphysics also, to an end by substituting becoming 
for being. Nietzsche obviously rejects Hegel's notion of world history as a 
process culminating in the Prussian state, but he does carry on the radical 
historicizing initiated by it. 64 
Models of Revolution 
The necessity of historical philosophising is of central concern to Benjamin and 
Irigaray. I will be exploring their different methods and outcomes in relation to 
the different historicisms and ahistoricisms of Hegel and Nietzsche. The contrasts 
and comparisons will be made in order to try and set out the different 
temporalities at work in the various theories. While I have not gone into the 
temporalities of history at work in Hegel and Nietzsche above, I will be 
elaborating on these and exploring the consequences for Hegel's narrative of 
continuity and Nietzsche's insistence on the moment. 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the ldoLv, trans, R. J. Hollingdale, London, Penguin, 1968, p. 35. 
Although he tends to attribute the thinking of becoming more to Heraclitus. See, for example 
Twilight of the Idols, p. 3 6. 
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The explorations of temporalities of history will be conducted as part of an 
investigation into the idea of revolution. I will be considering revolution as a 
radical change in culture rather than a merely rebellious, political challenge to the 
status quo. While revolution is often thought of as the violent overthrow of a 
government, I will be paying attention to its status as bringing about change, 
including the possibilities of the non-violent inclusion of difference. Because of 
the radical nature of this change, revolution presents us with what Hannah Arendt 
has termed 'the problem of beginning' 65 . However, rather than concerning myself 
with the overtly political problem of beginning, I will be looking at the 
philosophical problems surrounding the relationship between revolution and 
history. 66 1 take the link between revolution and history as necessitated by the 
special place given to revolution within history. By this I mean that revolution 
can be considered as an historical event that contributes more to the shape and 
understanding of history than most. Revolution can variously be thought of as a 
turning point in history, a particular stage in the continuous development of 
history, or an interruption of history. It is the latter, interruptive interpretation of 
revolution that I will be most concerned with here, as this is the interpretation 
most closely associated with Benjamin. 
What will bring Benjamin's thinking of interruption as revolution together with 
Irigaray's call for radical cultural change, is the timing of revolution at work in 
these thinkers. Having stated that revolution is accorded a special place in 
65 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, London, Penguin, 1990, p. 2 1. 
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history, it is necessary to add, following Agamben, that it must also be given a 
special time. If Benjamin's and Irigaray's conceptions of revolution are to be 
regarded as genuine, according to Agamben's criteria, they must also be able to 
theorise the change in time implicit in revolution. I will be arguing that Benjamin 
and Irigaray both successfully theorise the change in time requisite for revolution. 
They will be shown to offer multiple models of the temporality of history and 
revolution. 
In many cases these models will take the form of various art fon-ns. Even in this 
introduction we have come across Hegel's view of history as a gallery of images. 
In the chapters that follow we will become acquainted with Benjamin's thinking 
of historical time as narrative, tragedy, and image, as well as the recurrent themes 
in both Benjamin and Irigaray of the rhythmic and musical nature of historical 
time. 
"" For a comprehensive account of revolution as a political concept involving the overthrow of 
goverriments by physical force see, Peter Calvert*s, Revolution, London, Macmillan, 1970. Also 
see Arendt, On Revolution. 
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Part 1 
Benjamin 
. 1901ý 
Chapter 1 
Benjamin's Revolutionary Philosophy of History. 
ý90ý 
What is at issue is the violent rhythm of impatience in which the law 
exists and has its temporal order as, opposed to the good (? ) rhythm of 
expectation in which messianic events unfold. ' 
In this chapter I will be undertaking a reading of some of Benjamin's texts in 
order to support my claim that he can be read as a revolutionary thinker. I will 
begin with an analysis of the 1921 text 'Critique of Violence' as an example of 
Benjamin's revolutionary, political agenda. This reading will also introduce 
elements of messianism in Benjamin's thinking. The seeond half of the ehapter 
will begin to elaborate the alternative temporalities of revolution and history that 
can be found in some of Benjamin's later writings. Rather than emphasising the 
differences in these two phases, I will be stressing the development and 
continuity of Benjamin's thinking by suggesting that the later messianic 
temporalities of revolution are closely related to the theory of 'divine violence' 
attributed to the 'Critique of Violence'. 
'Critique of Violence' is, perhaps, Benjamin's most overtly revolutionary text; it 
can be read, primarily as a response to George Sorel's Reflections on Violence 
which was published in 1908. Benjamin uses Sorel's text in order to attempt to 
provide a metaphysical basis for revolutionary violence. The essay moves from 
an analysis of how law arises as an original agreement between two parties in 
' Walter Benjamin, 'The Right to Use Force', in Selected Writings, Volume 1: 1913-1926, ed. 
Marcus Bullock & Michael W. Jennings, London, Belknap Press, 1996, p 23 1. The question mark 
is Benjamin's. 
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violent conflict, through a further analysis of how the law is maintained, and 
concludes with a study of a violence that would be outside the law altogether -a 
revolutionary violence. At this stage in his work, Benjamin's conception of 
revolution is at its most radical. A genuine revolution would be one in which a 
radical break would eliminate the possibility of any complicity with the present 
regime. 
This problematic of complicity with state, or law-preserving, violence is a central 
focus of the 'Critique of Violence' essay. In this essay the general proletarian 
strike is given as a paradigmatic example of revolutionary action. This is seen as 
non-complicitous because, in Benjamin's terms, it is pure and unmediated, which 
means it is not instrumental; it is not oriented to any posited goal. In this essay 
we are presented with a kind of thinking which would consider any positive 
programme or positing as always already complicitous. Pure, unmediated 
violence, which is revolutionary violence, is described in tenns of suspension and 
destruction. Revolution is not the result of a planned take-over of one section of 
society by another, instead it is the way this cycle of taking over and transferring 
power from one group to another through foundational violence is broken. 
Benjamin states that revolution, which he terms here as 6a new historical epoch', 
will only come about through 'the suspension of law with all the forces on which 
it depends as they depend on it, finally therefore on the abolition of state power'. 2 
2 Benjamin, 'Critique of Violence. in One Way Street and Other Writings, trans. Edmund 
Jephcott and Kingsley Shorter, London, Verso, 1979, p. 153. 
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This lack of complicity is formulated by Benjamin using overtly theological 
language. It is described as divine violence and structured like a messianic 
intervention. Only the Messiah can remain transcendent or exterior enough to 
avoid complicity with worldy, or state violence. However, as we shall see, in the 
later thinking of the theses 'On the Concept of History', the 'historical 
materialist' is given access to this exteriority through a 'weak Messianic power' 3 
which will mean she/he can also at least weakly avoid complicity. This claim to 
avoid complicity is also described as a turning away from the world in thesis X. 
But what is being turned away from is the world that believes in the inexorable 
advance of history as teleological progress. The transcendent step outside is the 
movement outside 'accustomed thinking'. The exteriority of a non-complicitous 
Messiah can also provide the critical impetus and apparatus to conceive of 
history and temporality ultra-radically and ultra-alternatively. This will be what 
makes room for the interruption of radical alterity as revolution. 
Benjamin's revolution is to be pure, uncomplicitous and unmediated, and it 
seems that only this theological framework would give it access to adequate 
exteriority, in order to avoid the pitfalls of teleology and instrumental reason. The 
problem of complicity leads Benjamin to set out a theory of pure violence. While 
the demand for purity is always a dangerous condition to impose, this is, for 
Beqjamin, a purity of political means. Pure means are not means to ends which 
would be situated outside the immediate context in which they are being 
Beiliarnin, Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn, London, Fontana, 1992, p 246. The title of the 
theses is translated as 'Theses on the Philosophy of History' in this edition, however I shall use 
deployed. Benjamin describes the problem in terms of law-making and law- 
preserving violence. 'All violence as a means is either law-making or law- 
preserving. 0 Law-making violence is like a liberating violence and is pure 
because it is not directed towards a goal whereas law-preserving violence is 
repressive because it has a purpose; it has as its telos the maintenance of what 
already exists and can only maintain this by the violent denial of any other law- 
making violence. 
What is revolutionary about Benjamin's text is that it is not merely an attempt to 
theorise the replacement of one type of violence with another, it is an attempt to 
inaugurate another history through a thinking of pure violence that does not need 
to fall back onto the model of an impure, law-preserving violence. Rather than 
taking the route of an evolution or development of history, Benjamin is 
attempting to interrupt history, which he considers to be the history of the 
abjection of others. Werner Hamacher describes Benjamin's project in the 
'Critique of Violence' in terms of positing and deposing. For Hamacher 
The logic of inaugurating this other history is not the logic of positing and 
intrinsic alteration, and accordingly not a logic of substituting one violence 
with another, or one privileged class with a hitherto oppressed one. Rather, 
the title 'On the Concept of History' as a closer translation of Benjamin's 'Ober den Begriff der 
Geschichte'. 
Benjamin, 'Critique of Violence', in One Way Street, p. 142. 
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it is the logic - assuming one can still speak here of logic - of 'deposing' 
(Entsetzung). 5 
This Entsetzung which means deposing, suspension, or relief, is the pure violence 
which Benjamin is looking for. It is a violence which is not violent because in 
deposing or suspending it does not posit anything. It has no telos and is therefore 
a pure means without an end. The imposition or positing of law is a paradigmatic 
performative act. By saying what it does it does what it is saying. Hamacher, on 
the other hand, concludes that Benjamin's deposition or suspension will be 
imperfonnative or afformative. 'Pure violence does not posit, it 'deposes'; it is 
not performative, but afformative. ' 6 In other words pure violence says nothing, 
and by doing so it does nothing. It suspends the activity and violence of 
preservation without violently instigating a positive alternative. 
This afformativity is a useful way of thinking about the purity of revolutionary 
violence that Benjamin is trying to theorise. For Hamacher 'afformatives are not 
a subcategory of performatives. Rather, afformative, or pure, violence is a 
"condition" for any instrumental, performative violence and, at the same time, a 
condition which suspends its fulfilment in principle. ' 7 He even goes so far as to 
suggest that there is a thinking of the sublime at work in Benjamin's pure 
violence. To borrow a term of Benjamin's from his essay on Goethe's Elective 
Werner Hamacher, 'Afformative, Strike: Benjamin's "Critique of Violence"' in Andrew 
Benjmain and Peter Osborne (eds) Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience, 
London, Routledge, 1994, p. 115. 
6 Ibid., p 115. 
7 Ibid., p. 128. 
Affinities, which was being written at the same time, we could say that this pure 
violence, as an afformative, is doing the same work in politics and history as the 
4 expressionless' (das Ausdruck-slose) does in literature. 8 In that essay Benjamin 
used the notion of radical interruption as a key to a theory of criticism. The 
expressionless is what interrupts the movement and harmony of an art work. It is 
what shows the impossibility of the art work becoming a totality. There is a clear 
family resemblance between the thinking of the expressionless in the Elective 
Affinities essay and the notion of pure, or divine violence at work in the'Critique 
of violence'. Instead of an account of history which is to be interrupted by this 
pure violence, the expressionless is situated in an account of the literary or 
artistic absolute that is to be interrupted by this pure violence: 
The expressionless is the critical violence which, while unable to separate 
semblance from essence in art, prevents them from mingling. It possesses 
this violence as a moral dictum. In the expressionless, the sublime violence 
of the true appears as that which detennines the language of the real world 
according to the laws of the moral world. For it shatters whatever still 
survives as the legacy of chaos in all beautiful semblance: the false, errant 
totality-the absolute totality. 9 
8 'Goethe's Elective Affinities' was written between 1919 and 1922, 'Critique of Violence' was 
written in 192 1. 
9 Benjamin, 'Goethe's Elective Affinities', in Selected Writings, Vol. I., p 340. While I will 
primarily be engaging with the ontological aspects of the political and ethical thinking involved in 
Benjamin's texts, it will also be necessary to engage with his aesthetics at certain points. For more 
complete and sustained readings of Benjmin's aesthetics see Michael Jennings, Dialectical 
Images: Walter Benjamin's Theory of Literary Criticism, London, Cornell University Press, 
1987; Rainer Rochlitz, The Disenchantment ofArt, New York, Guildford, 1996; Richard Wolin, 
Walter Benjamin: AnAesthetic ofRedemption, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. 
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This thinking of the expressionless as a kind of critical cognate for political, pure 
violence will be helpful in the discussions of rhythm in chapters 6 and 7, because 
Benjamin also links the expressionless to H61derlin's theorisation of the caesura 
in tragedy as a 'counter rhythmic rupture'. ' 0 Indeed there is already a thinking of 
pure revolutionary violence as counter rhythmic rupture in one of the sketches 
Benjamin wrote before the published version of 'Critique of Violence'. He 
already makes the link between the rhythms of the law and the possibility of the 
different rhythms of a messianic interruption when he states that, 
What is at issue is the violent rhythm of impatience in which the law exists 
and has its temporal order, as opposed to the good (? ) rhythm of expectation 
in which messianic events unfold. " 
Afformativity, according to Hamacher, must also demand singularity. Only 
affonnativity can prove appropriate to the singularity of individual situations 
because absolute singularity suggests such a radical or complete difference from 
all other situations that it could only be articulated as difference. Peformativity, 
on the other hand, must ignore the singularity of a situation in order to validate it 
through the reiteration or repetition of conventions or nonns, even if these are 
subversive reiterations. 12 This singularity is not exclusive in the sense that it 
produces the exclusion or abjection attributed to performativity; the deposing 
'Goethe's Elective Affinities'. p. 340-1. 
Benjamin, 'The Right to Use Force', in Selected Writings, Vol. 1. p. 23 1. 
The question of subversive reiterations will become appropriate in chapter 4 below, when we 
begin to engage with Irigaray's mimetic strategy. 
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aspect of afformativity means that it is not an attempt to put anything in place and 
therefore will need no constitutive outside. 
Benjamin's uses the example of the proletarian general strike as a practical 
demonstration of pure revolutionary violence because this kind of strike is not an 
attempt to put anything in place, it is an attempt to put an end to state violence. 
'[T]he proletarian general strike sets itself the sole task of destroying state power. 
It 44nullifies all the ideological consequences of every possible social policy; its 
partisans see even the most popular reforms as bourgeois. " 13 What is 
affonnative about the proletarian general strike is that it is one 'in which nothing 
happens, no work is done, nothing is produced, and nothing is planned or 
projected. ' 14 As such, it cannot be subsumed under any instrumentality. If 
revolution is to be an affortnative event it would need to be a revolution which 
has no programme or goal other than destroying the present regime. 
However, if this pure violence or afformative suspension allows revolution to 
circumvent the problem of complicity, it raises another, and equally serious, 
problem, that of resignation. If to be truly revolutionary is to disengage from the 
present forms of violence and do nothing, then this could always be read by those 
who are not revolutionaries as resignation, quietism or defeatism. Proletarian 
general strikes are only successful if enough members of the proletariat do 
nothing; so revolution will only be successful if there is an overwhelming lack of 
action. If revolutionaries affonn then this will leave free reign for those who 
13 BeRjamin, *Critique of Violence', p. 145. 
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would consider revolution as damaging to their interests to perform defensive and 
repressive actions. The metaphysics of revolution might prove the justice of 
afformativity but it could still be pragmatically considered as ineffective and 
dangerously quiet. 
However, those pragmatic interests will always still be complicit with the old 
regime, if they are posited instrumentally. The logic of afformativity means that a 
new history must be created non-instrumentally. To be completely 
uncomplicitous with the old regime is also to break with its instrumental logic. 
For the afformative revolution, the goal is to have no goal, and in so doing, to 
annihilate all impositions of law. Performativity carries on the evolution, 
replacement and substitution of one or several laws (symbolic as well as 
jurisprudential), whereas afformativity brings an end to this evolutionary history 
and thereby inaugurates another, revolutionary history. 15 
14 Hamacher, 'Afformative, Strike', p. 120-1. 
" The question of performativity as a radical or revolutionary gesture can be linked to the work 
of Judith Butler who theorises performativity in terms of sex and gender in her books Gender 
Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion ofIdentity, London, Routledge, 1990; and Bodies that 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex", London, Routledge, 1993. Butler explores 
performativity as part of a wider exploration of sexual politics. It is partly her hope that her 
thinking of performativity might enable woman, women, gays and lesbians to construct legitimate, 
sexed and gendered identities. This can be aligned with a feminist argument which would suggest 
that to give up the logic of performativity, in favour of afformativity, one must first of all be in a 
position of legitimate and effective performance. Those who have traditionally been excluded 
from the practice and metaphysics of law-imposition, or violent performativity would seem to be 
at an advantage in that this would put them closer to a position of afformativity. As we shall see 
below this could be linked with Irigaray's thinking by noting that it could be argued that she 
constructs woman as the hidden principle, or condition for metaphysics, and that this might be 
analagous to thinking of afformativity as the condition for performativity. But the historical 
silencing of women cannot be interpreted as placing women in an advantageous revolutionary 
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Benjamin's pure, afformative violence, is indeed a version of nihilism in its 
nullification of the consequences of all social policy. If it is a pure violence 
which is not violent because it suspends and deposes all existing violence, then it 
could be described as a pure praxis. But it is the praxis of nothing. It does not 
seem as if we are yet in any position to decide on the truth or danger of 
afformativity. Hamacher suggests that the 'decision reached by pure, critical 
violence cannot be made by cognitive means. The decision eludes judgement. ' 16 
The contrast between performativity and afformativity in relation to revolution 
situates performativity as an evolutionary strategy rather than as a revolutionary 
one, whereas afformativity produces a formal concept of revolution as absolute 
interruption and new beginning. However, it is this almost pure formality of 
afformativity -a formality which is probably impossible to form - that leaves it 
somehow stranded. Its purity which allows it to be righteously free from the 
contamination of complicity also leaves it unable to come together with anything 
concrete. 
The nihilism of this pure violence, which is also in the suspending and doing 
nothing of the general proletarian strike, is also reflected in another text of this 
period. The 'Theologico-Political Fragment' of 1920-2 1. In this fragment 
position of afformativity. For a silence to be effective it must be the silence of something we have 
come to expect a noise from. If women are to afforin a revolution they must first be put into a 
position from which they can be heard and listened to. If women's performativity is to be 
suspended it must first be in an effective position to be suspended from. The effectivity of 
deposition will be greater from a stable and dominant position than from a minority and marginal 
one. 
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Woft 
Benjamin draws the distinction between the what he terms 'the order of the 
profane', and the 'Messianic"'. The messianic, as outside mundane history. 
means that 'the order of the profane cannot be built up on the idea of the Divine 
Kingdom'. However even though the messianic is extra-historical, it is also the 
completion and redemption of history. In other words there can be no redemption 
in history, only a redemption of history. This completion is not to be thought of 
as 'the telos of the historical dynamic' though, because while it is the end of 
history, it is not its goal. There is, however, something in history that can act as a 
model to direct history towards redemption. This is the idea of happiness. For 
Benjamin, 'The order of the profane should be erected on the idea of happiness', 
but the idea of happiness also turns out to be a nihilistic idea of happiness 
18 because 'For in happiness all that is earthly seeks its downfall' . 
Benjamin discovers parallels between this nihilistic, profane happiness and 
messianic redemption. Although he considers them to be acting in opposite 
directions he suggests that the profane idea of happiness can help to bring about 
the redemption of history. There is a correspondence between the two, and it is 
this notion of correspondence that will become important in trying to decipher 
the various images and tensions that Benjamin presents us with in his thinking of 
history, time and revolution: 
just as a force can, through acting, increase another that is acting in the 
opposite direction, so the order of the profane assists, through being 
16 Hamacher, 'Afformative, Strike', p. 126. 
" Benjamin, Theo logico-Political Fragment', in One Way Street and Other Writings, p. 155. 
' Ibid., p. 155. 
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profane, the coming of the Messianic Kingdom'9 
Sigrid Weigel identifies a theme of 'counter striving disposition' (gegenstrebige 
Rigung) at work here that runs through Benjamin's work, wherever he tries to 
construct thought-images about the nature of history 20 . These 
forces acting in 
opposition are both directed by the fading rhythm of impermanence. Even the 
messianic, it seems, is not the bringer of eternal truths or values, for Benjamin. 
As we shall see, Benjamin will always look for the space and time in which 
becoming and difference are allowed to open up the scene and play their part, 
rather than those times and places in which closure, fixity and eternal being 
dominate. He recognises that this may be diagnosed as political nihilism, but he 
suggests that, 
To the spiritual restitutio in integrum, which introduces immortality, 
corresponds a worldly restitution that leads to the eternity of downfall, 
and the rhythm of this eternally transient worldly existence, transient in its 
totality, in its spatial but also in its temporal totality, the rhythm of 
Messianic nature, is happiness. For nature is Messianic by reason of its 
eternal and total passing away. 
To strive after such passing, even for those stages of man that are 
nature, is the task of world politics, whose method must be called 
nihilism. 
21 
19 lbid- p. 155. 
20 Sigrid Weigel, Boa5, - and Image-Space: Re-reading Walter Benjamin, London, Routledge, 
1996, P. 54. 
" 'Theo logico-Pol itical Fragment', p. 156. 
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It is this image of the tension between the profane idea of happiness and 
messianic redemption, that continues through Benjamin's work. The tensions are 
constantly refigured in different images of historical time and messianic time. 
Osbome suggests a link between the different images of time at work in the 
'Theologico-Political Fragment' (192 1) and the theses 'On the Concept of 
History' (1940). He argues that Benjamin's analysis of Surrealism is able to 
reintroduce 'historical time into the conceptualisation of Surrealist experience'. 22 
According to Osborne, this takes place through Benjamin's constant attention to 
the 'everyday' and results, in what Benjamin describes as the 'trick' of 'the 
substitution of a political for a historical view of the past'. 23 It is this same 
substitution that Osborne sees taking place in both the 'Theologico-Political 
Fragment' and the theses 'On the Concept of History' and is necessary to the 
'refiguration of the everyday through interruption' 24 _ or revolution. 
In elaborating the historical and messianic temporalities germane to this 
revolution I will also provide ftu-ther links between the early writing of both the 
'Theologico-Political Fragment' and the 'Critique of Violence, and the theses 
'On the Concept of History'. The account of 'image-time' set out below will also 
be able to be read back - as messianic time - into the afformative, divine 
violence and messianic rhythms of Benjamin's earlier essays. 
22 Osborne, The Politics of Time. p. 184. 
'13 Ibid., p. 184, Benjamin One Way Street, p. 230. 
24 Osbome. The Politics of Time. p. 185. 
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Experience and Story-time 
In his notes for the 'Arcades Project, Walter Benjamin makes an intriguing 
claim. In a section on what he calls, the theory of historical materialism, he 
writes: 'History breaks down into images, not into stories. "' As a way into 
Benjamin's philosophy of history I will be motivated by the questions of 'What 
could it mean for history to break down into images instead of into storiesT and 
'would this give us any theoretical advantage in understanding historical, 
messianic, or revolutionary timeT 
Benjamin also links experience to his statement that 'history breaks down into 
images, not into stories. ' in the fifth of his propositions on the theory of historical 
materialism,, which reads; 
The procedures of historical materialism are founded on 
experience, on common sense, on presence of mind, and on 
dialectics. 26 
And as it is his version of historical materialism that breaks history down into 
images, this breakdown must also be founded on experience, as well as common 
sense, presence of mind, and dialectics. It is important to note here, that the 
presence of mind present here, as Weigel reminds us, is always a 'bodily 
25 Walter Benjamin, 'N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress], in Benjamin: 
Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. Gary Smith, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1989. 
References to this will be given with the 'N' number, for example this reference is N 11,4. 
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presence of mind'(leibhaftiger Geistesgegenwart), for Benjamin 27 . But what 
kind 
of experience is it that Benjamin's version of historical materialism is founded 
on? 
Benjamin uses two different words for experience. Erfahrung is the word for 
experience that is linked to tradition; experience which is acquired and learnt 
from. On the other hand, Benjamin uses Erlebnis to refer to a more impoverished 
form of experience; experience that is merely lived through. For our own 
purposes we can start from the assumption that experience in the first instance 
derives from perception, and that the events that we experience contribute to 
knowledge. Experience can contribute to knowledge through perceptions, which 
in turn,, depend on events - whether mental or material. Experience then, is a 
necessarily temporal concept; one that belongs to time and history. If there is any 
truth to historicism, it is that we are all creatures of our own time and history. 
However great or small an extent we allot to the contribution of history to the 
social/historical construction of our knowledge, there can be no such thing as 
completely ahistorical experience. 
In an early work entitled 'On the Program of the Coming Philosophy' (1918) 
Benjamin explicitly stated the task in hand is 'to undertake the epistemological 
foundation of a higher concept of experience (Erfahrung)', also referred to as 'a 
new and higher kind of experience yet to come, ). 28 In this piece he is in dialogue 
26N 11,4. 
7 Weigel, Botý-- and knage-Space p. 4, Benjamin, One Way Street, p. 99. 
Benjamin, 'On the Program of the Coming Philosophy', in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, p. 102. 
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with Kant on the concept of experience. However, the criticism of Kant's 
conception of experience is not straightforwardly a formal, epistemological 
criticism of the logic at work in the Kantian construction, instead it is based in 
the historicity of the concept itself. Written in 1918 while the collective 
experience of the 1914-1918 war was still being assimilated, Benjamin realised 
that Kant's concept of experience is no longer adequate to the radical change in 
historical conditions that have emerged in or as modernity. 
One of the main threads of Benjamin's criticism was that Kant's concept of 
experience was too tightly tied to the scientific framework of his time. The 
newer,, 'higher' concept of experience that Benjamin wants to elucidate would 
extend Kant's concept to make it more inclusive of aspects that would escape the 
limits of Newtonian physics. These criticisms, however, are not necessarily 
attempts to undermine Kant's critical project, rather, they can be read as 
supplements to a neo-Kantian theory of experience which places more emphasis 
on the historicity of experience. Benjamin connects Kant's own conception of 
expenence to a particular 'world view (Weltanschauung) ', and more specifically, 
the world view of the Enlightenment. 29 The problem with this Enlightenment 
experience, for Benjamin, is that it is insufficiently inclusive of all that he would 
like to encompass by the concept experience. It is, in his words, 'experience 
(Erfahrung) virtually reduced to a nadir, to a minimum of significance'30 . 
'() Ibid., p. 10 1- 
Ibid.. p. 10 1- 
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What he considers to be happening in the Kantian construction of experience is 
that it becomes reduced to a subjective process. Kant's reliance on the 
subject/objeet dichotomy demanded that experience could only be described as a 
kind of gathering together of perceptions in consciousness; a mechanical relation 
between objects and a perceiving subject. But, according to Benjamin, even the 
subject/object divide on which the Kantian system and its concept of experience 
rests is a result of its own historicity. This 'shallow experience' is just as much an 
epistemological fiction and has no more claim to universal or timeless truth as 
the belief of ancient or, so called, 'primitive' peoples who 'identify themselves in 
part with objects of their perception' . Indeed the shallowness of Kant's concept 
of experience is that it is set up in terms of the individual human, as a purely 
psychological problem of consciousness, rather than taken as a larger picture of 
what Benjamin calls 'a systematic specification of knowledge 3 1. This would 
include experience that lies outside rationality, for example intoxication and 
dream experience. By taking Enlightenment experience as the norm Kant is 
unable to account for historical change in the nature of experience, he fails to 
register its own historicity. 
The new concept of experience that will constitute the programme of the coming 
philosophy is one that will somehow go beyond the subject/object divide. But as 
it is just the programme that Benjamin is giving us in this text, he is unable to 
show what this new 'higher' concept of experience will look like. The problem 
with the development of this new concept of experience is that although he is 
successful in showing its inherent historicity, he is unable to show how it can be 
]bid., p. 103. 
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a more inclusive concept. 
That it has been a more inclusive concept, historically, we are in no doubt. This is 
resonant in an experience of the events of knowledge that have taken place in not 
only an individual but also a community. This is experience as wisdom; the 
traditional wisdom of the elders of a society as well as the collective wisdom of 
the society itself, embedded within the traditions of that society. More accurately 
this is experience as tradition: the experience that is handed down from 
generation to generation. 
In 1934 Benjamin wrote more directly about the qualitative change in experience 
that he saw as characteristic of late modemity. The experience of modem 
technological warfare was what finally completed the failure of tradition to 
convey experience. There was no way that the traditional fornis of 
communicating experience could convey this experience. The radical and sudden 
nature and speed of change in the early 20th century is his prime example of the 
historicity of experience itself. That the nature of experience could remain 
unchanged in such historical circumstances is out of the question for Benjamin. 
The changes are so rapid tradition is no longer able to assimilate them: 
Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the 
battlefield grown silent - not richer, but poorer in communicable 
experience?... For never has experience been contradicted more 
thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic 
experience by inflation. bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral 
experience by those in power. A generation that had gone to school on a 
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horse-drawn streetcar now stood under the open sky in a countryside in 
which nothing remained unchanged but the clouds, and beneath these 
clouds, in a field of force of destructive torrents and explosions, was the 
tiny, fragile human body. 32 
Although he stated in his early work that the new concept of experience still 
wants to incorporate religious experience, this does not necessarily have to be 
read as a reactionary stance. " In recognising the qualitative change in experience 
(even though he labelled it as having fallen in value) that accompanies social and 
technological change, the appropriate response is not an atavistic wish for a 
return to a mythical golden age of experience 34 . The challenge is to create a new 
concept of experience that can help us to understand our own reactions and 
interaction to the social and technological enviroDment in which we find 
ourselves. Ben amin's later theory of experience, although labelled as 'historical i 
materialist', was still carrying on the project of trying to produce 'true' 
32 Illuminations, p. 84. 
33 Experience always retained a spiritual element throughout his work, and it is always 'shot 
through with theology' however uncomfortable this may be for some commentators. For 
Benjamin modernity doesn't so much mark the death of God, rather the impoverishment of the 
experience of God. Osborne also argues that this religious aspect of Benjamin's thinking later 
became a thinking of the 'everyday'. (Politics of Time, p. 18 1. ) 
34 Richard Wolin, detects conflicting attitudes to the impoverishment of experience in Benjamin's 
essays of 1936. He identifies a nostalgic yearning for the wisdom of tradition in 'The Storyteller' 
which sits uneasily with the bold iconoclasm of 'The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological 
Reproducibility. ' However there does appear to be a synthesis of these apparently conflicting 
positions in the 1939 essay 'On Some Motifs in Baudelaire'. See chapter 7 of Wolin, Walter 
Benjamin: .4n Aesthetic of 
Redemption, New York, Columbia University Press, 1982. Although 
Wolin's position could be challenged by noting that, in 'The Storyteller', Benjamin makes use of 
long passages from an earlier essay, 'Experience and Poverty' (1933), in which he argued that the 
modem impoverishment of experience provides the opportunity for a fresh start. 
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experience. This 'true' experience, which is also political experience can only be 
produced through a disruption of the continuity of history. which at the same time 
enacts 'a specific and unique engagement with 935 the past. 
Benjamin's text is concerned with the transition of storytelling into the form of 
the novel, in modernity. The novel can be seen as the paradigmatic narrative 
medium of modernity because it is created by an isolated individual to be 
consumed by isolated individuals. No longer is the 'counsel of wisdom woven 
into the fabric of life'. instead we are presented with mere infon-nation. Because 
the novelist is not in a position to communicate her experience, she can only 
attempt to create a false experience by creating a false totality. 
36 In 'The 
Storyteller' Benjamin describes the differences between traditional experience 
and modem experience. The experience of the traditional is steeped in the lore: 
the teaching and counsel, of a community. This kind of knowledge assumes a 
continuity of the community in which it is being transmitted. This is what 
Benjamin terms the 'communicability of experience'; and this 'counsel woven 
into the fabric of real life is wisdom (Weisheit)'. The 'epic side of truth'or 
wisdom is what Benjamin diagnoses as dying out in modernity. 37 This wisdom, 
in belonging to a community, could pretend to a kind of universalism. On the 
other hand modem experience has become the disrupted and private experience 
of an individual within society. Although Benjamin's text does appear nostalgic 
Beqiamin, 'Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian", in One Way Street and Other Writings, p. 
)52. 
36 Benjamin's thinking of totality here, is deeply indebted to Georg Lukdcs', The Theory of the 
Novel, trans. Anna Bostock, London. Merlin Press, 1971. 
37 Illuminations. p. 86. 
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in places, his materialist analysis is careful to avoid describing the change in 
experience as either a' "symptom of decay, (Verfallserscheinung)" let alone a 
"modem" symptom. It is, rather, only a concomitant symptom of the secular 
productive forces of history. ' 38 
Benjamin maintains that there is still some possibility for Erfahrung, - the 
traditional experience that is acquired and learnt from - but suggests that, in 
modernity, the more common form of experience is Erlebnis - the impoverished 
experience that is merely lived through. For him, the paradigmatic experience of 
modernity, is the experience of shock 39 . This 
is the daily experience of the city 
dweller who has no chance of assimilating all the fleeting encounters and 
experiences involved in the modem urban encounter with the crowd. Benjamin 
derived this concept of the 'shock experience' from his reading of Baudelaire as 
the poet of modernity. It is this shock factor that is also characteristic of 
experience as a moment that is lived (Erlebnis). The temporality of these accounts 
of experience also reflect on the temporalities of history implied in Benjamin's 
historical materialism. The continuity of the community assumed in traditional 
experience suggests a continuous temporality. While the individualised, shock 
experience of the lived, urban moment suggests a more disjunctive temporality. 
Benjamin opposes his version of 'historical materialism' to a position that he 
identifies as 'historicism'. For him, historicism presupposed the possibility of 
38 Illuminations. p. 86. 
39 See Susan Buck-Morss, 'Aesthetics & Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin's Artwork Essay 
Reconsidered', in New Formations, 20, Summer 1993. for a detailed examination of the shock 
experience in Berliamin's work. 
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objective knowledge about the past by pretending to present it 'the way it really 
was !, 
40 
. In order to do this it has to depend on the 'Once upon a time' (Es war 
einma 41 form of historical construction which tends to fix the past as eternal and 
immutable. This is the narrative form of history which treats history as if 'telling 
the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary. ' 42 This narrative structure of 
history provides the conditions for historical experience through assuming a 
seamless continuity in history. This continuity is often described as being at work 
in tradition, where tradition is taken to be the handing over from one generation 
to the next. But for Benjamin, historicism is not a traditional form of historical 
consciousness. As we have seen in the case of experience, the breakdown of 
traditional forms due to the historical circumstances of modernity would make 
historicism only one of a number of competing historical consciousnesses within 
modemity. 
It is precisely storytelling as traditional experience 'which is passed on from 
mouth to mouth 43 which was identified by Benjamin as the communicable 
experience (Erfahrung) that has been lost by the returning soldiers of the war. 
However, Benjamin's target is not storytelling, as such, but the idea of history 
and time that comes with the attempt to break it down into stories. For Benjamin, 
it is not only that historicism still adheres to a linear, narrative structure of 
history, or even that it closes the borders of history through claiming objectivity 
and immutability, its greatest sin is that it still maintains an idea of history as 
40 Thesis V1, Illuminations, p. 247. 
" Thesis XV1, Illuminations, p. 254. 
42 Thesis XV111A. Illuminations, p. 255. 
43 Illuminations, p. 84. 
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progress. 
The narrative form which is used to retain the seamless continuity of historical 
time is described by Benjamin as the 'vulgar naturalism of historicism 44 which, 
in refusing even to acknowledge the possibility of other modes of time- 
consciousness (let alone compete with them), standardises and homogenises its 
own time-consciousness. However what is missing in the idea of history as a 
seamless narrative is any account of a present. Continuity is bought at the 
expense of a present which is able to disrupt this continuity. It is our experience 
of the present, or our present experience, and its historicity, that plays a major, 
constitutive role in our own consciousness and idea of time. We deten-nine the 
shape and direction of history in and through the present. 
This inflated continuity of historicism is also accused of presenting a skewed and 
partial view of history: one which empathises with the victors, also as a result of 
its narrative form. For Benjamin, historical continuity becomes the 'triumphal 
procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate 45 
Cultural products such as technological, theoretical or artistic developments, 
which are exhibited as proof of historical progress, also incorporate all that 
remains forgotten by this idea of history. For Benjamin these 'cultural treasures' 
owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents 
who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their 
contemporaries. There is no document of civilisation which is not at the 
44 N 2,6. 
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same time a document of barbarism. 
46 
By forgetting the price paid for these cultural treasures, historicism takes progress 
as the norm. This is not to suggest that historicism automatically accepts a more 
recent development as necessarily better than its predecessor. Writing at a time 
when Fascism commanded huge popular support in Europe he could not help but 
notice that those who he would position as historicists around him were amazed 
that such a movement could emerge in the twentieth century. But he diagnosed 
their amazement as arising out of their inadequate conception of history and 
historical time. Their seamless, progressive narrative of history could not help but 
be amazed that Fascism could arise in the twentieth century - the century that 
promised to be the most progressive and enlightened in history. Their 
amazement, for Benjamin, was 'not philosophical, This amazement is not the 
beginning of knowledge - unless it is knowledge that the view of history which 
gives rise to it is untenable. ' 47 
The story of story-time was one of progress that was based on the closure of the 
6 once upon a time', and its time is described as 'empty' and 'homogenous 48 . The 
story of progress takes up residence in this empty time and closes its doors to any 
future challenge. It must be homogenous time to exclude any difference within 
history; to exclude the competing claims of all those who have given of their 
anonymous toil or who are still lying prostrate. Indeed it is the fourth premise in 
the list concerning the theory of historical materialism that also states; 'The 
45 Thesis, VII, Illuminations, p. 248. 
46 Thesis, V11, Illuminations, p. 248. 
47 Thesis, VIIL Illuminations, p. 249. 
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materialist presentation of history goes hand in hand with an imminent critique of 
the concept of progress. 
49 
Image-time 
Benjamin wants to break open the 'continuum of history ý50 to explode this story- 
time and its tale of homogenous victory in order to make room for all those who 
have been excluded from it. It is through a certain understanding of a relationship 
between history and images that we might be able to construct a more useful 
account of history and historical time that may be able to accomplish this. 
Sigrid Weigel has referred to Benjamin as a thinker-in-images", but the use of 
the term 'image' that she is attributing to Benjamin is, again, rather unorthodox. 
His 'Image' (Bild) is traced back to an older use of the word which she calls the 
'original and literal sense of the word: image as likeness, similitude or 
resemblance (A . hnfichkeit) -)52 . This 
is to be distinguished from thinking of an 
image as a representation, standing in for something else. An image for Benjamin 
refuses the dichotomy of form and content, it is what he calls, 'that third thing' in 
his essay The Image ofProUSt. 53 Although he does not explicitly mention Kant in 
this text, he is again in dialogue with him, attempting what we might describe as 
48 Thesis, XJV, Illuminations, p. 252. 
49 N 11,4. This critique of the concept of progress will be examined in greater detail in the next 
chapter. 
50 Thesis, XIV, Illuminations, p. 253. 
51 See Sigrid Weigel, Boaý-and Image-Space, this is one of the major themes of her book. 
52 Weigel, Body-and Image-Space. p. 2_33. 
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a proto-deconstruction of the dichotomies that his system functions on. Just as 
we have seen his earlier engagement with Kant as an attempt to elaborate a more 
inclusive concept of experience, here he is making silent reference to Kant's 
discussion of the 'Transcendental Schemata'. 
In the chapter on the schematism on the pure understanding of concepts in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is concerned with finding a way to understand 
how an 'object can be contained under a concept (Begrifj)'. The problem is that if 
4 pure concepts of the understanding' are indeed pure then they have nothing to 
link them to 'empirical intuitions (Anschauung)'. The situation has been set up in 
such a way that there seems to be only pure concepts of the understanding and 
intuitions., without any way of bringing the two together. Kant, however, 
announces that 'there must be some third thing' that has something in common 
between the category and the appearance which allows us to apply categories to 
appearances. This is the 'transcendental schema' which is described as a 
' mediating representation' which is both purely 'intellectual' and 'sensible'. 54 
According to Kant, it is these schemata which make images possible for us and 
they connect the image to its appropriate concept. 
These Kantian schemata depend on the subject/object dichotomy and result in a 
mediation between the two. As a representation (Vorstellung), the schema also 
depends on the form/content dichotomy which can be extrapolated from the 
original subject/object one. However, Benjamin also wants to supersede this 
53 Illuminations, p. 200. 
59 
dichotomy with his use of image. Because his images are not representational in 
the Kantian sense 55 , they no longer rely on this distinction. He gives us a clue as 
to how they might work when he describes a childhood scene in which he is 
intrigued by the way a rolled up woollen stocking appears to be a bag which 
contains a present. But then he relates, 
I applied myself to unwrapping 'what had been brought me' out of its 
woollen bag. I drew it ever closer to myself until the perplexing thing 
happened: I had taken 'what had been brought me' out, but 'the Bag' in 
which it had lain was no longer there. I could not put this process to the 
test often enough. It taught me that form and content, the wrapping and 
what is wrapped in it are the same thing. 56 
In this case the first thing is the bag, the second, the gift within the bag, and the 
third is the stocking, which was both the bag and the present. In The Image of 
Proust essay this stocking/third thing re-appears as the image. 57 It is the form and 
the content and yet not the same as, but greater than the sum of its parts. 
Benjamin's image is concerned with similarity (Ahnlichkeit) rather than 
representation (Vorstellung), but this is the kind of similarity that he describes as 
958 'the deeper resemblance of the dream world . It 
has the associational quality of 
a dream image. It is through tangential, marginal, non-linear and extreme 
54 Kant Critique ofPure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan, 1929, B 177. 
55 In Kant a representation does not match the object in a mimetic way, rather it is produced by 
our concepts and intuitions. 
56 Benjamin, Berliner Kindheit um Neun--ehnhunderd, Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 198 1, p. 
58. 
57 Illuminations, p. 200. 
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associations that we come to be able to understand the image. These associations 
crystallised into different types of images at various stages of Benjamin's work. 
There are dream-images, the image as third thing in the Proust essay, which is 
derived from a meditation on Proust's involuntary memories (the famous 
madeleine). There are also the 'profane illuminations' that he attributes to 
Surrealism and drug induced ecstasies. What is so powerful about all these 
images is the instant moment of cognition or recognition. It is the moment of 
waking out of the dream. 
The images that we are concerned with, and from which we will construct a 
notion of image-time are not pictorial images, they are, what Benjamin calls, 
dialectical-images. For the moment we will take dialectics to be a description of 
the movement of thought. 59 So these images, as dialectical-images, are images of 
thought. However this is not to confuse them with mental images which would 
usually be thought of as pictorial representations in the mind. 
It is by using images as dialectical images that we can come to an understanding 
of image time and its possible advantages over story-time as a model of historical 
time. Images are always already historical images, for Benjamin. As we have 
seen through the analysis of experience there could be no such thing as an 
ahistorical experience of these images. The sudden recognition that occurs with 
images is not only a recognition in history, it is a recognition of the historicity of 
the images themselves. This is a historicity that would not only go some way to 
58 Illuminations, p. 200. 
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explaining our experience of them, due to our own historicity, but a recognition 
of different histories within the image. For Ben amin these images have an i 
'historical index' which has a double aspect when it comes to their role in the 
temporality of history. Firstly their 'historical index' means that they belong 
firmly to a particular time, and secondly, that 'they only enter into legibility at a 
specific time'. 
60 
We have seen the unsatisfactory aspects of story-time, due to its closure of the 
past and its commitment to the idea of progress. If story-time is this continuum of 
empty, homogenous time, what Benjamin requires is something that will break 
up this continuum and create full, heterogenous time. It is dialectical images that 
he sees as having the explosive potential to 'blast open the continuum of history, 
because they contain within their disparate elements both the 'Then' (Gewesene) 
and the 'Now' (Jetzt). This sudden recognition in which the various elements fall 
into place impacts on the dialectical movement of thought and history with such a 
power of shock that it freezes it into an image. Benjamin describes it thus: 
It isn't that the past casts its light on what is present or that what is 
present casts its light on what is past; rather, an image is that in which the 
Then and the Now come together into a constellation like a flash of 
lightening. In other words: an image is dialectics at a standstill. For while 
the relation of the present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, 
the relation of the then to the now is dialectical: not of a temporal, but of 
59 The next chapter will explore the more specific meanings of dialectics in Benjamin's work. 
60 N 3,1. 
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an imagistic nature. 61 
The 'Then' (Gewesene) and the 'Now' (Jetzt) are elements that belong to image- 
time, whereas the past (Vergangenheit) and the present (Gegenwart) belong to 
the continuum of story-time. The past is what is dead and gone, its place and 
significance in the story is fixed eternally. The present is merely the 
contemporary episode in this seamless narrative of sameness, a point on the 
continuum. The 'Then' and the 'Now' can come together in an image because, 
due to its image logic, both elements can be at work within the same 
constellation . The similitude or resemblances of an image allow it to hold 
elements of the 'Then', which is not fixed or closed, in a tense relationship with 
the 'Now'. in its constellation. What I am calling image-time, Benjamin termed 
Jetztzeit - the time of the now, which is able to keep these different modes of 
time and history at play within the present moment. This is the time of awakening 
- the time of both dreaming and consciousness. It is during this time that we 
become aware of the dream and its interpretation. 
Image-time opens history up: it evades the eternalising closure of story-time 
because the 'Then' is always in a dialectical relationship with the 'Now', and 
vice-versa. Dialectical images are the most historical of images in that their 
timing and their historicity coincide to form this explosive constellation. They are 
not historical in the sense that they are simply images of past events, they are 
historical in that they are the images which are full to bursting with the historicity 
of the 'Then' and the 'Now'. Their historicity not only determines our present 
experience but, according to Benjamin. even gives us an experience of the past, 
61 N 3.1. 
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because to be caught up in this explosively illuminating constellation we also 
form a relationship with the other elements. They are the most historical of 
images because, through their marginal and forgotten moments we can discover 
and experience aspects of history, new to us. 
By opening up history new constellations can be formed: Ones in which the 
excluded, the anonymised and the forgotten can shine again. This more inclusive 
opening up of history is captured by the phrase 'brushing history against the 
grain' This occurs in the seventh thesis of 'On the Concept of History': 
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a 
document of barbarism. And just as such a document is not free of 
barbarism, barbarism taints also the manner in which it was transmitted 
from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates 
himself from it as far as possible. He regards it as his task to brush history 
against the grain. (die Geschichte gegen den Strich zu bürsten. )62 
It is a phrase that may be interpreted as a wish to undo the injustices and lacunae 
of a great deal of historiography, or it can be given a stronger interpretation, 
which fills it with revolutionary hope and potential. It is the latter, stronger, 
interpretation that I would like to emphasise throughout this thesis. I shall be 
arguing that Benjamin's notion of brushing history against the grain was one 
which he thought could provide genuine transformation, in the sense of a 
revolutionary interruption of history. However, my main purpose is not to re- 
rehearse the debate over Benjamin's political radicality, his closeness to 
62 Illuminations, p. 248. 
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Communism; Trotskyism, Anarchism or Mystical theology etcetera; 63 but to 
explicate a radical version of brushing history against the gain. 
According to Benjamin, what is forgotten about cultural treasures and the 'great' 
events of history is that, 
They owe their existence not only to the efforts of the great minds and 
talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their 
contemporaries. 
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He is reminding us of such simple facts as the necessity of the blood, sweat and 
death of colonised peoples to build empires, of the necessity of slavery to the 
creation of the wealth of Western Europe and North America and the sub- 
humanisation of women to enhance the perceived greatness of men. To 
remember this is to remember the horror. For Benjamin and his 'historical 
materialist' any thinking about this culture cannot be separated from the horror of 
thinking about the price paid for it in terms of lives and agonies. 
For Benjamin, brushing history against the grain amounts to much more than 
simply reinterpreting historical facts. This conception also rests on the experience 
(Erfahrung) of the past. This experience is produced through remembrance 
(Eingedenken) and also requires an alternative temporality. Brushing history 
against the grain is not only the production of alternative histories but also the 
These issues are raised and discussed to varying conclusions in Michael L6wy, Redemption 
and Utopia, London, Athlone Press, 1992. And Rolf Tiedemann, 'Historical Materialism or 
Political Messianisn? An Interpretation of the Theses "On the Concept of History" ', in Benjamin, 
Philosophy, Aesthetics, History. 
'4 Thesis VII, fluminations, p. 248. 
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interruption or introduction of an alternative temporality of history. There is an 
urgency about this interruption which can be seen in thesis VIII where we are told 
65 that the revolutionary task is 'to bring about a real state of emergency' . 
Agamben discerns a link between Benjamin's use of this 'state of emergency' or 
exception (Ausnahmezustand) 66 and messianic time. This messianic time is the 
temporality of revolution that can be read back into the afformativity of the 
general strike and divine violence described above. He points out that this 
emergency, crisis, or exception is a kind of exclusion. What is interesting to note 
here is that he theorises this exclusion in terms of its relation to law. suggesting 
that 'what is excluded in it is not ... simply the relation to the rule. 
On the 
contrary, the rule maintains itself in relation to the exception in the form of 
suspension'. 67 In other words, it is indeed the exception that makes the rule. This 
would indicate that the 'state of emergency' theorised in the 1940 Theses still 
retains a very close connection with the afformative, divine violence of the 1921 
'Critique of Violence'. Exclusion, as a suspension, is given as a condition of 
possibility for the law. 68 
65 Illuminations, p. 248. 
66 This 'state of emergency' (Ausnahmezustand) is derived from Benjamin's reading of Carl 
Schmitt's Politische Theologie, Vier Kapiteln zur Lehre von der Souveränität, Munich-Leipzig: 
Duncker and Humbolt, 1922. It is in this volume that Schmitt sets out his theory of sovereignty. 
67 Agamben, 'The Messiah and the Sovereign: The Problem of Law in Walter Benjamin', in 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1999, p. 162. 
68 The notion that it might be an exclusion that maintains the law, or even makes it possible, will 
return during the discussion of frigaray's work below. Although, 
for Irigaray. the exclusion at 
work is often a founding gesture, such as the murder of the mother. The maintaining exclusion 
would then be the cultural forgetting of woman. 
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Agamben also discerns a nihilism at work in Benjamin's thinking of messianic 
time. He traces this nihilism to a Judaic tradition of reading the 'original Torah' 
69 as 'a medley of letters without any order - that is, without meaning'. What this 
lack of meaning means, for Agamben, is that this original form of the law does 
not signify any actual propositions. It is neither prescriptive nor perforinative. It 
is,, in fact,, afformative because it is 'a commandment that commands nothing. 70 
The problem then arises, that if the Messiah comes to redeem, restore and fulfil 
the original law, it will be the restoration of a law without commandments or 
propositions. It will be a different kind of law altogether -a lawless law. 
71 
However, Agamben correctly points out that Benjamin's thinking of messianic 
time does not construe it as chronologically distinct from historical time. 
Messianic time and historical time coexist as parallel, possible temporalities. 72 
They relate to each other in a way that produces paradoxes because if messianic 
time were to become actualised as the fulfilment of history it would both have to 
cancel historical time as well as manifesting itself in it. As Agamben states 'the 
two times must instead accompany each other according to modalities that cannot 
69 Agamben, 'The Messiah and The Sovereign', p. 165. 
70 Agamben, 'The Messiah and The Sovereign', p. 166. 
71 This will also relate to the discussion of Irigaray below, in particular to her exhortation to 
refuse moralising and law-making. See chapter five below. 
72 Susan Buck-Morss, in Dialectics ofSeeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project, 
Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1989, pp. 240-52, and Peter Osborne, in The Politics of Time: 
ý1 fodernitj, and A vant-Garde, 
London, Verso, 1995, pp. 151-53, also produce versions of this 
parallelism. Osborne, however produces a more nuanced reading than Buck-Morss due to his 
insistence on there being 'three temporal registers at play' instead of two. The third register - 
between the messianic and the 'empirical historical' - is given as 4 the phenomenological struclure 
of the Iii, ing present'. (Politics of Time, p. 152. ) 
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be reduced to a dual logic (this world / the other world) 73 . This doubleness can 
be seen more clearly in the figure of the Messiah who is both legislator and 
redeemer. As legislator he belongs to historical time and its law, but because his 
legislation will be the restoration of the original law which commands nothing, it 
will also put an end to the law. Benjamin's 'real state of emergency' can then be 
read as the state of exception in which this law can be seen to be in force without 
significance. To bring about a real state of emergency would be to realise the 
meaninglessness of the law. 
In terms of brushing history against the grain, this might be achieved through a 
realisation of the fact that for the oppressed majority life is a constant crisis of 
hand to mouth existence or the incessant degradation of sexist and racist culture. 
I am claiming that brushing history against the grain is a revolutionary strategy 
rather than an evolutionary strategy such as liberal political correctness. The 
latter seeks to counteract injustice through controlling language, but fails to 
grasp the force of claims, like Benjamin's, that something more than a mere 
rewriting of history needs to take place through a new use of language. Benjamin 
suggests that history and its temporality need to be changed beyond this. Rather 
than considering history as a linear progression which passes through its stages of 
imperialism, fascism, etcetera, Benjamin finds revolutionary potential in the 
notion of the messianic, parallel, but unactualised, temporality. 
This is also the conception of history of Benjamin's *historical materialist" not 
history according to 'historicism'. The crucial difference between these two is 
11 /_1 Agamben, 'The Messiah and The Sovereign', p. 168. 
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that 'historical materialism' maintains history as incomplete and open, thus 
providing hope for a fulfilment and redemption of history, whereas for 
'historicism' history is a closed book, with no hope of rescue. This experience 
provides a link between the past and the present and gives the historical 
materialist the power or influence over the past which is described as a 'weak 
Messianic power' 74 . It 
is the messianic aspect of Benjamin's conception of 
history that lends it a helpful discontinuity - helpful because its discontinuity 
enables it to act as a critique of teleological conceptions of history which ignore 
any possibility of redemption or revolution. 
For Benjamin messianic history becomes a form of remembrance (Eingedenken), 
as well as a science. This is the Judaic remembrance of the Torah which is able 
to experience the past. 'We know that the Jews were prohibited from 
investigating the future. The Torah and the prayers instruct them in 
remembrance, however. ' 75 It is through this active form of remembrance and its 
accompanying experience that the past is able to be modified through brushing it 
against the grain: 
What science has "established" remembrance can modify. Remembrance 
can make the incomplete (happiness) into something complete, and the 
complete (suffering) into something incomplete. 76 
This incompleteness of history is also what creates access to an alternative 
temporality of history: one in which the past will not be fixed or completed until 
., 4 Thesis 11, l1luminations. p. 246. 
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Illuminations, p. 255. 
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the arrival of the Messiah, or the revolutionary interruption. Revolution here is 
structured like a messianic intervention; it will be the final reckoning of history; a 
last judgement which is, at the same time, a new beginning. Such a revolution 
will be ultra-novel, but not in the sense of a new beginning which has wiped the 
slate clean and must start from scratch again. It is instead a whole new 
configuration of history, a retroactive as well as a pro-active retrieval and 
creation of a just history. History, therefore, is always provisional until its 
fulfillment, and the dominating versions of the perceived victors can be 
continually challenged and undermined by the ongoing historical guerrilla tactic 
of brushing history against the grain. 
Benjamin's device of the 'dialectical image' can provide us with an instance of 
ways in which the past and the present can come together in such a 
transformative moment. The dialectical image is described as the picture which 
'flits by' ( Thesis V) and as the 'memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger' 
in (Thesis VI) 77. Its equation would have the same explanatory power as E=MC'. 
Indeed Benjamin describes his method in the notes to the Arcades Project as 
being able to 
be compared to the splitting of the atom - [it] releases the enon-nous 
energy of history that lies bonded in the 'once upon a time' of classical 
historical narrative. 
78 
77 Illuminations. p. 247. 
78 N, 3,4. 
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The device itself could also prove to be as dangerous as the moment that it 
flashes up. While Benjamin's political affiliations were to 'historical 
materialism' and Communism, the collective aspects of those theories seem to be 
ýU absent from this moment that could be redescribed in terms of a direct and 
personal revelation of truth. While the dangers of such a device are not to be 
ignored it is also easy to imagine how effective it might be if detonated at the 
right time and in the right place. The only problem is of how to recognise the 
correct conditions for such an explosive transformation of history. However, the 
recognition itself is a part of the dialectical image in that the blast is caused by 
the sudden recognition of correspondences between past and present; 
correspondences that have always been there, that we have, up to now, simply 
failed to recognise. This is the specific time that the image enters into legibility, 
or recognisability (Erkennbarkeit). 79 It is also the 'profane illumination' that 
Benjamin refers to in his essay on surrealism and could be likened to James 
Joyce's epiphanies. Dialectical images are quasi-totalising snapshots: sudden 
revelations of world-historical profundity in the quotidian. 
Benjamin's most famous image of history is presented in the reading he produces 
of Paul Klee's painting Angelus Novus, in Thesis IX. Benjamin suggests that this 
painting could be taken as a representation of the angel of history. History, as 
viewed by this angel, would be the history of image-time, rather than that of 
story-time: 
Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe 
which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his 
-, ) N. 3,1 - 
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feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what 
has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught 
in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. 
This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is 
turned. while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is 
what we call progress. 80 
Rather than a narrative of' progress, the angel of history is able to show us a 
single montage of catastrophe. 
Weigel reads Thesis IX as a prime example of one of Benjamin's 'thought- 
images' (Denkhilder), which she also describes as 'dialectical images in written 
t'orrn'. "' She suggests that the tensions in this image - tensions between historical 
materialism and niessianism; between 'us' and the angel; between continuity and 
rk 
82 discontinuity, arc all brought together in a 'single constellation' . This image is 
'an allegory of Benjamin's specific theoretical work' in which she finds his 
83 
theories of language, writing, dialectics, and history all at play. More 
importantly, for us, it is also an embodiment of his dialectics at a standstill; one 
which will aid the disruption of the continuum of history. 
It is the sudden, disruptive nature of these dialectical images that demands that 
Benjamin's philosophy of history be read as one of revolution rather than 
evolution. The evolutionary politics of the Social Democrats embodied what he 
101 Fhesis I X, Ifluminalions, p. 249. 
8' Weigel, Body- and Image-Space, p. 5 1. 
92 ]bid., p. 55. 
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considered to be the politically paralysing effects of an adherence to the ideology 
of progress. This was another aspect of what Benjamin considered to be an 
insufficient conception of time and temporality: 
The concept of the historical progress of mankind cannot be sundered 
from the eoncept of its progression through a homogenous, empty time. A 
critique of the concept of such a progression must be the basis of any 
criticism of the concept of progress itself. 84 
If the concept of historical progress rests on its conception of time as empty and 
homogenous, the revolutionary alternative must advance a temporality of 
saturation and heterogeneity. The saturation will be provided by the Messianic 
structure of history which will be made whole, completed and saturated by the 
arrival/interruption of the Messiah/Revolution. The heterogeneity of time results 
from the dialectical interplay of the past and the present (or, more accurately, for 
Benjamin, the 'Then' and the 'Now'). Heterogenous time allows for an 
engagement with history whereas homogenous time is, by definition, a one-sided 
affair. Heterogeneity allows for a revolutionary hope, a hope for the past as well 
as the future, because of the ability to experience the past through remembrance 
(Eingedenken). It leaves history open, unfixed and therefore changeable. The 
engagement of the various elements of this heterogenous time - past, present, 
future, Then, Now, empirical, mundane events and messianic interruption - 
means that the import and direction of change and development are themselves 
constantly changing direction and significance. The struggle in and over history is 
S 3,1 bid., p. 5 -5. 
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ceaseless, a Sisyphean labour that will only be relieved through an interruptive 
cessation. This will be an afforynative cessation which will inaugurate a new era 
of history by refusing to posit or programme. 
Benjamin describes Jetztzeit as 'a model of Messianic time' which ýcomprises 
the entire history of mankind in an enormous abridgement' 85 . Using Jetztzeit as a 
model of messianic time we can more easily construct dialectical images from 
elements that, according to empirical, mundane time, would belong to different 
eras. Jetztzeit can also be thought of as a montage of world historical events 
rather than as a linear and progressive development. Thinking in tenns of 
montage rather than linearity allows for the plenitude or saturation of time that, 
coupled with heterogeneity, constitutes the alternative temporality that will allow 
us to brush history against the grain. History, according to this temporality might 
be described as a palimpsest, but in this case each layer of text is still in the 
process of being written and can interact with other layers to create different 
combinations and meanings. Because the logic of the dialectical image is 
imagistic rather than narrative or instrumental it can gain access to space and 
time outside the linearity of teleological meaning and time. In a certain sense, 
Benjamin could be described as attempting to think difference. However the 
difference of his alternative temporality will have great difficulty being 
articulated within a temporality and symbolic order that depends upon 
unidirectional linearity to structure its logic. 
84 Thesis XIII. Illuminations, p. 251 
' Thesis XVIII, Illuminations, p. 255. 
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Chapter 2. 
Historicism, Progress, and Dialectics 
On the dialectical image. In it lies time. Already with Hegel, time enters 
into dialectic. But the Hegelian dialectic knows time solely as the 
properly historical, if not psychological, time of thinking. The time 
differential (Zeitdifferential) in which alone the dialectical image is real is 
still unknown to him... Real time enters the dialectical image not in 
natural magnitude-let alone psychologically-but in its smallest gestalt. 
All in all, the temporal momentum (das Zeitmoment) in the dialectical 
image can be determined only through confrontation with another 
concept. This concept is the "now of recognizability" (Jew der 
Erkennbarkeit). 1 
tn this chapter I would like to continue the discussion of time undertaken in 
Chapter 1. This will involve a development of the concepts of historicism and 
progress at work in Benjamin's thought, and his criticism of certain uses of them. 
I will also be examining the question of the dialectical nature of Benjamin's 
revolutionary thought; asking if it is dialectical or not, or if it, in fact, presents us 
with a revolution in the dialectical method inherited from Hegel. These questions 
will all be mediated to a large extent through the work of Theodor Adorno, in 
order to bring to light certain criticisms of Benjamin's position. At the same time 
this mediation will also be used to show the full effect of Benjamin's influence 
on Adomo and his appropriation of Hegel. 
1 Benjamin, 'First Sketches' in The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland & Kevin McLaughlin, 
London, Belknap Press, 1999, Q', 211, p. 867. 
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As we have seen in Chapter I it is the narrative version of history and its 
concomitant conception of the continuity of time - what I have termed 'story- 
time' - that Benjamin finds most problematic in many modem philosophies of 
history. It is in trying to identify a representative example of a philosophical 
elaboration of 'story-time' that we must turn to Hegel. Although Benjamin rarely 
engages with Hegel explicitly, we can derive a reading of Hegel's philosophy of 
history as the paradigmatic model of narrative historical totalisation that 
Benjamin will come to criticise in his theses 'On the Concept of History'. 2 The 
description of Hegel's philosophy of history as a model of narrative historical 
totalisation is fairly common amongst commentators. For example Joshua Foa 
Dienstag comments that 'it is widely accepted that Hegel attempted to marshal 
most of the human past into a single story line'3 . From the emergence of the 
seamless dialectical progress of the Phenomenology of Spirit to the painstaking 
developmental description of historical change in the Lectures on the Philosophy 
of History, we can trace an unbroken linear narrative. It is the continuity of such 
an account that will prove problematic for Benjamin, but what also provokes 
criticism is the historicism and progressivism that emerge from reading Hegel as 
a theorist of narrative history, or 'story-time'. 
2 Although the particular targets of the Theses are the Social Democrats and Ranke. 
3 Joshua Foa Dienstag Dancing in Chains: Narrative and Memory in Political Theory, Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, 1997, p. 14 1. Other commentators supporting this view are Singer 
Hegel, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1983, Ch. 2; Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1975, Ch. 15; Findlay, Philosophy ofHegel, New York, Collier Books, 1958, 
p. 334, Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. Raymond Queneau, Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1980, p. 130-49. 
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Hegel can be read as a historicist, firstly, in the wider sense of historicism as 
claiming that states of affairs can only be properly understood by considering 
their historical context. Secondly, Karl Popper also famously reads him as a 
historicist, where historicism is more narrowly understood as 'an historical fate 
or inescapable essential destiny'4 . However, 
it is Benjamin's conception of 
historicism as the guarantee of both continuity and progress in history that will 
concern us here. His prime targets are those theorists who would aspire to being 
I'll able to represent history through an objective historical method. Ranke is 
Benjamin's most frequently referred to adherent of this version of historicism. 
This is best summed up in Ranke's claim to represent the past 'the way it really 
was' (wie es denn eigentlich gewesen ist)5 . These theorists can be seen to be 
reacting against the earlier Hegelian orthodoxy that they considered to be a 
version of historical relativism. However we can still try to apply Benjamin's 
criticisms to Hegel's historicism because of its own adherence to historical 
continuity and the notion of progress that is smuggled in along with this. 
Benjamin's criticisms of historicism are described by some commentators as a 
theory of modernity. According to this reading we can think of Benjamin's 
construction of historicism as modernity's version of historical time. However it 
is a historical time which fails to become fully modem because it is merely a 
replacement for the continuity of historical time that was formerly guaranteed by 
tradition. 
6 
' Karl Popper, The Open Socicty Vol. 2. Hegel and Marx, London, Routledge, 1945, p 7. 
5 Leopold von Ranke, Fürsten und Völker, ed. W. Andreas, Wiesbaden, 1957, p. 4. 
6 See, Osborne, The Politics of Time, Routledge, London, 1995, p. 138-144. 
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It is in his awareness of the different time consciousnesses at work within 
tradition and modernity that we come across the first aspect of the dialectical 
nature of Benjamin's thought. Although he is concerned with a certain 
destruction of tradition, he is also aware of its continuation in modernity. It is in 
the tension between modernity and tradition that we can discover the dialectical 
relationship that refuses to consider them as simple opposites. Indeed, for 
Benjamin, one of the problems of historicism is that it ignores this dialectical 
tension in favour of simply secularising traditional religious (especially 
Christian) notions of time and history. The continuity that was fon-nerly thought 
of as a continuous, linear movement of time towards the kingdom of heaven is 
still structurally the same in historicism. It has merely become a secularised 
version of this eschatology. For Benjamin, modernity is much more radically 
different than a secularisation of culture. We shall see that it involves a different 
consciousness of time and the present, and the critical ability to engage with the 
past in a dialectic of destruction and redemption. 
For Benjamin, historicism also fails to carry out this critical task through its 
adherence to a certain ideology of progress. As he puts it, 'the concept of 
progress is associated with an uncritical hypostatisation rather than with a critical 
placing into question. i, 7 However, historicism's faith in progress is not a separate 
aspect from its adherence to the structure of continuity, it is also the result of that 
continuity. The historicist's belief in progress results from its status as the 
secularisation of traditional eschatology. Adomo, in a highly Benjaminian essay, 
N 
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usefully draws our attention to the fact that, even for Benjamin, progress will be 
8 linked to the notion of redemption. At the same time progress is also 'averting 
utmost, total disaster'9 for Adorno (and for Benjamin) rather than the guaranteed 
movement towards redemption. 
In this essay on progress, Adorno can also be read as adhering to Benjamin's 
diagnosis of modernity as containing consciousnesses of time and history that are 
different to those of tradition. He is also endeavouring to undertake an 
investigation of the notion of progress that pays Ul attention to the dialectical 
relationship of modernity to tradition. Rather than succumbing to a nihilism that 
would give up on the idea of progress altogether, Adorno undertakes the more 
difficult task of trying to produce a thinking of progress that could escape the 
catastrophes of instrumental rationality and the 'triumph of radical evil'. 10 
Adomo reads progress as not only linked to the notion of redemption but also to a 
universalisation of the human subject. He also draws attention to Benjamin's 
criticism of progress that it is always only progress of humankind. The most 
significant moment in the dialectic of progress - the moment that marks the 
transition from tradition to modernity - is identified by Adorno, as taking place 
with Kant's Copernican revolution. This is the moment of secularisation in which 
the subject becomes central. It is also at this moment that the problems of 
modernity occur. According to Adorno existence becomes almost like a 'bad 
8 Adorno, 'Progress' in Benjamin; Philosophy, Aesthetics, History, ed. Gary Smith, Chicago, 
Chicago University Press, 1989, p. 85. 
9 Nd. p. 85. 
10 Ibid. p. 10 1- 
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faith'), because at this moment 'What is received the aura of redemption when 
redemption did not come and evil continued undiminished. "' 
Adomo argues that if history is to be truly secularised, then progress will need to 
give up the notion of redemption as a transcendent intervention. He also follows 
Benjamin in arguing that the conception of historical time must change if the 
notion of progress is not to 'evaporate into ahistorical theology" 2. So another 
dialectical relationship is at work here - that of redemption and history. Hegel 
was able to work with this tension, in as much as he translated the traditional 
telos of history (redemption) into a modern telos of progress as reconciliation. 
This meant that, for Hegel, progress required the supersession (Aujhebung) of 
history. According to Adorno's reading there is still room for the movement of 
progress within a Hegelian totality. But the problem then is that this totality, 
within which the movement of progress unfolds, itself remains stationary. There 
is no progress for the totality. This is still unsatisfactory for Adomo, because as 
far as he is concerned it is the totality that needs to be transfigured in order to 
escape from the undiminished continuation of evil. 
Adorno also reads progress as having been concerned with mastery - mastery of 
nature and human nature. So it also follows that if progress is about the 
increasing ability to control nature, then nature must also be brought to a halt so 
that spirit or human reason can subdue it. Adorno suggests that those who adopt 
" Ibid. p. 87. 
12 Ibid. p. 87. 
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such a conception of progress forget that humankind is in fact a part of nature 
itself In this case real progress would only be able to start once progress has been 
made aware of its own limitations and contradictions: 
Progress means: a coming out of the spell, even out of the spell of 
progress which is itself nature, when humankind becomes aware of its 
own indigenousness to nature and halts the mastery which it exerts over 
nature through which mastery by nature continues. In this respect it could 
be said that progress only properly occurs where it ends. 13 
The above quotation is a good example of what we will be seeing as Adorno's 
eminent Hegelianism which is at the same time his eminent Benjaminianism. It is 
Hegelian because of the structure and promise of dialectical supersession; 
because of the surpassing, overcoming, destruction and preservation of progress. 
It is Benjaminian because it is attempting to explode the continuity of progress 
through a dialectical juxtaposition of movement and stasis that will release the 
energies of real progress. It is in relation to this dialectical tension that Adorno, 
sums up his own appreciation of Benjamin's dialectical images: 
Dialectical images: these are the historical-objective archetypes of that 
antagonistic unity of standstill and movement which defines the most 
general bourgeois concept of progress. 14 
'Real progress' would not want to master or triumph over anything. Instead it 
would be the critical disruption of history as triumph and mastery. Adorno 
Nd. p. 90-91. 
" Ibid. p. 100. 
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describes such a version of progress as 'resistance against the perpetual danger of 
relapse' 15 which resembles and accompanies Benjamin's critical placing into 
question. The moment of disruption that Adorno envisages can also be derived 
from Benjamin's thinking on progress. For Benjamin, because progress is 
complicit with tradition through the secularisation of traditional continuity, then 
the present, for the historicist, becomes the continuation of the values of the past. 
According to Benjamin, the historicist's representation of historical phenomena 
(presents them in terms of their "value as heritage". ' Benjamin would, instead, 
like to save these phenomena from their fate of becoming cultural treasures. He 
proposes to rescue them by 'exhibiting the discontinuity that exists within 
them. ' 16 
This discontinuity, erupts in and as the present for Benjamin, and this should not 
surprise us since we have seen that it is also an attempt to engage philosophically 
with modernity. Indeed, as argued in the introduction above, any theory setting 
out to understand modernity will need to engage with the question of the present. 
As such it is also historicism's treatment of the present that indicates another 
aspect of its failure to engage with modernity properly, for Benjamin. It is by re- 
establishing continuity with the past that historicism forgets the present. For 
Benjamin, it is exactly this forgetting that produces the stultifying 'value as 
heritage' at the same time as it relies on the 'homogenous empty time' that needs 
to be exploded. 
Ibid. 10 1. 
16 N 9,4. 
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It is also around the question of the present that we can best distinguish the 
differences between Hegel's and Ranke's historicism, and Hegel's and 
Benjamin's dialectics. Benjamin's critique of historicism is explicitly aimed at 
Ranke and others who reacted against Hegel. We have also seen that Hegel's 
dialectic is prone to Benjamin's critique of historicism due to its investment in 
teleology and continuity. Hegel differs from Ranke primarily because he doesn't 
forget the present in his dialectics. This brings him closer to Benjamin which 
means that our task now must be to see how Hegel's present compares to 
Benjamin's before we go on to discover how Hegelian Benjamin's dialectics 
might be. 
Hegel's Present 
Hegel's conception of the present and historical time indulge in both the 
continuity and progress of historicism. For Hegel, time is becoming; but it is 
becoming which is directly intuited as an aspect of nature. Our intuition of the 
world leads unavoidably to a presupposition of the dynamic nature of the world. 
To put it very simply, we cannot help but notice that things change, and change 
ceaselessly. It is this ceaseless change that Hegel identifies as another aspect of 
the universal principle of contradiction. For him, non-contradiction would mean 
stasis and therefore would be either at the end of, or absolutely unrelated to, 
becoming. 
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Hegel argues that past, present and future are all contradictory. The past is a 
present that is not present (now), as is the future. But they are also brought 
together through the present. The operation of negation comes into play here 
because this unification only takes place negatively. The present only comes 
11'k about because the past is negated (it has ceased to be); and the present also only 
exists to be negated by the future (the present that will cease to be). This is one 
version of time that will enable us to label it as a 'negation of negation' 17 . 
In The Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel identifies this negation of past and future 
as the 'Now'(Jetzt) 18 which is the point in time which 'is nothing other than the 
passage of its being into nothingness, and from nothingness into its being. '19 The 
act of attempting to point to a particular Now is given as an example of the 
inexorable workings of the dialectic. Through making this attempt we arrive at 
the truth that 'Now is a universal'. 
Hegel's argument runs as follows: 
(1) 1 point out the 'Now; and it is asserted to be the truth. I point it out, 
however, as something that has been, or as something that has been 
superseded; I set aside the first truth. (2) 1 now assert the second truth 
that it has been, that it is superseded. (3) But what has been, is not; I set 
17 See Hegel, Philosophy ofNature, trans. M. J. Perry, London, Allen and Unwin, 1970, §257, p. 
229. 
18 Hegel, Phenomenology, p. 63 
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aside the second truth, its having been, its supersession, and thereby 
negate the negation of the 'Now', and thus return to the first assertion, 
that the 'Now' is. The 'Now'. and pointing out the 'Now', are thus so 
constituted that neither the one nor the other is something immediate and 
simple, but a movement which contains various moments 20 
According to this analysis, then, the negation which is the 'Now' is also 
inevitably negated, and it is this negation of negation which produces a general 
form of the 'Now'. It is this general or universal form of the 'Now' that is also 
described as a 'movement' and is indistinguishable from the movement of the 
dialectic as a whole - or the movement of becoming. 
The dynamic nature of the Hegelian dialectic and its corresponding 
conceptualisation of time guarantees the continuity required by the Hegelian 
system. By constructing his account of time as a dialectic of the 'Now', time 
becomes a continuous succession of precise instants. However it is both the 
dependence of this notion of time on the instant and the continuity that this 
demands that will enable us to treat it as an example of historicism. Although the 
account given above would allow us to position Hegel as privileging becoming 
over being, there is always the danger that this becoming is directed towards a 
specific, and pre-ordained goal. Whether this is cashed out in tenns of 'Absolute 
Knowing', the unity of subject and object, or the 'end of history' it would appear 
19 Ibid. p. 67 
20 lbid p. 634. 
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to be moving towards a final, static, atemporal Being. 21 Indeed, if we read 
Hegel's dialectic as an 'absolute method' committed to these goals rather than as 
an open-ended process, the consequences for the present become more serious. 
As Osbome remarks; 'Hegel's method - dialectic as absolute method - 
eternalizes the present' because the production of absolute knowledge and the 
4 end of history' abolish the past (as past) and the future, respectively. 22 
I have noted above that Hegel's concept of time and movement starts out from a 
spatial analogy of the 'Now', and that the construction of this notion of time as a 
movement of the 'Now' guarantees the seamless continuity of the movement of 
time and becoming. However as this is the continuity of a negation of negation it 
still lacks any graspable, concrete reality. Although Hegelian time incorporates 
and instantiates becoming, this is still a very abstract notion of becoming. Its 
continuity and movement depends on immaterial instants. 
What is most obviously at stake in the different conceptions of the dialectic in 
Benjamin and Hegel can be approached through an exploration of how they differ 
in their construction of the present or the 'Now'. As we have seen, for Hegel the 
'Now' is the motor and guarantee of the continuity of the dialectic. For 
Benjamin however, the present has a completely different nature and function. 
" It must be noted that the assumption that Hegel was committed to a teleological view of history 
has been challenged by many commentators. See Rolf Ahers' 'The Dialectic in Hegel's 
Philosophy of History' in History andSývStem: Hegel's Philosophy offfistory, ed. R. L. Perkins, 
New York, SUNY, 1984 for a criticism of readings of Hegel which assume a 'mythology of 
automatic progress in history'. 
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Benjamin's version of the present can be discovered in his concept of Jetztzeit or 
'Nowtime' which rather than guaranteeing a seamless continuity of the dynamic 
dialectic, brings it to a disruptive halt. As we have seen in Chapter 1, Jetztzeit 
brings dialectics to a standstill. 
Benjamin's Present 
Benjamin is careful to distinguish the present (Gegenwart) from his Nowtime 
(Jetztzeit). It is his reconceptualisation of time that begins to move us towards a 
different experience of time as well as a different metaphysics of time. Although 
I have been emphasising the stasis of Benjamin's Jetztzeit, it needs to be made 
clear that this is modelled on the stasis of a messianic interruption which would 
differ significantly from a stasis that would be thought of as dead or inert. This 
kind of stasis can be thought of as bringing movement to a stop; but it is not 
analogous to the gradual, or even sudden, application of brakes to a speeding 
vehicle. A more useful analogy might be to think of it as a freeze-frame 
interrupting a moving image. It is an instantaneous halt not a slowing down, 
however rapid. The notion of the instant would seem to comply with both the 
thinking of the present as the Hegelian 'Now', which can be characterised as a 
transition from one point in time to the next, and the Benjaminian Jetztzeit which 
he describes as 'a present which is not a transition, but in which time stands still 
and has come to a stop. ' 23 
22 Osbome, Politics of Time, p. 42. 
Illuminations, p. 254. 
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It will prove useful then to try to develop a notion of full, heterogeneous time. 
Just to think about time as having a fullness already gives us a clue as to how this 
might work. The phrase 'in the fullness of time' suggests a completion that is 
perhaps influenced by fate or at least some sort of guiding force or spirit. Indeed 
this fullness of time for Benjamin will also have something of the messianic 
1: 1'k about it. It will not be the completeness of a teleological end point, although it 
will be the completeness of an eschatological fulfilment. So full time is also 
fulfilled time. The moment of Jetztzeit will also be a fulfilled now due to its own 
messianic structure. This is the moment that 'every second of time was the strait 
gate through which the Messiah might enter. 24 The completion or the fullness of 
time, can then come in any instant, it can exist in this instant now, at this time 
now. The completion could take place in every now which differentiates it 
ftulher from a completion that would be the result or end point of a process, such 
as the Hegelian dialectical process. This aspect of fullness as completion and 
fulfilment will be developed into the account of the revolutionary aspect of 
Benjamin's conception of time, because with its fulfilment and completion will 
come a different, more fulfilled, experience of time and culture. 
What is it that is fulfilling about this time? What is this time so filled full of that 
it will burst open and explode the historical continuum of Hegelian dialectical 
time? Giorgio Agamben suggests that there is already an experience available to 
us that would enable us to understand this concept of time and experience. This 
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is the experience of pleasure" which would also support the reading of fullness 
as fulfilment, and even the satiated fulfilment of gastronomic or sexual pleasure. 
He also points out that this account even accords with Aristotle') s deliberations on 
pleasure which assume it to be heterogeneous and 'within each now something 
26 
whole and complete' . This completeness 
in every moment of pleasure can also 
be seen in the thought of the monadic structure of the full time of Jetztzeit. 
According to this thought we could see the completion of history in every 
moment of time. 
It is in the possibility of pleasure, completion or happiness in time and history 
that Benjamin again diverges radicallY from Hegel. If dialectical thinking is 
driven by an attempt to solve contradictions, we would assume that pleasure, 
happiness and completion could only result from the final resolution of 
contradictions. For Hegel this could only take place at the end of the dynamic 
process of history. He states boldly in his introduction to his Lectures on the 
27 Philosophy of History that 'history is not the place for happiness' . Max Pensky 
suggests that although Benjamin's and Hegel's dialectics may differ in their 
respective static and dynamic natures they are both melancholy thinkers who 
reject any promise of happiness within history. 28 But although this is an accurate 
interpretation of Benjamin's position on historical time as portrayed by 
24 Ibid., p. 255. 
25 Giorgio Agamben, Infancy and History: Essays on the Destruction ofExperience, p. 104. 
26 Ibid. p. 104 
27 Hegel, Introduction to the Philosophy qf History, p. 29. 
28 max Pensky, melancholy Dialectics: Walter Benjamin's Play of Mourning, Amherst, 
Mass, 1993, p. 17. 
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historicism, I would argue that it fails to consider the promise of happiness in 
history evoked by the messianic structure of Jetztzeit. 29 
The possibility that the Messiah might arrive at any second not only holds out a 
hope for happiness in the future. For Benjamin it promises a hope for the past and 
a rescue of the past. Rather than supposing that we can only have contradictions 
resolved at the end of history, or even through the mediation of 'the total social 
process', Benjamin's fulfilled time gives us the possibility to grasp the moment 
in all its fullness and to liberate ourselves in history, not from it. The happiness 
promised in Benjamin's concept of time and history is not an escape from the 
painful contradictions of our position in history but a fulfilled possession of the 
pleasure of our own lived experience. 
Benjamin's Non-Hegelian Dialectics 
Benjamin's Jetztzeit is most famously at work in his own most dialeetical 
formulation - the dialectical image. It is through his own description of this 
difficult construction that we will best gain an insight into what dialectics might 
mean for Benjamin: 
29 Osborne is another commentator who refuses an account of fulfilment in Benjamin. He suggests 
that 'Benjmain's 'now' is one of futurity rather than fulfilment' due to the 'exteriority of 
Benjamin's materialist messianism' (The Politics of Time, p. 177). However, I would argue, 
following Agamben's reading of the doubleness of the Messiah in chapter I- the Messiah as both 
legislator and redeemer, internal and external - that we can read both futurity and fulfilment into 
Benjamin's 'now'. 
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Thinking involves both thoughts in motion and thoughts at rest. When 
thinking reaches a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions, the 
dialectical image appears. This image is the caesura in the movement of 
thought. Its locus is of course not arbitrary. In short, it is to be found 
wherever the tension between dialectical oppositions is greatest. The 
dialectical image is, accordingly, the very object constructed in the 
materialist presentation of history. It is identical with the historical 
object; it justifies its being blasted out of the continuum of the historical 
process. 
30 
We shall see that this conception of dialectics diverges radically from any 
orthodox Hegelian theory. Although during a discussion of dialectics at a 
standstill in the first version of his essays on Brecht, 'What is Epic Theatre? ' 
(193 1), he suggests that this could be a respectable Hegelian construction: 
The conditions which epic theatre reveals is the dialectic at a standstill. 
For just as, in Hegel, the sequence of time is not the mother of the 
dialectic but only the medium in which the dialectic manifests itself, so in 
epic theatre the dialectic is not bom of the contradiction between 
successive statements or ways of behaving, but of the gesture itself . 
31 
The view that the dialectic is not born out of the sequence of time but manifests 
itself in it, fits comfortably with Hegel's notion of the dialectic, but it is the 
nature of the sequence of time that would differ radically between Hegel's and 
Benjamin's dialectics. If the dialectic is born. of the gesture in epic theatre we are 
30 NI Oa, 3 
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left unclear as to what would correspond to this in Hegel. Benjamin privileges 
gesture in epic theatre precisely because it is able to interrupt the continuous flow 
of scenes in time, as well as being 'the basis of each sequence in time'32. If we 
can agree that Hegel's dialectic takes place in the sequence of time we can also 
admit the possibility of bringing this process to a halt. For Benjamin, however, it 
is not just a possibility but a necessity that we discover dialectics at a standstill, 
and this is due to the nature of the time at work as the medium of the dialectic. It 
is only in the later theses 'On the Concept of History' that Benjamin explicitly 
criticises the account of time at work in the concept of dialectic as a continuous 
process. This will become the 'homogeneous, empty time' of Thesis XIV, 
which he replaces with a notion of time that is 'filled by the presence of the now 
-) 33 [Jetztzeit] . 
While Hegel's dialectic can be read as a continuous process, Benjwnin's is an 
attempt to destroy the continuity of that process. Benjamin's dialectics at a 
standstill reappropriates the Hegelian Au)hebung (supersession, preservation, 
destruction) in order to destroy the 'homogenous, empty time' of historicism. 
However, this is not a purely destructive gesture; Benjamin's Aujhebung also 
retains what has been destroyed in a totality. Or, as Michael Lbwy argues in his 
analysis of Benjamin's dialectical conception of culture; the preservation of the 
Au)'hebung is also destructive because 'only by breaking the reffied shell of 
official culture does it become possible for the oppressed to take possession of 
31 Walter Benjamin, Understanding Brecht, London, Verso, 1977, p. 12. 
32 lbid p. 12 
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[the] utopian kernel. ý34 Even though the destructive aspect of dialectics does, at 
times, seem to be favoured or emphasised by Benjamin this destruction always 
works as a kind of liberating release or rescue. The continuity of the historicist 
version of history is destroyed to release its historical objects from their 
imprisonment within it. 
Benjamin's dialectics must also be seen as part of his analysis of modernity. It is 
not just an abstracted methodology which can then be used to try and see what 
modernity is 'really' like. It is also a direct engagement with the experience and 
politics of modernity. Another of his criticisms of historicism is that, because of 
its continuity with tradition it produces the appearance of the 'ever the same'. 
Benjamin's dialectical method engages with this as another aspect of his concern 
with the experience of and in modernity. Dialectics at a standstill is a way of 
experiencing which is also trying to experience differently and to experience 
difference: 
It is the unique property of dialectical experience to dissipate the 
appearance of things always being the same (das Schein des Immer- 
Gleichen). Real political experience is absolutely free from this 
35 
appearance. 
Because this is a political intervention we can describe Benjamin's dialectics as 
the political experience of difference. 
33 Walter Benjamin. Illuminations, p. 252/3. 
3 34 Michael L6wy, "'Against the Grain": The Dialectical Conception of Culture in Walter 
Benjamin's Theses of 1940', in Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History, ed. M. P. 
Steinberg, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 211. 
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Although Benjamin claimed that his method was dialectical, Adorno was to 
criticise him for not being dialectical enough. In a response to a draft essay on 
Nineteenth Century Paris 36 he accuses Benjamin of 'wide-eyed presentation of 
mere facts'37 which is a coded reference to its insufficient (Hegelian) mediation. 
That this also places it at the 'crossroads of magic and positivism' 38 does, 
according to Adorno, bring with it all the weight of the implicit critique of 
positivism inherent in Hegel's method. 
Hegel's definition of mediation in the introduction to the Phenomenology of 
Spirit occurs during a discussion that begins with the famous statement that 'The 
True is the whole' in which mediation is understood as, 
nothing beyond self-moving selfsameness, or its reflection into self, the 
moment of the T which is for itself pure negativity or, when reduced to 
its pure abstraction, simple becoming. 39 
This simple becoming is essential to the dynamic of the Hegelian dialectic, and 
there can be no point along the way - as well as no end point - that has not been 
mediated. According to this dialectic, any result will be due to this mediation. 
Adorno's criticism is linked to his concern over Benjamin's apparent 
extrapolation from 'general theoretical discussion' to 'concrete representation'. 
3 35 N 9,5. 
3' Benjamin's essay is now published as 'The Paris of the Second Empire in Baudelaire' in Walter 
Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire, London, Verso, 1997. 
37 Adorno et. al. Aesthetics and Politics, trans. Ronald Taylor, London, Verso, 1977, p. 129. 
38 lbid p. 129. 
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He considers this to be part of a tendency on Benjamin's part to give 'individual 
features from the realm of the superstructure a "materialistic" turn by relating 
them immediately and perhaps even causally to corresponding features of the 
40 jamin infrastructure' 
. This is where the 
danger of positivism appears. If Ben 
were to take these features of the infrastructure - which Adomo also refers to as 
(cultural traits' - as 'facts' of the kind beloved by empiricists, and if he also 
supposed that that certain key features of the superstructure could map onto these 
directly, then this might be a fair and accurate accusation. 
For Adomo the 'Materialist determination of cultural traits is only possible if it is 
mediated through the total social process' 41 . We can catch another glimpse of 
Adorno's Hegelianism in his use of this 'total social process', in that it appears to 
be a version of Hegel's 'whole' - even if Adomo reverses Hegel's faith in the 
truth of the whole to a despairing rejection of the whole as the false. 42 
Giorgio Agamben has also interpreted Adorno's criticism of Benjamin's lack of 
mediation. He helpfully labels the different stances as 'dialectical historicism' 
(Adomo) and 'historical materialism' (Benjamin). 43 In this criticism he also 
draws attention to the primacy of the concept of time at work in the competing 
versions of the dialectic. However he places this difference as emerging from 
39 G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of5pirit, p. 11. 
40 
.4 esthetics and 
Politics p. 129. 
41 Ibid. 129. 
42 For Hegel's statement that 'The True is the Whole' see G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of 
Spirit, p. 11. For Adorno's 'The whole is the false' see Minima Moralia : Reflections From 
Damaged Life, trans. EX. N. Jephcott, London, Verso, 1978, p. 50. 
43 Agamben, 'The Prince and the Frog: The Question of Method in Adorno and Benjamin', in 
lq/ancy & Hisloty. P. 120. 
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their differing conceptions of the correct interpretation of the relationship 
between 'structure and superstructure'. As we have seen, Adorno insists on a 
mediated relationship between these two realms, and this would be an eminently 
Hegelian mediation. However Benjamin refuses this mediation through his 
insistent invocation of the monad. He states in a note on the basic doctrine of 
historical materialism that 'Wherever a dialectical process takes place, we are 
dealing with a monad. 944 
The Leibnizian provenance of Ben amin's monads is traced by Andrew Benjamin i 
who shows that they are concerned with 'the internality of the 'historical 
object'. 45 This can also be derived from Leibniz's statement in the Monadology 
that 'the natural changes of monads come from an internal principle, since an 
external cause could not influence their inner being. A6 So for both Leibniz and 
Walter Benjamin all futural possibilities exist within the monad. But Andrew 
Benjamin also draws attention to a significant difference in these conceptions of 
the monad. For Leibniz monads operate in a temporality of 'continuous and 
continued self-completion 47 which would deny them the opportunity to explode 
the historical continuum. Whereas their function for Walter Benjamin is to act as 
part of a disruptive device. 
44N 11,4. 
45 Andrew Benjamin, 'Time and Task', in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy, eds. A. Benjamin and 
P. Osborne. London, Routledge, 1994, p. 237. 
46 Leibniz, Monadology, 11, 
47 Andrew Benjamin, 'Time and Task', p. 239. 
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Irving Wohlfarth traces Benjamin's use of monads in relation to historical objects 
back to his re-working of origin (Ursprung) in The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama. He reads Benjamin's description of an origin as 'an eddy in the stream of 
becoming -)48 as another example of disrupting the continuous flow of time. 
Wohlfarth describes origin and monad as both involving a leap (Sprung) 'or 
compression of ordinary time and the concomitant emergence of another, more 
originary temporality. ' 49 Benjamin suggests that the historical object is 
understood, not by opening it up to an external gaze but it is instead revitalized 
by 'constitut[ing] itself as a monad. In the monad everything that used to lie in 
mythical rigidity as a textual reference comes alive. ' 50 The monad seems to arise 
through the convergence of the historical perspective and 'our own historical 
experience' which appears to complete the image. 
Far from a lack of mediation which would present the object under the enchanted 
'appearance of closed facticity', Benjamin brings together an historical 
perspective with 'our own historical experience', and is able to bring the object 
'into its own ý51 By presenting the object as a monad that has come into its own 
Benjamin side-steps the question of mediation because a monad must be an 
already completed or fulfilled process of becoming. In other words a monad can 
also be described as a totality in which this mediation or simple becoming is 
48 Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. John Osborne, London, Verso, 1977, p. 
45. 
49 Irving Wohlfarth, 'Smashing the Kaleidoscope: Walter Benjamin's Critique of Cultural 
History' in Walter Benjamin and the Demands of History Op. Cit. p. 193. 
50 
. -1 esthet 
ics and Politics p-13. ) 7. 
51 Ibid., p. 137. 
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always already underway and at the same time completed. We can only assume 
from this characteristically opaque reference to monads that the mediation 
through the total social process that Adorno demands is mirrored within this 
micro-totality. 
The appeal to the monadic construction of the object could be read as an 
ingenious attempt on Benjamin's part to reclaim the expected Hegelian 
respectability of his theory without having to overcome his own enchantment by 
the material minutiae of the text. To describe this in terms of parts and wholes, 
we could say that by allowing the object to constitute itself as a monad 
transforms it from being an isolated part of the 'total social process' (the whole) 
to a whole in its own right. If this is the case we are presented with a complete 
process rather than a discrete event: a process that, in being unimediated, is 
stopped in its tracks. However, it is the question of the dynamic or static nature 
of the dialectic that is one of the major and irreducible differences between 
Benjamin's and Hegel's conceptions of the dialectic. The monad is not used to 
smuggle in some respectable Hegelian dynamism, but to exaggerate the static, yet 
dynamic, nature of dialectics as Benjamin understands it. This use of monads 
overcomes certain difficulties that we might have in reconciling Benjamin's 
notion of dialectical images, as dialectics at a standstill, with the more obviously 
dynamic nature of Hegel's dialectic. In fact, far from being the kind of face- 
saving gesture suggested above, monads become inseparable from dialectics for 
Benjamin. 
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Although Benjamin's reliance on the Leibnizian notion of 'monad' does, in some 
sense,, avoid Hegelianismq he can still be described as carrying out his own 
supersession (Aujhebung) of structure and superstructure. It is the Aujhebung in 
which structure and superstructure become unified in the same monadic entity. 
As Agamben puts it 'the structure is the superstructure' 52 . However this 
dialectical Aufhebung also has other subtle but crucial differences that distance 
Benjamin from both Hegel and Adorno. As we have seen above, Adorno 
accused Benjamin's reading of the Baudelaire and the Paris Arcades of being 
unmediated. But Adomo's insistence on mediation through the total social 
process also bears within it a presupposition that the only other possible reading 
would be one that attributed a causal relationship between structure and 
superstructure. 
As we have seen from the discussion of both Hegel's and Benjamin's 
conceptions of time at work in the dialectic, for Benjamin the Aujhebung of 
structure and superstructure is not one that will occur as part of an ongoing 
process. It takes place in this dialectic which is 'at a standstill'. But Benjamin's 
formulation also guarantees a more materialist dialeetic. This is alluded to in the 
distinction Agamben makes between Adorno's 'dialectical historicism' and 
Benjamin's 'dialectical materialism'. What is less material about Adorno's 
method is that by retaining its Hegelian, developmental historicism and the 
accompanying account of time it still requires an extravagant level of abstraction. 
52 Agamben, 'The Prince and the Frog', p. 123. 
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Agamben suggests that a Benjamin-like conception of time as Jetztzeit is required 
in order to produce 'a dialectic that is truly freed from all 'abstractness". 53 
To be free of all abstractness would also suggest a freedom from mediation - 
from mediation of the material monad. Agamben is correct in as much as he 
diagnoses this freedom from abstraction in Benjamin's work. He is also able to 
make a very useful connection to another of Benjamin's Aujhebungen in the early 
essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities. 54 In this essay Benjamin overcomes the 
distinction between the material content or subject matter (Sachgehalt) and truth 
content (Wahrheitsgehalt) in such a way that they both remain distinct objects of 
investigation while at the same time directly corresponding to each other. 
For Adomo, there are still only two possible positions to take on the relationship 
between structure and superstructure - either the dialectical or the causal. And, 
for him, it is always the dialectical that will give the most accurate analysis of the 
relationship. This can be read as an aspect of his thought that can be traced not 
only to his avowed Hegelianism, but also to his equally avowed Marxism. He 
gives his criticisms of Benjamin an explicitly Marxist gloss through his demand 
for mediation through the total social process. What Adorno considers to be 
essential to both Hegelian and Marxist analysis is this idea of 'universal 
mediation' which 'produces the totality' 55 . It is the lack of this 'universal 
mediation' that he diagnoses as being the cause of Benjamin's theoretical 
53 Ibid., p. 123. 
Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings, Vol. 1, pp. 297-360 
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infirmity. Indeed, because Benjamin lacks this mediation he is accused of 
lacking any adequate theory altogether. 56 
On the other hand, however, Agamben reads Adorno's commitment to 'universal 
mediation' as contributing to a blind-spot in Adorno's own thinking. He 
suggests that this also commits Adorno to an illegitimate level of abstraction. 
According to Agamben, Adorno's Hegelianism means that he is 'renouncing the 
concrete grasp of each single event and each present instant of praxis in favour of 
deferral to the final instance of the total social process' 57 . This is then considered 
by Agamben to be a betrayal of the Marxian critique of Hegel as a purely 
, "'k 
58 
abstract, formal process'. According to this analysis Adorno's dialectical 
historicism becomes almost indistinguishable from Hegel's. 
If we are to distinguish Benjamin's 'historical materialism' from this 'dialectical 
historicism' we need to be wary of following Adomo's diagnosis too uncritically. 
We can agree that there is no universal mediation which would produce a totality, 
but it does not necessarily follow from this that Benjamin's analysis of the 
structure/superstructure relationship must fall back into a simple causal model. 
According to Agamben, Benjamin's analysis is much more faithfully Marxian 
because, 
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- Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber, London, Neville Spearman, 1967, p. 236. 
56 
.4 esthetics and 
Politics, p. 129. 
57 Agamben, 'The Prince and the Frog', p. 118. 
58 Ibid., p. 118. 
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Marx abolishes the metaphysical distinction between animal and ratio, 
between nature and culture, between matter and form in order to state that 
within praxis animality is humanity, nature is culture, matter is form. If 
this is true, the relationship between structure and superstructure can 
neither be one of causal determination nor one of dialectical mediation, 
but one of direct correspondence. ' 59 
Benjamin's historical materialism does not lack mediation. It has no need of it, 
because the poles that are presumed by Adorno to require its services are also 
shown to be in direct correspondence with each other. Although in his response 
to Adorno,, Benjamin suggests that 'the philological interpretation of the author 
ought to be preserved and surpassed in the Hegelian Manner 60 , 
his Au)hebung, is 
still proudly lacking in any orthodox Hegelian mediation or becoming. 
Benjamin's Aujhebung produces another 'third thing'. The messianic and 
historical temporalities concerned in Benjamin's mediation lead Osborne to 
describe it in tenns of 'a switch between circuits' rather than 'the production of a 
shared conceptual space'. This non-Hegelian, transformational retains its futural 
possibilities as well as holding open the past through thinking the 'now' as 
Jetztzeil. 61 
59 Ibid., p. 119-20. 
60 Benjamin, Aesthetics and Politics, p. 136. 
(11 Osborne, The Politics of Time, p. 15 1. Not only does Osborne allow this to be described as a 
form of mediation, he also constructs a narrative form in which Benjamin's revolutionary 
temporalities can function. He describes Benjamin's 'now' as 'an integral moment within a new, 
non-traditional, future-oriented and internally disrupted form of narrativity. ' (p. 159). 1 believe 
this position to be consistent with my own as it is definitely not an attempt to reclaim Benjamin's 
now as a form of, what I have described in Chapter I as, Story-time. 
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Agamben shows the methodological continuity between Benjamin's concept of 
criticism in his early essay on Goethe's Elective Affinities. In that essay Benjamin 
uses a metaphor to try and explain the relationship between material content and 
truth content. He suggest that, 
If, to use a simile, one views the growing work as a funeral pyre, its 
commentator can be likened to the chemist, its critic to an alchemist. 
)While the former is left with wood and ashes as the sole object of his 
analysis, the latter is concerned only with the enigma of the flame itself- 
the enigma of being alive. 
62 
The chemist looks for a causal relationship between two substances (the wood 
and the ashes), but the alchemist focuses on a living unity - the flame. Adorno, 
the 'dialectical historicist',, is like the chemist because he strictly separates the 
structure and superstructure; by contrast Benjamin, the 'historical materialist' 
will see a third, single, monadic historical structure. 
Agamben calls on the notion of praxis to do the work of unifying structure and 
superstructure 63 which would support his reading of Benjamin as remaining more 
faithful to the concrete than Adomo. The idea of praxis would also situate us in 
the terrain of lived experience (Erlebnis) which would again fit more comfortably 
with the idea of dialectics at a standstill, because it could also be interpreted as an 
instantaneous and immediate decision which could interrupt the continuity of 
history. 
62 Benjamin, 'Goethe's Elective Afflinitles', p. 298. 
104 
Reading Hegel Against the Grain. 
Although Agamben's reading of Benjamin is useftil in determining what 
dialectics at a standstill might look like, I would suggest that his reading of 
Adorno's dialectical historicism is flawed. If we were to be convinced by 
Agamben's reading, Adorno would be committed to a dialectical historicism 
virtually indistinguishable from Hegel's. However if we turn to Adorno's own 
reading of Hegel, a picture of both Hegel and Adomo emerges that is in stark 
contrast to that painted by Agamben. What I would like to show is that rather 
than being left with the impression of a rigidly Hegelian Adorno, there is a more 
flexible, Benjaminian Hegel that emerges from Adomo's own reading. 
The first clue to support this claim comes from Shierry Weber Nicholsen's 
introduction to her translation of Adorno's Hegel: Three Studies. Here she 
claims that 'Adomo presents a Hegel read against the grain'. 64 This is an obvious 
reference to Ben amin's project of brushing history against the grain and must be i 
considered in the light of Benjamin's enterprise. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, Benjamin used this phrase in Thesis VII as a way of emphasising the 
historical and cultural debt owed to the anonymous and forgotten figures of 
history. By using this tenninology Nicholsen is suggesting that Adomo is 
attempting to make Hegel relevant and useful to whatever has been excluded 
63 Agamben, 'The Prince and the Frog', p. 122. 
"4 T. W. Adomo, Hegel: Three Studies trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen, London, MIT, 1994, p. 
j. 
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from his system. This is different from Marx turning Hegel on his head because 
it is not a mere substitution of the material for the ideal. Instead Adorno is 
attempting an immanent criticism of Hegel, one which can follow the logic of his 
theory and system and bring out the contemporary and relevant truth content 
buried deep within it. The idea of an immanent criticism and its accompanying 
notion of truth content can once again be traced back to Benjamin's essay on 
Goethe's Elective Affinities. The truth content is what Adomo would like to 
produce by brushing Hegel against the grain. Instead of a criticism that would 
explore where Hegel has simply gone wrong, such an immanent criticism will 
produce the 'truth' in Hegel - even if in Adomo's assessment this is a negative 
truth. 
Even though we can discover a Benjaminian methodology at work in Adomo's 
approach to Hegel, this is not the same as showing how Adomo 'Benjaminizes' 
Hegel. The strongest evidence in favour of this claim emerges in a discussion on 
the role of parts and wholes in Hegel's system. As has been shown above, a 
useful way of delineating the differences between Benjamin's and Hegel's 
conceptions of the dialectic is to examine the role that parts and wholes play in 
their dialectical methods. But having argued that Benjamin, to a certain extent, 
privileges the role of parts in his dialectic, it is surprising to find Adomo 
claiming something similar for Hegel. Although he acknowledges that Hegel 
'recognized the primacy of the whole over its finite parts' 65 he goes on to claim 
that 'If Hegel's whole exists at all it is only as the quintessence of the partial 
65 Ibid. pA 
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moments, which always point beyond themselves and are generated from one 
another. ' Although Adorno describes the whole's debt to its parts in terms of 
totality rather than monads, it is clear that he considers Hegel's treatment of 
wholes and parts as a dialectical relationship which cannot be reduced to a simple 
opposition. Instead he insists that the category of totality is not a purely abstract 
metaphysical principle, but that it is instead meant to convey its immanent 
relationship to the parts of which it is constituted, and to the fact that it does not 
transcend, or exist beyond, these parts. 
For Hegel, the relationship of parts and wholes is the relationship of moments to 
the system, respectively. Just as with Benjamin's monads, so the partial 
moments have the whole 'already inherent in every one of them' according to 
Adorno. He continues by stating that the concept of system at work here already 
9 66 'implies the identity of subject and object . It is here that the influence of 
Benjamin starts to fail, because the mediation to which Adorno is so committed 
leads to the collapse of any difference between sub ect and object. Benjamin's j 
method has the advantage that it allows differences to be maintained at the same 
time as they are in direct, unmediated correspondence. 
Of course Adomo will insist that the relationship between these wholes and parts 
must be mediated in a truly Hegelian dialectical fashion - that they must 
participate in the process of simple becoming. However even though this is still 
subscribing to a dynamic, processual model of the dialectic, it is no longer a 
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simple linear model of continuity. According to Adorno's analysis, the 
connection between the various stages of this simple becoming is unmistakablY 
discontinuous. He claims that for Hegel, 
connection is not a matter of unbroken transition but a matter of sudden 
change, and the process takes place not through the moments approaching 
one another but through rupture. 67 
If this is the case then it will also have major repercussions for the concept of 
time that we have attributed to Hegel, because this reading took him to be 
committed to a continuous process emerging from the 'Now'. Not only will this 
involve a revised conception of time, but it will also accord with the demand for 
discontinuity and rupture that occurs throughout Benjamin's work. 
The suggestion that Hegel's dialectic is one of rupture and discontinuity is a very 
unorthodox reading. Adorno recognises this in his own reading of Hegel against 
the grain when he suggests that even Hegel failed to notice the discontinuity 
within his own system: 
Hegel praised the greater consistency of Kant's successors in comparison 
with the abysmal discontinuities of the Kantian system, and he even 
outdid them in this regard. It did not occur to him that the Kantian 
discontinuities register the very moment of nonidentity that is an 
indispensable part of his own conception of philosophy. 68 
66 Ibid. p. 77. 
67 Ibid. p. 4-5. 
68 Ibid. p. II- 
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Adorno suggests that this dialectic of rupture and discontinuity can be 
extrapolated from Hegel's earlier work such as the PhenomenoloýT of Spirit. He 
doesn't go so far as to suggest that this discontinuity is also at play in the later 
work such as the Philosophy of Right or the Lectures on the Philosophy of 
History. These later works are characterised as showing a 'tendency to 
harmony'. 69 This would suggest that it must be the contlict at the heart of works 
such as the Phenomenology that persuades Adorno of the rupturing fonn of the 
dialectic. It is understandable how he might arrive at this decision if we are to 
take the Master/Slave narrative in the Phenomenology as paradigmatic of the 
Hegelian dialectical process. This is obviously based on the conflict between 
individuals, and the idea of discontinuity or rupture must be derived from the 
outcome of this struggle for recognition, Perhaps the discontinuity is also 
attributed to the moments of recognition within the Hegelian system - the 
moment when the Master is recognised as Master by the Slave, and the moment 
when the Master recognises that he owes his own status to his recognition by his 
slave 70 . It is the temporality of the recognition that Adorno is attempting to 
negotiate in his reading of Hegel. He is suggesting that this is not another 
example of continuous progress or steady change, but that the speed of the 
change is infinite. If he is suggesting that the moment of recognition is 
69 Ibid. 4. 
70 It must be noted that Hegel's theory of recognition cannot be taken a separate theory in its own 
right, as in the theory of time, history, etcetera, it should be treated as an important principle 
within the overall, interconnected theory. This point as well as a detailed account of the paradoxes 
that emerge from the fact that the relata (the agents) also being relational within the theory of 
recognition are laid out in L. Siep's. 4nerkennung als Prinzip der praktischen Philosophie. 
Untersuchen :u Hegels Jenaer Philosophie des Geistes. Freiberg: Karl Alber, 1979. As Siep 
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instantaneous, and that this instant disrupts and ruptures the continuity of the 
dialectic, then we do indeed have a reading of Hegel that would position him 
much closer to Benjamin than had previously been imagined. 
As we have seen, for Benjamin the dialectic is a process to be interrupted, halted, 
or blasted open. His criticism of historicism and its 'homogenous empty time' 
has been described above as a criticism of a Hegelian version of the dialectic. 
But if Adomo is correct in his analysis of the Hegelian notion of totality, and the 
total process that would constitute it, then it would seem that this total process is 
open to the very interruptions and explosive ruptures that Benjamin is 
advocating. The speed of the change, its suddenness, could make way for a re- 
evaluation of the notion of the 'Now' which is at work in the dialectic. Instead of 
the traditional instant which guarantees continuity we could re-describe this 
Hegelian moment of sudden change and rupture as something more like 
Benjamin's Jetztzeit. 
It is interesting to note that although Benjamin obviously influenced Adorno's 
reading of Hegel, Benjamin, saw his dialectics at a standstill resulting to some 
extent from Adorno's reading of Hegel. Adorno's study of Hegel was not 
published until 1963, twenty three years after Benjamin's death, but in some 
preparatory notes for the Arcades Project written in 1934 Benjamin notes 
'Wiesengrund [Adorno"s 'German" surname] Dialectical image and dialectics at a 
points out Hegel sets out his own solutions to these paradoxes in his accounts of 'reflection' and 
the 'logic of essence'. 
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standstill in Hegel' .71 This adds confusion to the provenance of 
'dialectical 
images' because Adorno's first recorded use of this is in his book on Kierkegaard 
where he directly attributes it to Benjamin. 72 In the same notes it appears that 
Benjamin has also set himself the task to 'Reread Hegel on dialectics at a 
standsti 11-)73 which would suggest that the notion can be traced back to Hegel 
himself However, there is no evidence to suggest that Benjamin ever carried out 
this rereading, neither are there any references as to where Hegel sets out his 
thoughts on dialectics at a standstill. 
am not suggesting that we can completely revise our analysis of the conception 
of time in Hegel, merely that Aclorno's representation of Hegel would lead to a 
conception of time that was not so completely continuous. Neither would I 
suggest that both Adomo and Benjamin are simply misreading or misrepresenting 
Hegel. Instead I would suggest that in reading Hegel against the grain, as the 
result of a method strongly influenced by Benjamin's notion of dialectical 
images, Adomo has discovered the truth content of rupture in the paradigmatic 
account of continuity. 
As should be clear by now, Adorno's main criticism of Benjamin, was his lack of 
mediation. But it is around this question of mediation that another of Adorno's 
(perhaps unconscious) Benjaminisations of Hegel takes place. We see this in his 
-1 Areades Project. p. 912. 
72 'They may be called dialectical images, to use Benjamin's expression... ' Adomo, Kierkegaard, 
Tubingen, 1933, p. 60. 
favourable assessment of Hegel's response to the Kantian legacy of extremes (or 
poles) such as 'form and content, nature and spirit, theory and praxis, freedom 
and necessity, the thing in itself and the phenomenon'. 74 Adorno insists that these 
extremes are mediated in Hegel, but in a very specific way. Thus Adorno claims 
that, 
for Hegel mediation is never a middle element between extremes 
instead mediation takes place in and through the extremes, in the 
extremes themselves. 
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However, Adorno develops this mediation between extremes which is not a 
middle element in the process into the process itself Although he refuses a 
description of mediation as a middle element, the dialectic, as a relationship, 
remains a process rather than a direct correspondence. 
Hegel shows that the fundamental ontological contents that traditional 
philosophy hoped to distill are not ideas discretely set off from one 
another; rather each of them requires its opposite, and the relationship of 
all of them to one another is one of process. 76 
The supposition that ideas can only exist in relationship to other ideas could 
either lead to, or be derived from, Benjamin's constellations, while the insistence 
that this relationship must be one of process is antithetical to the static tensions at 
work in Benjamin's dialectical images. 
73 
4rcades Project, p. 912. 
74 Adomo, Hegel: Three Studies, p. 8. 
15 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
76 Ibid., p. 9. 
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Adorno's evocation of extremes in Hegel's dialectic can be read as another aspect 
of Benjamin's influence on Adorno's thinking. And the attempt to overcome the 
fixed separation of the poles can be identified as a common motif in both Hegel 
and Ben amin. Hegel set out to accomplish this through arriving at the subject- i 
object, whereas Benjamin tried varied devices such as the 'third-thing'. What 
links these attempts further and brings the different dialectics much closer 
together can be discovered in their shared concern for extremes. We might say 
that both Benjamin's and Hegel's dialectics are dialectics of extremes. 
Benjamin brought together various extremes in his own dialectic and method, not 
to neutralise or homogenise them, but to produce an explosive combination. It is 
in the extremes of the past and the present and the extremes of theology and 
historical materialism that he finds the potent mixture for his dialectical images. 
He discusses the methodological importance of extremes in his Origin of German 
Tragic Drama (1925). During a discussion of 'ideas' (Ideen) he suggests that 
'The idea is best explained as the presentation of the context within which the 
unique (Einmalig) and extreme (Extreme) stands alongside its counterpart. -)77 
Because this is the 'presentation of the context' its shape is determined more by 
its extremes (or extremities) than by its more average or easily encompassed 
elements. Indeed it is only by taking account of an object's extremities that we 
can grasp its shape. 
7 17 Orikin of German Tragic Drama. p. 3 5. 
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Benjamin's use of extremes can also be used to show how his later notion of 
dialectics at a standstill and the stasis at work in the dialectical image is not a 
stultifying, terminal stasis but an explosive tension. Here in the attempt to present 
'ideas', he is not presenting them as fixed or ahistorical. It is through the 
extremes - the difficult to accommodate elements precariously balanced on the 
edges and borders of the context - that the ideas come to life: 'ideas come to life 
only when extremes are assembled around them' 78 
Benjamin's use of extremes here follows from his evocation of constellations, 
79 
which he considers to be analogous to ideas . What is of particular interest to us 
here is that it is this very discussion of constellations in the 'Episterno-Critical 
Prologue' that was most influential on Adorno's own thinking. 80 And it is here 
that Benjamin attempts to set out a theory in which general ideas emerge from the 
particulars themselves in all their differences and extremes. Adorno recognised 
the groundbreaking possibilities for a materialist theory in Benjamin's use of 
constellations, 
Even at this early stage of the 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue' (1925), and before 
when he wrote his essay 'Critique if Violence' (1921), Benjamin was doing his 
78 Ibid. p. 35 
79A discussion of Benjamin's use of 'constellations' will take place in Chapter 3. 
'0 See Gillian Rose, Melancholy Science: An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W Adorno, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 198 1, pp. 3542,61,90; Susan Buck-Morss, The Origin ofNegative 
Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute, New York, Free 
Press, 1977; and Adomo's own discussion of constellations in Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. 
Ashton, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984, pp. 162-164. 
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utmost to avoid a role for mediation in theory. It was in the 'Violence' essay that 
he called for pure or unmediated positing (Setzung). Again this produces 
resonances with Hegel as he has stated even earlier in his dissertation The 
Concept of* Criticism in German Romanticism (1919), that 'the concept of 
positing ... appears in its fully developed form in Hegel's dialectic' .81 But this 
would again have to be a mediated positing in Hegel, not the pure unmediated 
and even divine positing of the 'Critique of Violenee'. The dialeetic of extremes 
at work in the influential idea of constellations - and idea as constellation - was 
already a dialectic of unmediated extremes. This early methodological 
innovation would later become manifest in practice in the direct correspondences 
of his analysis of nineteenth century Paris. 
Adorno took Hegel's idealism to lead beyond itself to anti-idealism, and it is in 
this moment that Adorno sees its truth. In fact it is the process itself which is the 
truth for Adomo - 'process, that is, is truth itself -)82 So if we are to take Adomo 
at his word here, the discontinuity and rupture at work in Hegel's dialectic must 
be processual. If they are also to partake of the truth they must also be part of the 
process. 
In contrast to this Benjamin's analysis of nineteenth-century Paris and his critique 
of homogenous, empty time challenge the identification of truth and process. On 
this analysis truths will only arise out of the explosion produced by dialectical 
81 Selected Writings, Vol. 1, P. 123. 
82 Ibid. p. 37. 
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tensions. These explosions cannot be reduced to processes because they are 
instantaneous ruptures that work according to the image logic of the extremes of 
constellations that defy the notion of process altogether. 
It is, of course, this very refusal of Process that Adorno recognises in Benjamin's 
lack of mediation or becoming. Hegel had also labelled such a refusal of 
becoming as scepticism or nihilism and we could interpret Adorno's criticisms of 
Benjamin as a veiled accusation of nihilism. But for Benjamin, the charge of 
nihilism is not always a pejorative one. As we have seen in the 'Theologico- 
Political Fragment', the method of the task of world politics is explicitly 
identified as nihilism. 83 This is nihilism that has been placed in a messianic 
context. Moreover, it is nihilism that is also a precursor of the full-time of 
pleasure and happiness when Benjamin states that 'the order of the profane 
should be erected on the idea of happiness'. 84 Although this order of the profane 
- which is also the world political - pulls in a different direction to the 
Messianic, it also assists it. Happiness is also given as 'the rhythm of Messianic 
nature' 85 and what this nature - and all nature - has in common with nihilism is 
its transience. The Messianic aspect of nature is in its 'eternal and total passing 
away' and the striving after such a passing is nihilism. 
For Benjamin, the passing of time does not lead to a progressive accumulation, 
redemption or reconciliation through the dialectical process. It inevitable leads to 
83 Benjamin, One Woý, Street, p. 156. 
84 Ibid. p. 155. 
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ruin - to passing away. But this passing away does not have to result in a passive 
nihilism. Howard Caygill suggests that, for Benjamin, it also presented the 
opportunity to produce something new. 86 This would be an active nihilism that 
would take transience as presenting opportunities and possibilities. Benjamin's 
concept of time and its static dialectics are an active attempt to destroy tradition, 
rescue the vanquished and create new possibilities for the future. 
In a letter to Scholem, Benjamin brought together his own nihilism with an 
explicit anti-Hegelianism. He stated that he, 
would be surprised if the foundations of my nihilism were not to manifest 
themselves against communism in an antagonistic confrontation with the 
conceptions and assertions of Hegelian dialectic'. 87 
As I have indicated above, this is one of very few references to Hegel in 
Benjamin's work. As Caygill has also pointed out it is curious then that he uses 
another of these rare occasions to give Hegel the last word. In the final paragraph 
of the 1935 expose of the Arcades Project Benjamin discusses the 'ruins of the 
bourgeoisie' in orthodox historical materialist terms of 'the development of 
forces of production'. However he then goes on to describe the cultural changes 
at work as 'residues of a dream-world', and that: 
85 Ibid. p. 156. 
86 Howard Cay,, 'Il, Walter Benjamin: The Colour ofErperience, London, Routledge, 1998. ý1 
30. P. -) 
87 The Correspondencc of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940, ed. Gershorn Scholem and Theodor W. 
Adorno, trans. Manfred R. Jacobson and Evelyn A Jacobson, Chicago, University of Chicago 
Press, 1994, p 248. 
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The actualisation of dream-elements in waking is the textbook example of 
dialectical thought. Hence dialectical thought is the organ of historical 
awakening. Every epoch not only dreams the next, but while dreaming 
impels it towards wakefulness. It bears its end within itself, and reveals it 
- as Hegel already recognised - by ruse. 
88 
From this passage we might assume that Benjamin owes and acknowledges a 
great debt to Hegel's identification of the ruse, or cunning, of reason (its ability to 
recognise, and bring about, the future). But again, this invocation of Hegel is 
double-edged because it is presented in the context of dreaming and waking. 
According to the quotation the dream-elements will always be with us. There is 
no logic - no reason, or time - that does not also have some drearn-logic and 
dream-time smuggled within it. So the 'textbook example of dialectical thought' 
that gestures towards continuous development in historical time only does this 
through dreaming. Historical time is contaminated with dream-time. This is 
another aspect of the heterogeneity of Benjamin's Jetztzeit. Even if historical 
time is condemned to the sterile progression of empty, homogenous time, the 
dream-time that is always smuggled within it holds out the possibility of 
confounding, confusing and destroying its soporific certainties. 
Benjamin's dialectic might also be called a post-Freudian dialectic as it also 
seems to be working with and developing elements of what Freud had suggested 
about dream-work and the unconscious. According to Freud, one of the tasks of 
" Walter Bepjjamin. Charles Baudelaire. London, Verso, 1997, p. 176. 
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the dream-work 'consists in transforming thoughts into visual images' 89 , 
just as 
for Benjamin, the revolutionary actualisation of dream elements transforrns them 
into dialectical images. Freud argued that time was a fiction of the ego and that 
'The logical laws of thought do not apply to the id ... There is nothing in the id 
that corresponds to the idea of time'90. However Benjamin refuses to relegate 
time to being a fiction of the ego, instead he finds the hope of a more complete 
and fulfilled time in the dreaming of the collective unconscious. For Benjamin 
dreaming is linked to different times, whereas for Freud, dreaming imposes 
temporal structures on the non-temporal. 
I would suggest that the 'ruse', according to Benjamin, isn't the Hegelian 
cunning of abstract reason, but the secret workings of dreaming and its different, 
heterogeneous, instantaneous time. This would then shift the focus of the 
'textbook example' of Benjamin's dialectical thought from the 'utilisation of 
dream elements in waking' to the actual moment of waking from a dream. The 
moment when consciousness and dream world are both present in a tension that 
is both rational and irrational. This moment is when the dream can still be 
understood according to its own logic; it is also the moment when its strangeness 
and irrational impossibility also appear. As Benjamin puts it himself; 'The Now 
of recognizability is the moment of awakening. '91 
89 Freud, 'The Dream-Work' in Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth, 
Penguin, 1973, p. 209. 
90 Freud, 'Dissection of the Personality' in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 199 1, p. 106. 
91 N 18,4. 
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The time of this Now (Jetztzeit) is contiguous with the dream but not continuous 
with it. It is the proximity of the state of dreaming and waking in a dialectical 
image rather than their temporal order that creates the conditions that allow 
Benjamin to label it as dialectical. Again it is Adorno who reminds us of the 
unorthodox and paradoxical nature of Benjamin's dialectics when he suggests 
that Benjamin leaves us the 'obligation to think at the same time dialectically and 
92 
undialectically' . 
The complicated relationship between Hegelian dialectics and Benjaminian 
dialectics is ftirther reflected in other aspects of Benjamin's theory of awakening. 
While the moment of awakening is described as the now of recognizability, and 
therefore takes place according to Jetztzeit, this awakening is also what aids in 
the reading of the dream images. The moment of awakening is the critical 
moment in reading these images because it is in this moment that 'the dream 
stands StiII993 . However, although this is dialectics at a standstill, Benjamin still 
also formulates awakening in terms of the popular reduction of Hegel's method 
to thesis, antithesis and synthesis when he asks: 
Is awakening perhaps the synthesis of dream consciousness (as thesis) and 
waking consciousness (as antithesis)? Then the moment of awakening 
92 Adomo, Hegel: Three Sludies, p. 152. 
()-I Benjamin, Arcades Project, p. 912. 
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would be identical with the "now of recognizability", in which things put 
94 
on their true-surrealist-face. 
This surrealist face is the embodiment of the real state of emergency and the 
revolutionary realisation of dialectics at a standstill. Rather than the Hegelian 
progressive, teleological and linear movement and temporality, this is the 
bringing together of thesis, antithesis and synthesis in to an explosive tension. 
Benjamin described the surrealist project as 'to win the energies of intoxication 
for the revolution' 95 . The space of this revolution 
involves the interpenetration of 
body and image space 96 , and 
its time is the time of the real state of exception 
signified by the Surrealists' exchange of 'the play of human features for the face 
of an alarm clock that in each minute rings for sixty seconds. -Y 97 This constantly 
ringing alarm clock reminds us both of the dialectical synthesis of the ever 
present moment of awakening as well as the undialectical and non-mediated 
direct correspondences that take place in the now of recognizability. 
9' N 3a, 3. 
95 Benjamin, 'Surrealism', in Selected Writings, Vol. 2, p. 215. 
96 'Only when in technology body and image space so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension 
becomes bodily collective innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the collective become 
revolutionary discharge. has reality transcended itself to the extent demanded by the Communist 
Manifesto. ' 'Surrealism', p. 217-8. For a detailed study of Benjamin's linking if body and image 
space in relation to dialectical images see Weigel, Body- and Image-Space, pp. 19-22. 
97 'Surrealism. p. -1 
18. 
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Chapter 3. 
Staged History: The Representation of Tragedy in 
Nietzsche and Benjamin. 
Revolution is a drama perhaps more than a history, and its pathos is a 
condition as imperious as its authenticity. (Blanqui) I 
In this chapter I would like to shift the focus of the discussion from the dialectical 
aspects of Benjamin's temporalities of history and revolution to its non- 
dialectical aspects. This shift from dialectics will also involve a shift in the 
literary and aesthetic models that these temporalities use. Having discussed the 
temporalities of history and revolution with reference to narrative and images we 
will move on to see how these can be further elaborated by an examination of 
their relations to theatrical and musical presentations. This will be conducted 
through an account of Benjamin's relationship to the theories of Friedrich 
Nietzsche. In particular I will be exploring the different constructions of 
historical and revolutionary time that can be extrapolated from Nietzsche's 
reading of tragedy and Benjamin's reading of German Tragic Drama 
(Trauerspieo. 
'Tragedy' is the most hopeless of words. It suggests the inevitability of 
catastrophic fate: unredeernable and irreparable loss and sorrow. Tragedy is what 
we ascribe to the most unreasonable personal and public calamities. Tragedy, in 
this sense, is beyond understanding, it is that which cannot be explained in terms 
of reason, meaning, or purpose. Tragedy is, of course, also the name of a tradition 
or form of dramatic presentation. It is the 'Tragedy' of Classical Greek and 
' Cited by Beqjamin in N 7,3. Immediately after a discussion of the 'method' of dialectical 
materialism and history as a 'constellation of dangers'. (N 7,2) and immediately followed by a 
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Modem European Tragedy. I will be looking at both uses of the tenn as it is used 
by Nietzsche and Benjamin. In Nietzsche's Birth of TragedY it is explicitly used 
with reference to Greek Tragedy, although it also resonates throughout this text 
with the unreasonable and catastrophic. Benjamin's work The Origin of German 
Tragic Drama' is more concemed with Trauerspiel, the baroque German 
mourning play, rather than tragic drama in a strict sense, but it does discuss 
tragedy and in places it also explicitly engages with Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy. 
By examining these two works and their attitudes and staging of the role of 
tragedy I have two tasks in mind. The first is to show one aspect of Benjamin's 
indebtedness to Nietzsche and his attempt to move beyond him. Although, as will 
be shown below, Benjamin is critical of Nietzsche's treatment of tragedy, his 
own method owes a great deal to Nietzsche" s genealogical method. The other 
task,, which is more central to my project on history and revolution, is to bring 
other, alternative conceptions of history that are embedded in these texts, to the 
surface. I will suggest that theatrical models of history can be found to be at work 
in both of these texts. 
Nietzsche's Representation of Tragedy 
note about the 'Necessity of paying heed over many years to every casual citation, every fleeting 
mention of a book'. (N 7,3). 
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, 'The Birth of Tragedy' in The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner 
translated by Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage, 1967. 
3 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama translated by John Osborne, London, 
Verso, 1985. 
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As a dramatic fon-n tragedy immediately leads us into problems concerning its 
presentation or representation. The history or genealogy of tragedy that we are 
given by Nietzsche traces its emergence from the frenzied ululations of the 
chorus in Dionysian revelry (the goat song of the intoxicated worshippers) to the 
more controlled dramatic presentations at the festivals of Dionysus. Nietzsche's 
Birth of Tragedy is really about the death of tragedy or, more accurately, the 
whole life of tragedy from its birth to its death. For Nietzsche, tragedy was bom 
out of the ecstasies of the worshippers of Dionysus. Its origin is in this collective, 
intoxicated, immediate expression of wild and chaotic nature, an expression that 
precedes rationalisation and exceeds individuation. It is, according to Nietzsche's 
subtitle, bom 'out of the spirit of music" which precedes ideas. As it becomes a 
more formed and formal part of Greek culture, tragedy takes on the features of an 
Apollonian art form. In opposition to the realm of the Dionysian, the Apollonian 
is much more concerned with formal beauty, restraint, individuation and illusion. 
According to Nietzsche tragedy dies when this formal, Apollonian aspect 
overcomes the Dionysian completely, when Greek culture embraces the rational 
so fervently that it forgets and rejects the primordial ecstasy. In other words 
tragedy is born from the pure, almost animal, expression of pain and/or joy, it 
lives to be tamed and civilised by formal dramatic constraints, and it dies of 
neglect by individualised subjects. 
4 The title of the first edition of 1872 was The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music, this was 
changed for the reissue of both the first and second editions in 1886 to The Birth of Tragedy Or: 
Hellenism and Pessimism, although the original title was still retained between the 'Attempt at a 
Self Criticism' and the Preface. 
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What is interesting about Greek tragedy as a dramatic form is that it is still at the 
stage where the Dionysian and Apollonian elements are working together in a 
productive and profound tension. This is Tragedy's teenage crisis where its 
adolescent yearnings are still trying to produce a pure expression through an 
unmediated contact with the primary life forces, while the more sober and 
sensible, civilised wisdom of age is perhaps more honest in settling for an 
illusion or representation of truth. 
For Nietzsche, there are problems with this representation that arise from the 
opposition of the Apollonian and Dionysian that he sets up. Although it is often 
assumed that Nietzsche's text unequivocally privileges the Dionysian over the 
Apollonian, Peter Sloterdijk in his study of The Birth of Tragedy' argues that this 
is never the case; that, in fact, the Apollonian must always also be present to hold 
the Dionysian in check. Although Nietzsche seems to present himself as the 
prophet of the Dionysian, 'the Dionysian element is never in power as such )6 
because it is presented or re-presented on stage. This staging is a kind of 
bracketing out of the Dionysian: 'a Dionysian paroxysm set apart in Apollonian 
quotation marks. ' 7 These Apollonian quotation marks also provide the condition 
of possibility for expression, or representation, of the Dionysian. 
The representation at work here would be representation as 'standing for' 
something. The problem of the representation of the Dionysian element of Greek 
'Peter Sloterdi. ik, Thinker on Stage: Nietzsche's Materialism, Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989. 
Sloterdijk, Thinker on Stage, p. 24. 
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tragedy is that there can be no umediated access to this primordiality, at least 
not through the institution of the theatre. In order to be represented it must be 
controlled by this theatre of representation and as Jochen Schulte-Sasse states in 
his foreword to Sloterdijk's text 'Representation, however, is always already 
Apollonian in nature'. 8 Representation is about gathering together the elements of 
an expressive idea into a controlled, repeatable structure that has its own clearly 
marked boundaries and limits. It is a kind of translation into an artificially 
universal, or at least shared, language: a language that is kept well back from its 
limits, that is kept in check in order to avoid any ambiguities that might result in 
excess or escape, that is also harnessed by the myth of transparent meaning and 
intention. If tragedy is to be an expression of the Dionysian it must necessarily 
take place through a form of Apollonian representation, it can only be expressed 
within 'Apollonian quotation marks'. 
For Nietzsche the most comfortable artistic vehicle for the Dionysian is music 
which, for him, is at least beyond the bounds of linguistic and imagistic 
representation, even if it retains its own form of symbolism: 
Language can never adequately render the cosmic symbolism of music, 
because music stands in symbolic relation to the primordial contradiction 
and primordial pain in the heart of the primal unity, and therefore 
symbolises a sphere which is beyond and prior to all phenomena. Rather, 
all phenomena, compared with it, are merely symbols: hence language, as 
the organ and symbol of phenomena, can never by any means disclose the 
Ibid., p. 24. 
127 
innermost heart of music; language, in its attempt to imitate it, can Only 
be in superficial contact with music; while all eloquence of lyric poetry 
cannot bring the deepest significance of the latter one step nearer to us. 9 
Dionysian music steps, leaps, even dances, beyond the limits of representation 
because it is the art form which comes closest to a Dionysian 'absoluteness'. 
Nietzsche thinks of music as able to escape the restrictions of representational 
thought and art. In positioning music as able to symbolise 'a sphere which is 
beyond and prior to all phenomena' he echoes Schopenhauer's privileging of 
music as a direct expression of the underlying metaphysical reality of the world. 
For Schopenhauer music 'is directly a copy of the will itself, and therefore 
expresses ... the thing-in-itself to every phenomenon. 
"' 
Although the Dionysian and its music challenge representational thought, 
language and art, this does not have to commit Nietzsche to a view that language 
has necessary limits that cannot be overstepped. The Dionysian aspect of tragedy 
could be viewed as that which pushes and extends the negotiable boundaries of 
language. Although the Dionysian rhetoric of The Birth of Tragedy often sounds 
as if it is an attempt to escape the phenomenal world, it can be more accurately 
described as a celebration of the inescapable entanglement of reality and 
appearance. Nietzsche 'proclaims this primordial relationship between the thing- 
8 Ibid., p. xi. 
9 Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, pp. 55-56. 
loArthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Representation, Vol. I trans. E. F. J. Payne, New 
York, Dover, 1969, p. 26'21- 
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in-itself and appearance"'. If there is only one thread that can be followed 
through from Nietzsche's early to his late writing it must be his attempt to make 
this relationship concrete; to challenge the appearance/reality distinction to such 
an extent that both must be abolished, and to bring thought back to the body. 
To think of the Dionysian as 'beyond' this world or as only existing in some 
, 11k absolute, metaphysical realm is to misunderstand The Birth of Tragedy. If we can 
think of tragedy and its Dionysian aspect as being encompassed within the sphere 
of poetry, then according to Nietzsche it 'does not lie outside the world as a 
fantastic impossibility spawned by a poet's brain: it desires to be just the 
12 
opposite. ' . Although it challenges representational thought and pushes the 
boundaries of language, the Dionysian is not outside our experience - it is at its 
very heart - and its representation through tragedy is successful even if it takes 
place in 'Apollonian quotation marks'. 
However, as we have already seen, it is this Dionysian spirit of music that gave 
birth to Greek tragic drama. The Apollonian form itself is in a quasi-dialectical 
relationship with the Dionysian: the Dionysian can only be represented within the 
Apollonian, while the Apollonian owes its existence to the Dionysian, which it is 
trying to represent. Nietzsche suggests that we are reminded of this during the 
musical (Dionysian) aspects of the performance. 
Thus the choral parts with which tragedy is interlaced are, as it were, the 
womb that gave birth to the whole of the so-called dialogue, that is, the 
'' Nietzsche, Birth qf Tragec4,, p. 62. 
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entire world of the stage, the real drama. 13 
So even though the theatrical fonn of tragedy is only able to represent the 
Dionysian in 'Apollonian quotation marks', it owes its Apollonian form to the 
more 'primal ground' of Dionysian music. Nietzsche even suggests that even 
though the form may be Apollonian 'it represents not Apollinian redemption 
through mere appearance but, on the contrary, the shattering of the individual and 
his fusion with primal being. ' 14 
This kind of representation is an external depiction of the Dionysian and is 
unable to copy it mimetically but presents itself in place of it. In the German this 
would be a Darstellung as opposed to the other widely used German word for 
representation, Vorstellung. Although a theatrical Performance may be called a 
Vorstellung in the sense of a 'show' that is being put on, what concerns 
Nietzsche is not the relationship between the representation and what is being 
represented: his concern is with how the Dionysian can be adequately expressed 
rather than with the mimetic concerns of representation. The show or the actual 
performance would be the Vorstellung, but within the performance another kind 
of representation (Darstellung) is taking place. In Greek tragedy what is being 
represented is the Dionysian, it is being portrayed through an external 
representation (Darstellung). 
However Vorstellung and Darstellung are not only theatrical concepts, they also 
12 Ibid., p. 6 1. 
'-" Ibid., p. 65. 
14 Ibid., p. 65. 
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have a history of more purely philosophical and epistemological usage. In this 
context Vorstellung is a notion, concept, idea or imagining; one that is usually 
thought of as somehow within the subject's mind in the sense of an inner vision 
or image. This 'Vorstellung' or idea in the subject's mind is, however, not 
necessarily mimetic, as both Kant and Schopenhauer make clear. The Vorstellung 
is what is given to the mind through the senses whilst Darstellung is the external 
presentation or exhibiting of such a concept (Vorstellung) that gives it a sensible 
or sensory form. " Bearing this in mind, we could describe what is taking place in 
Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy as the analysis of the Apollonian exhibiting 
(Darstellung) of the Dionysian idea (Vorstellung). 
In The Birth of Tragedy this can already be detected as emerging from his 
privileging of the aesthetic over the epistemological. Although the problem of 
representation is an epistemological one, its solution, for Nietzsche, is not in a 
comprehensive epistemological analysis of how and why this relationship works, 
but in a meditation on the aesthetic purpose of tragedy. Instead of thinking of The 
Birth qf Tragedy as an analysis of the problem of dramatic representation that 
wants to understand how 'truth' can be represented, it shows that there can only 
be the representation itself without the 'truth' which it claims to represent. The 
Apollonian side of theatre is that of its appearance or illusion, but for Nietzsche 
this becomes the 'mere appearance of mere appearance'. 16 The representation of 
tragedy, although it is the representation of the tragic ground of existence, is not 
15, For a ffill discussion of the various nuances and translations of these tenns see J. Engell The 
Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism, Cambridge Mass., Harvard U. P. 198 1. 
16 Nietzsche, Birth of Trageqy, p. 45. 
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the representation of a fundamental truth. The 'truth' of the Dionysian is not an 
absolute idea, it is instead an acknowledgment of the basis of existence in pain, 
terror and joy. Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy is a text full of pain, terror and joy 
which are all effects and experiences that blur the distinction between the 
aesthetic and the existential. If there is a truth behind tragedy it is what Sloterdijk 
calls the 'Terrible Truth! ' which is so unbearable that the illusionistic 
representation of art acts as a distancing device, making the unbearable bearable. 
Art offers us a 'protective distance from what is unbearable' 17 because it offers us 
the dream of bridging the gap between representation and what is represented and 
reaching the epistemological and ontological grail of 'truth' as the unity of 
subject and object which would result in extinction of both. Greek tragedy is not 
a method of bearing the unbearable in itself, it is a way of bearing the unbearable 
through a distance from it. This exhibiting (Darstellung) is no longer a 
representation of the 'truth' that endeavours to get as close as it possibly can to 
its object, instead it is a 'protective distance' which deliberately keeps away from 
what is unbearable. What is unbearable is not only that there is no 'truth' but that 
the chaos is also unknowable. 
This distance which become the 'pathos of distance' in Nietzsche's later works" 
means that representations must become autonomous, they will no longer be able 
to derive any authority from the 'truth' that they purport to represent. What 
Sloterdijk's reading of this genealogy of 'truth' also implies is that this distance 
17 Sloterdýjk, Thinker on Stage, p. 39. 
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has been maintained for so long that its object has died of neglect. The 'terrible 
truth' that we must keep our distance from has faded out of existence and we are 
left with only its distanced presentation (Darstellung). If justification is still 
something that is needed, it will become purely aesthetic because there is no 
longer any absolute 'truth' accessible through representation. Any evaluation of 
these representations must now depend only on criteria belonging to the 
representations themselves. Nietzsche's privileging of the aesthetic does not have 
to retreat into an and and abstract fonnalism based on aesthetic rules and 
conventions. Even though he repeatedly insists that 'it is only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally justified, 19 the 
justification doesn't necessarily come Erom a formal analysis of the 'aesthetic 
phenomenon'. What is being challenged is the claim to justification at all. 
To privilege the aesthetic in this way is to accept not so much that there is an 
unbridgeable distance between the representation and the 'truth', but that there is 
no 'truth' behind the representation. The relationship is not mimetic because 
there is nothing to be copied. This affirms illusion as the only and best form of 
justification we have. For the early Nietzsche the illusions of art, and the 
Dionysian intoxication and ecstasies that erupt from music or tragedy, all count 
in its favour because they are able to place us outside of space and time. They 
allow us to escape the narrow confines of representational thought and its 
epistemological concerns in order to more freely experience and see wider vistas 
'8See Genealoý. T qf Morals trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale, New York, Vintage, 
1989, First Essay, section 2, and Bey, ond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Han-nondsworth, 
Penguin, 1990, section 257. 
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of life and more varied perspectives of existence. 
Benjamin's Presentation of Trauerspiel 
For Benjamin as well as Nietzsche the problem of Tragedy is the problem of its 
presentation (Darstellung). However, although I have described Benjamin in the 
previous chapter as following a Nietzschean path in pursuing an 'active nihilism', 
as well as privileging intoxication in places", he is more sceptical about the 
I-I'k ability to, or merits of, stepping outside of space and time. His book on Tragedy 
and Trauerspiel, is necessarily concerned with these problems of presentation. It 
is a work of the most engaged literary criticism which also contains one of his 
most purely philosophical pieces as its 'Epistemo-Critical Prologue'. Benjamin's 
first words in this prologue which are his own first words in the book set up the 
problem of presentation as not only a philosophical one with respect to literary 
criticism but as a problem for the practice of philosophy itself- 
It is characteristic of philosophical writing that it must continually 
confront the question of presentation (Darvellung) ". 
'9 Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, p. 14 1. 
20For example see his essays on 'Surrealism' and the writings on his experiences of Hashish use 
such as 'Main Features of My Second Impression of Hashish'; 'Hashish, Beginning of March 
1930'; and 'Hashish in Marseilles', in Selected Writings, Vol. 2. 
2 'Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 27.1 have ammended the translation of 
Darsiellung which is given as 'representation' throughout this edition to 'presentation' in order to 
more accurately reflect the aspects of presenting as exhibiting as outlined in the discussion of 
Nietzsche above. 
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For Ben amin this is not a question that will disappear with any advance in i 
mathematical or scientific knowledge. Instead it is the question that mathematics 
and science have neglected to their own peril. To neglect the question of 
presentation is to leave one path of knowledge untrodden; it is according to 
. )22 Benjamin, to renounce 'that area of truth towards which language is directed 
There is a wholeness of knowledge (Erkenntnis) that Benjamin would like to 
strive towards, but this is not the wholeness of a flawless, positivistic, scientific 
system, it is an unsystematic wholeness that would draw together science and art. 
It is also an undialectical wholeness in its non-systernaticity and lack of 
mediation. 
Having said that his own first words in this text indicate the concentration on the 
question of presentation, there are words preceding these; Goethe's words from 
his book on colour, which already pose the question of creating a wholeness from 
science and art: 
Neither in knowledge nor in reflection can anything whole be put 
together, since in the former the internal is missing and in the latter the 
external, and so we must necessarily think of science as art if we expect 
to derive any kind of wholeness from it. 23 
What is being suggested through the use of this quote and the concentration on 
the problem of presentation is a rearticulation and re-examination of Nietzsche's 
meditation on the relationship of art and science in The Birth of Tragedy. What 
22 The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 27. 
2 ', Ibid, p. 27. The quote is from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe: Materialien --ur Geschichte der I 
Farbenlehre. 
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Nietzsche identifies as the scientific is the direct descendant of what he sees as 
Socrates' faith in reason. This faith is given the title of optimism throughout 
Nietzsche's text, but it is the optimism of a bad faith. Nietzsche sees this 
Socratic/scientific optimism as a false hope because it supposes that the 
knowledge attained by the rational method will be able to predict and avoid 
catastrophes if humans would only use their faculties Properly. For Nietzsche the 
promise of enlightenment reason is a direct descendant of this Socratic optimism. 
Benjamin seems to follow Nietzsche's criticism of this rational optimism to the 
extent that he too recognised the need for a realignment of philosophical thinking 
that would incorporate the methods, styles, and values of art. For philosophy to 
model itself too strictly on science puts it in danger of forgetting the questions of 
its own presentation that it must continually confront. 
Although Nietzsche does seem to be advocating a pessimism in The Birth of 
Tragedy, his championing of tragedy as the alternative to rationalism complicates 
the attempt to read this as a simple competition between optimism and 
pessimism. As Walter Kaufmann points out, the tragedians that Nietzsche takes 
as exemplary, Aeschylus in particular, do not fit comfortably into the pessimistic 
mould. " Aeschylus is commonly distinguished as producing a major change in 
Greek thought, pre-empting Socrates to some extent, by describing the 
foundation of the rational patronage of the city by Athena. His Oresteia can much 
more easily be read as the story of the emergence of a faith in rationality in Greek 
1.4 See Walter Kaufmann, 'Nietzsche and the Death of Tragedy: A Critique' in Studies in Nietzsche 
in the Classical Tradition, eds J. C. O'Flaherty, T. F. Selner & R. M. Helm, Chapel Hill, University 
of North Carolina Press. 1976. 
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thought and culture than as a warning about the uselessness of human effort in 
the face of the gods. 
However, we can also read The Birth of Tragedy according to Nietzsche's own 
later assessment of it in Ecce Homo which no longer describes it in terms of an 
opposition between optimism and pessimism. According to this reading, tragedy 
is not pessimism, but the overcoming of pessimism. The Dionysian element of 
tragedy can indeed be read as the emergence of an affirmative thinking. But what 
is being affirmed is a critique of causation, an alternative to the "'Rationality" at 
any price' which is 'a dangerous force that undermines life'. " Socrates is linked 
with an: 
unshakeable faith that thought, using the thread of eausality, ean penetrate 
the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not only of 
knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime metaphysical 
illusion accompanies science as an instinct and leads science again and 
again to its limits at which it must tum into art. 
26 
For Nietzsche. ) science cannot reach through to truth 
but, in its failure, is 
transformed into art. It appears then, that Benjamin is also following Nietzsche's 
lead in reiterating the Goethean. dream of scientific and artistic wholeness, that 
regards scientific knowledge and its cognitivism and causality as only a fragment 
of the whole. 
25Nietzsche, On The Genealok, of Morals and Ecce Homo, New York, Vintage, 1989, p. 27 1. 
26 Nietzsche, Birth of Trageaý% pp. 95-96. 
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However, we must remember that, for the Nietzsche of The Birth of Tragedy, the 
Dionysian was also only a fragment of the whole. The Dionysian is the missing 
element from modernity's predominantly Apollonian culture. The beauty and 
strength of Greek Tragedy was that it brought these two forces together, the 
Dionysian intoxication and the Apollonian dream. Tragedy gives us a complete 
representation of existence rather than incomplete, optimistic knowledge. Indeed, 
tragedy as an aesthetic phenomenon is closer to exhibiting the condition of 
existence than any scientific knowledge. This brings us back to what Benjamin 
takes to be the slogan of The Birth of Tragedy: 
it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are 
etemally justifted27 
According to Benjamin, what Nietzsche achieves in this book is the 
aestheticisation of existence. If science, once it has reached its limits, must turn 
to art he has succeeded, as Lutz P. Koepnick puts it, in transfonning the world 
into 'an aesthetic spectacle"'. It becomes pure spectacle, pure representation 
which is in danger of becoming an 'infinite regression from appearance to 
appearance of appearance' 29 without any ground or foundation on which to gain 
some critical or political purchase. Here Koepnick marks an important difference 
between Benjamin and Nietzsche. Whereas Nietzsche can be read as proposing a 
complete aestheticisation of existence and truth, Benjamin, whilst retaining a 
notion of truth that involves contemplation of its object through presentation, is 
Ibid., p. 52 & 141. 
28 See Lutz P. Koepnick, 'The Spectacle, the Trauerspiel, and the Politics of Resolution: Benjamin 
Reading the Baroque Reading Weimar' in Critical Inquiry, Winter 1996. 
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reluctant to follow Nietzsche into this absolute 'abyss of aestheticism'. " He says 
of Nietzsche that this aestheticisation is 'a high price to pay for his emancipation 
from the stereotype of a morality in which the tragic occurrence was usually 
clothed. ý3 1 Too high a price because it invokes the priceless gesture of non- 
affirmative nihilism. The abyss opens up only through forgetting the historical 
and material conditions that gave rise to the 'idea' of tragedy. 
Benjamin is never far from a political analysis of whichever cultural target he has 
in his sights, and in this case it is the politics of presentation that is being 
interrogated. The difference between tragedy and Trauerspiel is not only a purely 
aesthetic one, the analysis also needs to enlist the aid of the philosophy of history 
in order to understand the political changes taking place in and as aesthetic 
representation. He identifies a shift from myth to history in the move from 
tragedy to Trauerspiel. This is also located as an aspect of the move into political 
modemity. It reflects the loss in faith of a transcendent, eternal, cosmic order in 
its representation of purely mundane and transient events. Accompanying this, 
though, is the difficulty of positioning philosophy within a modernity in which 
art and science remain sundered. Is it a purely cognitive activity that can be 
firmly placed in the scientific camp, or is philosophy so preoccupied with 
questions of presentation that it must belong solely to art? For Benjamin 
Ibid., p. 275. 
Origin of'German Tragic Drama, p. 103. This characterisation of Nietzsche as advocating a 
complete aesthetic isation of existence is more Benjamin's than Koepnick's (or mine) and it could 
be argued that it is a skewed and unsubtle reading of The Birth of Tragedy. However it is 
important that we temporarily suspend criticisms of this characterisation in order to understand 
Benjamin's text. 
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philosophy promises to be a facilitator for the elusive wholeness. 
It certainly appears that philosophy is dealing with the realm of presentation 
when Benjamin states that philosophy has as 'the law of its own form' 'the 
presentation of truth ý32 . 
But it is an unfamiliar concept of truth that is being 
worked out in this text; one which distinguishes it from 'the acquisition of 
knowledge', which is identified as the goal of science. 33 Knowledge is what the 
scientist possesses and it differs from its presentation. What is important for 
knowledge is its possession, 'presentation is secondary' 34 . Truth, on the other 
hand, is described in terms of 'essence', 'wholeness', and a certain 
' unquestionability'. But its presentation is of primary concern and unavoidable 
because, 
For knowledge, method is a way of acquiring its object ... ; 
for truth it is 
self-presentation (Sich-Darstellendes), and is therefore immanent in it as 
forM., 15 
According to this formula, if philosophy professes a concern for truth it must 
always already indulge in a concern for presentation. 
However if the purpose of the original quote from Goethe indicated an attempt to 
accomplish a rapprochement of science and art, Benjamin's emphasis on the 
presentational character of philosophy would appear to place it more firmly 
Origin (? f German Tragic- Drama, p. 102. 
Ibid., p. 28. 
Ibid., p. 28. 
34 Ibid., p. 29. 
35 Ibid., pp. 29-30. 
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within the artistic camp. However, this presentation, as we have seen, is also the 
presentation of ideas which include the formal abstractions of science: 
If it is the task of the philosopher to practise the kind of description of the 
world of ideas which automatically includes and absorbs the empirical 
world, then he occupies an elevated position between that of the scientist 
and the artist... ' 36 
Benjamin follows Nietzsche's attempt to overcome the optimism of causation in 
suggesting that philosophy has become too closely linked with the scientific 
method of 'the elimination of the merely empirical' at the expense of 'the task of 
presentation' which it shares with the artist 37 . The ideas that are to be presented 
are not purely cognitive or conceptual and therefore accessible through scientific 
knowledge; they do not come under what Benjamin terms 'scientific verism 38 11 
which is the positivist scientific obsession with accuracy of material detail - the 
simple minded facts of positivism perhaps? They are themselves interpretations, 
but 'objective interpretations' of phenomena 39 , and as such, they reside with 
truth. which, at this stage, still retains explicit echoes of Platonism and implicit 
echoes of Schopenhauer, when it is described as an 'intentionless state of being' 
which is 'made up of ideas'40 . 
However, a closer look at this part of Benjamin's text shows that these are a new 
and different sort of ideas. Although ideas are discussed in quasi-Platonic 
,6 Ibid., p. 32. 
37 Ibid., p. 32 
38 Ibid., p. 41. 
-'9 Ibid., p. 34. 
40 Ibid., p. 36. 
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language they differ radically from any Platonic framework. Although Benjamin 
states that 'The general (Allgemeine) is the idea (Idee) 41 , the particulars 
do not 
participate in them in any recognisably Platonic way. Although ideas represent 
phenomena they do not claim possession of them, which in this scheme also 
means that 'They do not contribute to the knowledge of phenomena'42 . Although 
they are the general they do not rigidly demarcate categories and classes or 
impose their form on the particulars. Ideas are distinguished from concepts 
(Begriffe) which 'assist in the presentation of an idea 43 . In other words, concepts 
assist philosophy in its basic tasks of description and presentation. Thus there is a 
doubling of presentation at work here; firstly the presentation of the ideas by 
philosophy, and secondly, the presentation of phenomena by ideas. Although the 
language often sounds quasi-Platonic the picture that emerges is one of a network 
of active and dynamic relationships between all the elements. To represent the 
Platonic notion of ideas crudely we could say that an eternal and immutable idea 
imposes its fon-n on a passive particular. Benjamin's description of this 
relationship differs because it never turns the idea into an absolute. Even the 
phenomena that the ideas are presentations of have an active input to their own 
presentation by being able to 'determine the scope and contents of the concepts 
which encompass them, by their existence, by what they have in common, and by 
their differences'44 . We can hear the implied echoes of Schopenhauer more 
clearly in this construction. It sounds like Benjamin's ideas also function 
analogously to Schopenhauer's music which is described as having a universality 
41 Ibid., p. 35. 
12 Ibid., p. 34. 
Ibid., p. A. 
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which is 
by no means that empty universality of abstraction, but is of quite a 
different kind; it is united with thorough and unmistakable distinctness. " 
Both constructions allow us not only to find the universal within the particular, 
but also actively discourage the kind of abstraction that would situate the 
universal in a separate realm. Benjamin does follow Nietzsche in respect of his 
own affirmation of the inescapable entanglement of the universal and the 
particular. 
Benjamin's concepts do resemble Platonic ideas in as much as they divide the 
phenomena into different classes. However this is not accomplished through an 
absolutistfiat; the existence, sameness and difference of the phenomena, in other 
words their relationships to each other, help to form the concepts themselves. The 
concepts only group the phenomena together in order to help in their presentation 
by ideas, but the ideas then turn this whole relationship upside down again when 
they are described as determining the relationship of the phenomena to each 
ot er. 
46 
The difference between Benjamin's concepts and ideas is the difference between 
two varieties of generalisation. Concepts generalise phenomena into classes or 
groups,, but ideas generalise even further in that they determine the relationships 
of the phenomena encompassed by these concepts to each other. For Benjamin, 
44 Ibid., p. 34. 
. 45 Schopenhauer, op. cit. p. 262. 
46 Origin oj'German Tragic Drama, p. 34. 
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these generalisations are not a way of producing sameness out of difference, they 
do not attempt to create an understanding of the world by dividing it up into 
manageable pieces in order to create familiarity. They are definitely not averages 
of any sort, neither mean, mode or median. He explicitly states that 'It is absurd 
47 to attempt to explain the general as an average' . Instead, as discussed in chapter 
2, what is productive about these generalisations is their extremes. Although 
concepts divide phenomena up into classes, their useftil function is in identifying 
the elements of the phenomena that lie at their extremes. What defines a concept 
then is not an average grouping that pretends to the sameness of its members, but 
a group that can maintain difference within sameness. To be at the limit of a 
concept is also to define its boundaries. Benjamin's ideas then, map out the 
relationships of these extremes. He describes them as constellations because they 
can map the relationships between their elements without detracting from the 
uniqueness and difference of each of these elements. They contextualise 
phenomena through showing the shape or pattern of the context. In Benjamin's 
own words: 'The idea is best explained as the configuration (Gestaltung) of the 
context within which the unique and the extreme stands alongside its 
48 
counterpart' . 
Benjamin's conceptions of truth and ideas arise from his thinking on language, 
which takes the idea of an originary, prelapsarian, Adamic language of the pure 
name as a model of intentionless language. This is a theory that he calls a 
. purified concept of language' in a preparatory fragment for The Origin of 
47 Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 35. 
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German Tragic Drama. 49 This is the Edenic language which still had access to 
truth due to the still direct, umnediated relationship between name and object; 
language based on 'the expressly immediate, creative word of God' and 'the 
blissful Adamite spirit of language' 50 . What 
is essential to language, for 
Benjamin, is not just communication, but communicability: 'this capacily for 
communication is language itself. 51 Human language is described as a language 
of naming, and in naming it communicates. The name itself is what is 
communicable. In the pure language of God and Eden, language is not a means 
but a medium. However it is a medium in which communicability is immediately 
expressed. In this pure language there is no separation between creation, 
knowledge, and being. For God, to name is to create which is also to make things 
knowable. For man, who is, of course, made in the image of God, to name is to 
know. The consequences of the fall reduced language to a means and sundered its 
immediacy. This also resulted in the separation of knowing, naming and being, 
and the origin of abstraction in language. 
The themes of this earlier fragment reappear in the prologue to the Trauerspiel 
book where they are synthesised with the theory of ideas. According to this 
theory it is philosophy's job to recover this originary, intentionless apprehension 
of words as names, and so present the truth and the ideas of which it is 
composed. According to Benjamin there can be an objectivity to language and 
ideas which will derive the objectivity of their presentation from the nature of 
48 Ibid., p. 335, translation revised. 
49 'On Language as Such and on the Language of Man' in Selected Writings, Fol. 1. p 74. 
50 Ibid., p. 71. 
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language. Charles Rosen, in his com-mentary on The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama represents this as a theory of meaning, and his description of Benjamin's 
Ideas is, 'The total range of significance, represented objectively, and as a 
structure of its most distant relationships'. 52 So an idea will convey every possible 
meaning and nuance of its word, not forgetting the limiting cases and extremities 
of shared resemblance. Benjamin's ideas are not attempting to form totalities like 
absolute universals, perhaps they could be described oxymoronically as open 
universals in that they do form a wholeness or comprehensive pattern without 
closing off the possibility of change and difference. These ideas will give us a 
more complete picture than the fragmentary concepts of cognitive knowledge 
because of their monadic structure. 
The idea is a monad - that means briefly : every idea contains the image 
of the world. The purpose of the presentation of the idea is nothing less 
than an abbreviated outline of this image of the world. 53 
Benjamin elaborated this esoteric and challenging theory of ideas in the prologue 
to The Origin of German Tragic Drama because he needed to make use of these 
emphatic notions of truth and ideas with reference to both Trauerspiel and 
tragedy. These two dramatic forms both embody ideas. Trauerspiel embodies the 
idea of mouming or sorrow, and tragedy contains the idea of the tragic not just as 
51 Ibid., p. 63. 
52 Charles Rosen, 'The Ruins of Walter Benjamin' in On Walter Benjamin: Critical Essays and 
Recollections, ed. Gary Smith, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., 1988. p 159. 
5-3 Origin (? f German Tragic Drama, p. 48. 
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a dramatic form, but also as a cosmic principle or 'ruling force). 54 Because ideas 
are monadic, to understand both of these ideas would also be to understand two 
dramatically different images of the world. On the one hand there is the tragic, or 
ancient Greek, image, on the other hand, there is the Mourning play or baroque 
image of the world. The allegorical and fragmentary nature of the Mourning play, 
along with its tendency to avoid tidy resolution convinced Benjamin that it was 
also representative as an emergent image of modernity. Tragedy and Trauerspiel 
embody two different ideas and images of the world because they represent two 
different relationships of phenomena, in this case, different historical 
circumstances. Even though we have seen that the ideas determine these 
relationships, they still remain sensitive to the historicity of their components: 
When the idea absorbs a sequence of historical fonnulations, it does not 
do so in order to construct a unity out of them, let alone to abstract 
something common to them all. 55 
Thus, as we see, Benjamin's ideas remain open because part of their relationality 
is necessarily historical. 
For Benjamin, what is notable about Trauerspiel is that it is, precisely, not 
tragedy; a momentous distinction that he accused most previous theorists of 
ignonng or failing to notice. Trauerspiel had generally been thought of as a form 
of tragic drama, to some extent a renaissance of the classical Greek form, and as 
long as it was judged according to this idea it was generally considered to be an 
54 He makes this claim for tragedy in a fragment entitled 'The Role of Language in Trauerspiel 
and Tragedy' written in 1916. see Selected writings, Vol. 1, p. 59. 
55 Origin qf German Tragic, Drama, p. 46. 
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unsuccessful renaissance. Indeed its translation as 'tragic drama' also tends to 
lead to this confasion,, whereas if we look to the idea that Benjamin sees as at the 
heart of Trauers iel we can see that 'mourning play' is a more appropriate P 
translation, and one that better reflects the specificity of its form. 
For Benjamin, the fundamental difference between tragedy and Trauerspiel is 
that tragedy is based in myth whereas Trauerspiel is grounded in history. Greek 
tragedy, because it takes its object as pre-historical myth, is inevitably tied to an 
inescapable conclusion. 56 The mythical inevitability of tragedy differs from any 
notion of historical necessity. Tragedy is somehow beyond reason, the tragic hero 
is only able to accept and realise a transcendent fate, whereas the heroes of 
Trauerspiel are endowed with a degree of historical agency". Their fate is in their 
own hands, or at least in the hands of some kind of deterministic history. Tragedy 
does not need to appeal to any account of causation, as Benjamin points out, a 
tragic fate due to a miracle is no less inevitable than one due to causation 58 . 
These important distinctions, which had usually been blurred, allow the 
specificity of Trauerspiel to emerge. In Benjamin's text the historicity of 
56 It is important to note here that this is only true in relation to Greek tragedy. For other forms of 
tragedy (Shakespearean in particular) the downfall comes about through a character flaw, such as 
hubris. Shakespearean tragedy might be considered as somewhere between Greek tragedy and 
Trauerspiel because although it deals with individuals it takes their actions and characteristics as 
symptomatic of the universal. However Benjamin positioned Shakespeare's tragedy closer to 
Trauerspiel than Greek tragedy, even suggesting that they should be studied using the criteria of 
Trauerspiel rather that tragedy (Origin p. 136. ) and that 'Calder6n and Shakespeare created more 
important Trauerspiele than the German writers of the seventeenth century' (Origin, p. 127. ) 
S7 Indeed Benjamin points out that a great deal of the subject matter of the plays was based on 
historical material, especially the 'history of the Orient' Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 68. 
580rigin of German Tragic Drama, p. 129. 
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Trauerspiel starts to shine through and this is what enables a realisation that if we 
judge it on its own criteria rather than those of tragedy it can be seen as a very 
successful, timely and even revolutionary dramatic form. 
Trauerspiel's Musical Time 
In another preparatory fragment for the Trauerspiel book, Benjamin traces the 
relationship of the language of Trauerspiel to that of the pure word of his theory 
of language. The historical specificity of Trauerspiel is reflected in its language 
which bears the transient, dynamic and disjunctive hallmarks of the emergent 
modemity. Benjamin states that 'Language in the process of change is the 
linguistic principle of the mourning play' 59 There is a path that this change 
follows, but it is not the linear path of a progressive history, it is the sinuous and 
interrupted path of a river 'as it moves from its source toward a different point, 
its estuary i. 60 This path also traces a movement of sound which is also a history 
of sound. 'It describes the path from natural sound via lament to music). 61 What 
is interesting in this movement is that music has a redemptive ftinction in 
Trauerspiel. Benjamin endows music with an almost Schopenhauerian or 
Nietzschean purity of expression. 
59 , The Role of Language in Trauerspiel and Tragedy' in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, p. 60. 
60 Ibid., p. 60. The fluidity of the metaphor of the river will be shown to be significant in relation 
to Irigaray's thinking in chapter 7. Indeed it is useful to note at this point that Benjamin's own 
concept of 'Origin' it itself a fluid and dynamic concept. 'Origin is an eddy in the stream of 
becoming... ' (Origin of Get-man Tragic Drama, p. 45). 
61 'The Role of Language in Trauerspiel and Tragedy', p. 60. 
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Although Nietzsche's analysis of Greek Tragedy described it as emerging from 
the spirit of music,, Benjamin finds Trauerspiel moving in the opposite direction, 
towards music. The difference becomes significant when considered in terms of 
the models of time at work. In tragedy the fate of the hero is sealed and fulfilled 
at any and every point. This produces one, singular, closed and circular time. 62 
Whereas Trauerspiel produced discontinuity and disunity because it is based in 
allegory and is only resolved in catastrophe. For Benjamin this is closer to 
musical time: 
In the mourning play, sounds are laid out symphonically, and this 
constitutes the musical principal of its language and the dramatic 
principle of its breaking up and splitting into characters. 63 
Benjamin also shows that Trauerspiel, in its historical specificity, turns away 
tI rom abstraction and eternalisation. Its focus is the immanence of sorrow and 
suffering not the transcendent capriciousness of the gods. The fate at work within 
Trauerspiel is natural, mundane and historical and the only access we might have 
to any universal explanation is also only through the natural, mundane or 
historical. This notion of fate which eludes any scientific account of causation 
provides a link between, or continuation of, Nietzsche's formulation of tragedy. 
The tragic, and its concomitant fate, also seems to dwell in a realm of 'ideas' 
which come nearer to a wholeness than cognitive knowledge. The idea of the 
62 This closed circular time is similar to the time that we shall see Irigaray ascribe to Nietzsche in 
chapter 6. 
63 'The Role of Language in Trauerspiel and Tragedy'. p. 60. 
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tragic as a more complete, perhaps more cosmic 'truth' than the mournful, also 
shows a certain continuity with Nietzsche's thinking of tragedy as a more 
complete or fulfilled expression of existence than the modem, rational, scientific 
one. However, as we have seen, Benjamin is critical of Nietzsche's stance which 
he describes as opening up onto 'the abyss of aestheticism'. The hope for a 
Wagnerian rebirth of tragedy is in danger of succumbing to the nihilism of the 
ýmere appearance of mere appearance'. Benjamin's understanding of modernity 
argues that the theory of tragedy presented in The Birth of Tragedy is purely 
aesthetic and omits 'any understanding of the tragic myth in historical- 
philosophical tenns. ' 64 . The latent Schopenhauerianism of The Birth of Tragedy 
is read as Nietzsche's early madness. Benjamin questions the sanity of placing art 
at the centre of existence and retains a role for human creativity. 
Benjamin caricatures Nietzsche's Schopenhauerianism in terms of a 'Nirvana, 
the slumbering will to life )65 . This is exactly what the later Nietzsche himself 
would have described as a passive nihilism - the will to escape this world to gain 
a peaceful, pain-free, nothingness. However Benjamin's reading of The Birth of 
Tragedy as preaching the ubiquity of, and an intimacy with, pain and suffering - 
even if it is a distanced intimacy - is a somewhat idiosyncratic portrayal of 
Nietzsche's text. What Benjamin's concern seems to be is that Nietzsche still 
places the 'true author' of tragedy - which is, at the same time the metaphysical 
basis of reality - outside the world. While there may be hints of this in a 
Schopenhauerian. reading of The Birth of Tragedy. it would be difficult to 
640rigin of German Tragic Drama, p. 103. 
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describe it as an accurate reading of Nietzsche. What Benjamin reftises to notice 
is that even if we do place art at the centre of existence this does not mean that 
we have to devolve its authorship to the gods or 'the will'. Benjamin is indeed 
looking for an active nihilism, and may well have found it in Trauerspiel because 
this places the ubiquity of suffering and its source finnly within the world. At the 
same time it also points to a possibility for meaning or explanation through the 
universal at work in the world. 
Nietzsche's nihilism is described as nullifying 'the concept of the hard, historical 
actuality of Greek Tragedy. ' 66 The historical accuracy of Nietzsche's 
interpretation of Greek tragedy is being challenged here. The main charge is that 
the emphasis on Apollonian illusion is probably wishful thinking on Nietzsche's 
part rather than historical actuality. Where Nietzsche claims no division between 
the public and the chorus and therefore suggests a complete immersion in the 
illusion, Benjamin upholds the division on historical grounds. " Again, Benjamin 
refuses to totally aestheticise the question by refusing to separate the historical 
context in which the form emerged from its expressive content. 
What is central to both readings is that this is still emphatically staged tragedy. It 
is from its staging that questions of representation (Darstellung and Vorstellung) 
arise. According to commentators on both thinkers, this staging is never solely 
`5 Ibid., p. 103. 
66 Ibid., p. 103. 
"-For a full discussion of the historical circumstances of the emergence of Greek tragedy in 
relationship to Nietzsche's work see M. S. Silk & J. P. Stem Aliet: sche on Trqgeqý, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 198 L 
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limited to the theatrical boards. Sloterdijk argues that Nietzsche's thinking also 
takes the form of a dramatic performance, and Adorno suggests that Benjamin's 
thought undertakes so successful a critique of philosophical subjectivity that 
humanity itself becomes the space and place of performance: "Before 
[Benjamin's] Medusan glance, man turns into the stage on which an objective 
process unfolds"' 
Rather than placing art at 'the centre of existence'- which would be the true spirit 
of tragedy for Nietzsche - Benjamin closes the abyss by placing humanity at the 
'centre of art' 69 . This is not simply another humanism. As we have seen from 
Adorno's assessment of Benjamin's innovations, this is not to be equated with 
making the human 'centre stage', the most significant and triumphant aspect of 
the spectacle. Humanity instead becomes the stage itself- the material basis on 
which the spectacle unfolds; the space of reproduction; the place where 'ideas' 
and the truth can be contemplated - where they can show us the configuration of 
the context of the phenomena of history. What Adorno's reading of Benjamin 
also brings to light is that this place or stage cannot be reduced to the familiar 
autonomous subject. Just as tragedy and Trauerspiel need an historical, political, 
as well as an aesthetic understanding, so any understanding of the stage of 
subjecthood needs to come to ten-ns with the historical, material conditions of its 
construction. The tragic hero was the creation of its time as was the hero of the 
Trauerspiel, both of which reflect the transience of the autonomy of the subject. 
68 T. W. Adorno Prisms, London, Spean-nan, 1967. p. 235. 
69 Origin of'German Tragic, Drama, p. 103. 
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Rosen suggests that one of the advantages of the Trauerspiel for Benjamin was 
the obvious 'staginess' of its fonn. Paradoxically it is this obvious falseness that 
counteracts its illusion. There is no danger of falling into the abyss of 
aestheticism because the illusion breaks down in a deliberately unsuccessful 
representation. This formal aesthetic criticism is, of course, also an historical one. 
As in the theory of ideas outlined above, where the fonn, the content and the 
context could all be accounted for, so in this criticism of Trauerspiel, the 
historical context in which it emerged must not be separated from its expressive 
dimension. Its formal language is described as 'the emergence of the 
contemplative necessities which are implicit in the contemporary theological 
situation' 70 . By this Benjamin means the decline of theological or eschatological. 
certainties, again classic symptoms of modernity. The decline of these theological 
certainties do not., however, amount to a Nietzschean 'death of God' 71 for 
Benjamin. Instead God becomes 'incorporated into human existence' through the 
workings of Capitalism as a religion which 'is the expansion of despair, until 
despair becomes a religious state of the world in the hope that this will lead to 
salvation. ' 
72 
However, as Andrew Benjamin argues, Trauerspiel is a specifically baroque 
form. As such, he suggests that it maintains a difficult, transitionary relationship 
70 Ibid., p. 81. 
1 Nietzsche The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kauftnan, New York, Vintage, 1974. § 108, p. 167. 
72 -Capitalism as Religion', in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, p. 289. : _n 
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73 with modernity, 'within and as the founding of modernity'. What the staginess 
of Trauerspiel reveals is the disorder and fragmentation of the experience of the 
baroque. Andrew Benjamin links this to the dialectic of awakening that I have 
described in the previous chapter The baroque and T . 
74 
rauerspiel can be 
described as the awakening of modemity; the shock realisation of the 
fragmentary and dislocated nature of experience. This change in the nature of 
experience is also a change in the experience of time. Baroque allegory can be 
interpreted as boldly portraying the transience of the world through its ruination. 
Andrew Benjamin states that 'It is this which, for Benjamin, marks the end of 
Universal history. ' 75 For Walter Benjamin the baroque and its Trauerspiel 
represent a revolutionary moment in and of history; a new experience of time that 
also produces a new dislocated and disjunctive reading of history. However, as 
was discussed in the introduction, modernity 'proper' is more to do with the 
attempt to cover over the disjunctions and dislocations. It seems as if the moment 
of awakening in the Trauerspiel is being presented by Benjamin as a exemplary 
moment, a moment that has been lost again to the various modem attempts to re- 
create linearity, totality and teleology. 
The difference between tragedy and Trauerspiel - the switch from myth to 
history - also marks the modem decline in the belief in a transcendent agent of 
redemption. This is, again, Benjamin's own version of Nietzsche's 'death of 
Andrew Benjamin, Present Hope, p. 82. 
'14 Andrew Benjamin conducts his discussion of awakening (Erwachen) in relation to an analysis 
of Fascism as another possibility for modernity. One that involves a futural thinking of the eternal. 
See Present Hope pp. 88-97. 
7S 
Andrew Benjamin, Present Hope, p. 84. 
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God' as the religion of Capitalism. This acceptance of what Benjamin calls 'the 
hopelessness of the earthly condition 76 is what contributes to the Trauer - the 
mourning or sorrow - of the Trauerspiel. However although it can no longer 
endorse a true transcendence it represents a false, pretend transcendence. It plays 
at transcendence, and it is this deliberate 'staginess' which breaks down the 
illusion. This pretence is its most honest understanding of its own time. The only 
honest representation it can give of transcendence is as a play within a play. 
Again the mundane, historical boundaries of Trauerspiel might be described as 
its active nihilism in which the only transcendence is immanent. To apply 
Sloterdijk's reading of Nietzsche from earlier in this chapter, we could say that 
the Apollonian quotation marks which allowed the Dionysian to be represented in 
tragedy become the parodic 'scare quotes' of Trauerspiel. 
It is significant then that this is Trauer-Spiel; mourning-play instead of Trauer- 
Drama. Although we have seen above that the idea at work in Trauerspiel was 
mouming, it also incorporates the idea of play (SpieO. To continue using 
Benjamin's terminology the most accurate way to put this would be to say that 
the idea of Trauerspiel determines the relationships of the various elements of 
the concepts of Trauer and Spiel. The best representation of this idea, for 
Benjamin, is at work in Calderon's dramas where: 
The very precision with which the 'mourning' and the 'play' can 
harmonize with one another gives it its exemplary validity - the validity 
()rigin of Get-man Tragic Drama, p. 8 1. 
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of the word and the thing alike. 
77 
This exemplary validity that takes place in the harmonisation of word and thing is 
high praise indeed, from the theorist who finds the origin and truth of language in 
Adamic naming where word and thing combine. 
It is through such a Benjaminian analysis that we can find a useful connection 
between play and history. Having recognised the historicity of theatrical forms, 
and that, due to different historical circumstances, the ideas contained in tragedy 
and Trauerspiel must necessarily be different, we can also come to realise that 
philosophies of history themselves must also exhibit their own historicity. 
Benjamin valorises the philosophy of history to the extent that he calls on its 
resources as essential to any understanding of tragedy and Trauerspiel. The 
primary motive for this being the desire to avoid slipping into the 'abyss of 
aestheticism'. However, at the same time we can no longer ignore the abyssal 
dangers posed by the historicity of any idea or philosophy of history. 
These dangers arise from what we might characterise as the postmodern 
challenge to the philosophy of history. This would point to the arrogance of the 
position of any philosophy of history in supposing that it can give a total or 
comprehensive description -a grand narrative - of what history is in itself 
8. If 
77 Origin qf German Tragic Drama, p. 8 1. 
78 The obvious, exemplary account of this identification of grand narratives is Jean-Franýois 
Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press, 1984. Derrida also undertakes what might be characterised as a postmodern 
critique of the philosophy of history, especially the Hegelian form as represented by Fukuyama, in 
Specters of A farx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International, 
London, Routledge, 1994. 
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philosophies of history are also necessarily products of their own historical 
circumstances, then they can only ever offer a partial or local narrative, or 
description of the idea of history. The abyss that Benjamin saw in Nietzsche's's 
aestheticism might also be reflected in Benjamin's historicism. By subscribing to 
a theory that insists on the necessity of historical understanding for criticism he 
also implies that historical understanding itself must change over time. 
Although we might presume that there lurks a 'true' idea of history behind 
Benjamin's historical-philosophical stance, we must also bear in mind that his 
ideas are explicitly not closed totalities, especially when it comes to history. 
According to this theory an idea of history will be true only if it correctly shows 
the shape of the context within which the phenomena of history relate to each 
other - especially the extremes. However any judgement about the truth of this 
idea will only ever be able to be made once history has been completed. The 
grand narrative cannot be written until the messianic redemption of history. As 
we have also seen, this redemption may also be the realisation of difference 
within history which would produce an open multiplication of narratives, rather 
than a totalising closure. Benjamin's conception of messianic time can not be 
thought of as a version of universal history because, as his reading of Trauerspiel 
has shown, the Baroque marked the end of universal history. Messianic 
redemption then is the redemption of history that is not even necessarily a finality 
or completion it is instead, as Andrew Benjamin puts it, 'the generalisability of 
thinking the interruption of the present. -)79 
79 Andrew Benjamin, Present Hope, p. 97. 
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We need to be wary of suggesting that there is one, all encompassing idea of 
history that belongs to modernity. For Benjamin it would be the one that would 
show the configuration of the context; but within the historical context of 
modernity there are a multiplicity of competing ideas of history. The ironic aspect 
of what I have charaeterised as the postmodern charge against modemity and its 
most characteristic of philosophical enterprises - the philosophy of history - is 
that it mistakes the most successful idea of history for its only idea of history. 
Modernity's idea of history is caricatured as a progressive, linear, teleological 
narrative. Whereas,, if we are able to learn anything from Nietzsche and 
Benjamin, who both exhibit unparalleled understandings of modernity, it is that 
this monolithic idea of history is itself a myth. 
Counter to Benjamin's accusation that Nietzsche failed to have a sufficient 
historical-philosophical understanding of tragedy, Sloterdijk suggests instead an 
implied philosophy of history in the programme for a rebirth of tragedy. In 
highlighting the dramatic aspects of Nietzsche's thought and writing, he suggests 
that by representing himself as essential to this rebirth due to his affinity with 
tragic greatness: 
Nietzsche drew attention not to the epic but rather to the dramatic basic 
structure of modem philosophies of history. For that which occurs on the 
level of greatness is staged not in terms of narrative but in terms of 
theatre. 
80 
Sloterdýjk, Thinker on Stage, p. 20. 
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Although Nietzsche is often seen as a proto-postmodemiSt8l I would suggest that 
this theatrical idea of history rather than the usual narrative one can remain 
comfortably within a modernist reading. A combination and juxtaposition of 
Benjamin's and Nietzsche's versions of the theatricality, or staging of history will 
prove fruitful in unearthing the competing conceptions of history embedded 
within modernity. 
I have already drawn attention to the 'play' aspect of Trauerspiel and Benjamin's 
analysis would easily place it in the Nietzschean camp of a theatrical history 
rather than a narrative one. If the narrative is a linear, progressive history, a story 
of causation and Socratic cognition would remain as narrative while a 
presentation of mournful catastrophe that develops randomly through human 
fallibility, caprice and hubris could easily be described in terms of theatrical 
improvisation. But this is again in danger of homogenising Trauerspiel and 
tragedy by setting them both up in opposition to Socratic optimism or causation. 
What I would like to suggest here is that the thought of theatre as history can be 
derived from Nietzsche's thinking on tragedy, but that it is Benjamin's analysis 
of Trauerspiel that can help us to think a more timely theatrical thinking of 
history. This is a thinking of history as shaped by its extremes and inclusive of 
competing conceptions of modernity. 
81 By JOrgen Habermas, for example, in The Philosophical Discourse qf Modernity. Cambridge, 
Polity, 1987, particularly chapter 4 'The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point. ' 
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In making the link between philosophies or ideas of history and theatre we must 
also bear in mind other literary genres that inform and are informed by 
philosophies and ideas of history. A useful tool in coming to understand any 
philosophy of history might be to find its most appropriate literary model. For 
example, the novel is the most likely candidate for the dominant model of history 
as narrative. I would suggest that the Bildungsroman could be taken as the model 
of a German tradition of a philosophy of history, one that follows the line from 
Kant through Hegel and the Romantics. This would be the story of the 
progressive acculturation of the enlightened, enlightening or enlightenment world 
rather than an individual. 
What then would be the appropriate genre for a theatrical model of history? 
Sloterdijk suggests commedia dell'arte, 'in which the plot is carried along from 
scene to scene thanks to the improvisational powers of an ensemble of actors. ' 82 
This gives us a useful alternative to more restrictive ideas of history that insist on 
a plan or linear direction to history. To think of history along these lines, as 
involving a group of stock characters that improvise their way through history 
from one moment to the next. However is difficult to see how this would fit with 
the notion of tragedy at work in Nietzsche. It would fit more comfortably with the 
famous comment by Marx that historical facts and persons occur 'the first time as 
tragedy, the second as farce'. 
83 
82 Sloterdijk, Thinker on Stage, p. 96. 
Karl Marx 'The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' in The Marx-Engels Reader, ed, 
Robert C. Tucker, Norton, New York, 1972, p. 436. 
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In a preliminary sketch for The Origin of German Tragic Drama Benjamin 
outlines the differences in how time works in Trauerspiel and Tragedy. He 
suggests that these two forms also relate to, or can be taken as examples of, two 
forms of historical time . 
84 Tragic time is considered to be a form of what Caygill 
calls 'authentic' time 85 . By this he means that tragic time displays a present that 
is 'redeemed and completed by gathering its past to itself. The time of 
Trauerspiel, on the other hand, is an example of 'inauthentic' time, in which the 
past ruins the present, 'making it entirely in vain' 86 . However Caygill also 
reminds us that these two options are not presented as opposed moments of a 
dialectic that needs to be resolved or overcome. They are really irreconcilable 
distinctions, just as much as Benjamin's distinction between qualitative and 
quantitative time. 'For we should not think of time as merely the measure that 
records the duration of a mechanical change... Historical time, however, differs 
f1 87 rom this mechanical time. ' 
Caygill finds the main point of conflict between Benjamin and Heidegger's 
accounts of time to operate around the question of authenticity. For Benjamin, 
84 See 'Trauerspiel and Tragedy' in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, p. 55. 
'5Caygill, 'Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition', in Walter Benjamin's 
Phil6sophy, p. 9. Caygill's paper provides an intriguing account of the similarities and differences 
between Betliamin's and Heidegger's thought and writing, in relation to the questions of historical 
time, authenticity, tradition, origin and aesthetics. While it is extremely informative about the, 
sometimes very subtle, differences at stake, his claim that; 'The programmatic sketch for is 
Trazierspiel book, and indeed for his authorship as a whole, thus emerged from a critique of 
Heidegger. ' does seem somewhat exaggerated and difficult to justify. 
96 Caygill, 'Benjamin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition', p. 9. 
87 'Trauers1fiel and Tragedy', p. 55- 
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historical time is 'infinite in every direction and unf 88 ulfilled at every moment' . 
This infinity of unfulfillment means that there could be no such thing as 
authenticity within historical time. For Benjamin, there could only be a fulfilment 
or authenticity of historical time rather than in historical time. The first reason 
for this is that Benjamin no longer thinks of historical time as a container in 
which historical events might 'happen'. Although historical time does still 
appear to have the form of the transcendental conditions of possibility of events, 
'The event does not fulfill the formal nature of the time in which it takes place... 
to think of its being filled makes no sense. 89 The other aspect of this is that, for 
Benjamin, a truly fulfilled or authentic time, would be a messianic time; the time 
of the last judgement in which history itself would be redeemed. According to 
Caygill, the crux of the difference between Benjamin and Heidegger lies in the 
fact that 'For Ben amin there can be no redemption in historical time, only the i 
redemption of it. '90 
The time of tragedy would be an example of fulfilment in historical time and 
could act as a model of authentic historical time because the death of the tragic 
hero portrays a moment of fulfilment within historical time. 'In tragedy the hero 
dies because no one can live in fulfilled time. '91 On the other hand, the time of 
Trauerspiel portrays an inauthentic historical time that remains unfulfilled even 
at the moment of death: 
88 Ibid., p. 55. 
89 Ibid., p. 55. 
90 Cayoill, 'Betliarnin, Heidegger and the Destruction of Tradition'. p. 10. 
9' ' Trauerspiel and Tragedy', p. 56. I 
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Death in the mourning play is not based on the extreme determinacy that 
individual time confers on the action. It is no conclusive finality; without 
the certitude of a higher existence and without irony ... 
92 
Because there is no such thing as authentic historical time, for Benjamin, the 
Trauerspiel model presents a more honest, or appropriate, model for Benjamin's 
active-nihilistic conception of the transience of messianic nature. Historical time 
follows the same trajectory of ruination and dispersal as presented in Trauerspiel. 
While Caygill goes on to explore the consequences of these differences in tenns 
of authenticity, tradition, and origin, there are other aspects of this sketch that he 
does not explore due to the Heideggerian focus of his text. In particular, 
Benjamin introduces an account of repetition into his thinking of Trauerspiel. 
This repetition can be read as another aspect of the non-fulfilment of Trauerspiel 
time because it is a repetition that eschews closure and universality: 'The time of 
the mouming play is not ftilfilled, but nevertheless it is finite. It is nonindividual, 
but without historical universality. ' 93 Benjamin associated this finitude and non- 
universality with an account of repetition that he takes to be the founding law of 
Trauerspiel. Because in Trauerspiel 'all play, until death puts an end to the game, 
so as to repeat the same game, albeit on a grander scale, in another world. It is 
this repetition on which the law of the mourning play is founded 04 The repetition 
at work here is not a reproduction of the same; it is a production of difference, 
which is why 'The nature of repetition in time is such that no unified form can be 
92 Ibid.. p. 56. 
93 Ibid., p. 57. 
94 Ibid., p. 57. 
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based on it' 
95 
The temporality of these various examples of historical time is inextricably 
linked to their respective artistic forms. Benjamin describes tragedy's temporal 
character as 'in the form of drama'96 . However, although Trauerspiel is a 
dramatic form, its formal repetitions and revolutions that allow it to avoid 
closure, universality, non-unification, fulfilment and authenticity mean, Benjamin 
no longer conceives it on traditionally dramatic lines. These would still be the 
forms appropriate to tragedy and its authentic time which can be fulfilled in 
history: 
The mourning play, on the other hand, is inherently nonunified drarna, 
and the idea of resolution no longer dwells within the realm of drama 
itself And here, on the question of form, is the point where the crucial 
distinction between tragedy and mouming play emerges decisively. The 
remains of mourning plays are called music. Perhaps there is a parallel 
here: just as tragedy marks the transition from historical to dramatic time, 
the mouming play represents the transition from dramatic time to musical 
97 
time. 
It is in this closing sentence of this sketch that we are given the strongest clue as 
to the most appropriate form on which to model a new conception of historical 
Ibid., p. 57. 
96 Ibid., p. 57. 
97 Ibid.. p. 57- 
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time. It is music, the detritus of the historical time of Trauerspiel, that will 
provide the most suitable thinking of a revolutionary temporality of history. 98 
To think of history in terms of play and music does not have to result in an 
irresponsible devalorization of history - post- ideological post-history. The play- 
ness of Trauerspiel was, for Benjamin, the forgotten aspect that kept it from 
becoming passive, nihilistic tragedy. There is also a kind of thinking of history as 
play that can be teased out of Benjamin's thinking on Trauerspiel: a thinking that 
also remembers the sorrow and mourning (Trauer) at play in history. This 
thinking recognises the absence of a redemption that would come from outside 
history, and because of this it would have no choice but to cling to the wreckage 
of a modemity that still treats the human rather than art as the basis (Grund) - 
Adorno's stage - of existence and history. Trauerspiel may have been able to 
counteract the abyss of illusion by drawing attention to the fact that it was being 
staged, but the question that we now need to ask is about the stage itself Can we 
still believe in this stage or ground or must we come up with another idea of 
history that is better able to show the shape of the context in which 'the unique 
and extreme stands alongside its counterpart'? 99 
The reason that history seems to be so problematic today is that it has always 
been grounded in the human. Although Benjamin may have changed the position 
of the human from centre stage to the stage itself and given us a clue to the play- 
like nature of history the challenge remains to see if we can think of a less 
problematically humanist notion of history. But the only way to remove this stage 
Q4 
, This musical thinking of historical time will re-emerge in chapter 6 in relation to Irigaray's 
engagement with Nietzsche. 
166 
on which history is played out is to complete history. Perhaps the most tragic 
thought is the post-historical; that history has indeed played itself out and the 
theatre itself is an illusion. Perhaps we are left only with the musical remains. 
If we take the stage as a Benjaminian 'idea' we can try and tease out the elements 
of the constellation which are 'extreme' and discover its configuration from 
them. So if this stage is the human then it is in the extremes of the human that we 
may be able to find some Benjaminian hope for the redemption of the human and 
history. The 'human' will, likewise, only be understood as the shape or 
configuration of the total significance of this word which must be determined by 
its extremes. The extremes of humanity at any time also determine the historical 
specificity of the idea of humanity. To recognise the shape of this constellation 
from its extremes would be to bring about a more inclusive and open ended idea 
of the living stage of history. By refusing the exclusion of the non-human it 
opens up passages between the human and the non-human. 
Benjamin's fascination with the non-human, the monstrous, and the demonic can 
be found in his readings of Kafka's animals and Klee's figures. In Kafka he 
found a writer who could present the forgotten and discarded aspects of culture 
and history through making use of the non-human: 'Kafka did not tire of Picking 
up the forgotten from animals"00. The forgotten in these animals have a kind of 
anarchic revolutionary potential. Christine Buci-Glucksmann links this to the 
. active forgetting' of Nietzsche's essay on the utility and liability of history. 
According to her reading, Benjamin and Nietzsche share a temporality of 
" Origin of German Tragic, Drama. p. 3-5. 
Benjamin, 'Franz Katka: On the Tenth Anniversary of his Death', in Illuminations, p. 128. 
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101 
revolution which 'turns back in a suspension of linear, chronological time . 
This is because, as Benjamin says, the reflection of Kafka's animal's ýmesses a 
situation up, yet it is the only hopeful thing about itý. 
102 His affirmation of the 
monstrous and the barbaric are further aspects of brushing history against the 
grain. Ben amin describes Klee's figures as 'barbaric' 103 and his Angelus Novus j 
is treated as full of destructive and demonic potential. If we are to understand the 
stage of history - the human - on which the dramatic music of history is to be 
played, then we must include these extremes. As Benjamin himself put it: 'the 
monster stands among us as the messenger of a more real humanism'. 104 
The hope is that we will no longer exclude those who have often been positioned 
as somehow on the extremes or outside of humanity. However this hope should 
not be construed as teleological enough to suggest that there is a posited goal, an 
end of history in which all the world would become the stage. This would be to 
lose the power of Benjamin's constellation metaphor and turn ideas into 
universals - universes rather than constellations. The human will always be an 
exclusive idea because of its specificity, as will any idea, but as a constellation its 
extremities are negotiable and its shape can change radically. If the human is the 
stage of history it is not a fixed and immutable ground. Instead it would be akin 
to the staging of Trauerspiel, fonning patterns of identity through repetition, 
101 Christine Buci-Glucksmann, Baroque Reason: The Aesthetics of Modernity, trans. Patrick 
Camiller, London, Sage Publications, 1994. 
'02 Benjamin, 'Franz Kafka', p. 128. The most potent of Kafka's 'discarded, forgotten objects' 
must be Odradek which Benjamin describes as 'the form which things assume in oblivion' (Franz 
Kafka', p. 129. ) See Kafka's story 'The Cares of a Family Man*, in The Complete Short Stories of 
Fran.: Kajka, ed. Nahum N. Glatzer, London, Minerva, 1992. 
1 ()3, ýIr Benjamin, 'Experience and Povert,, ', in Selected ritings, Vol. 2, p. 733. 
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rehearsal and mourning. In both Nietzsche's Birth of Tragedy and Benjamin .s 
Origin of German Tragic Drama we can see the genealogical morphing of the 
stage. As long as there is a space to present history the show will go on, but what 
shape that space may develop into and how its human configuration will look 
might only be seen in the stars. 
'04 Benjamin, 'Karl Kraus", in 5elected Writings, Vol. -1, p. 456. 
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Part 2. 
Irigaray 
Chapter 4. 
Irigaray and the Brushing of History against the 
Grain 
This age is participating in one of the greatest revolutions ever to take 
place in the relations between the sexes. Only someone who is aware of 
this development is entitled to speak about sexuality and the erotic in our 
day. (Walter Benjamin)' 
Sexual Difference is one of the most important questions of our age, if not 
in fact the buming issue. (Luce Irigaray)2 
Irigaray has, notably, not engaged with Benjamin, to date. This may well be 
because of his own position as a somewhat marginal figure in the western 
philosophical canon. Indeed part of the project of this thesis is to explore 
Benjamin and Irigaray's positions as 'marginal' philosophers in relation to the 
philosophical tradition, as represented by Hegel and Nietzsche. The focus of this 
chapter however, will be to show that Irigaray's theory is not only revolutionary in 
its own right, but that it can also be read as a particular enactment of Ben amin's j 
call to brush history against the grain. Her theory will be seen to be more utopian 
than Benjamin's although this utopianism will be shown to be multi-faceted as 
well as problematic. I will also be attempting to set out the thinking of historical 
and revolutionary time implied in Irigaray's texts. 
1 Benjamin 'On Love and Related Matters', in Selected Works, Vol. 1. P. 229. 
2 Irigaray 'Sexual Difference', in The Irigaray Reader, ed. Margaret Whitford, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 199 1, p. 165. 
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Revolutionary Irigaray 
While it would be relatively uncontroversial to say that Irigaray is a thinker who 
is concerned with bringing about ethical and political changes, it cannot be 
assumed that she is a revolutionary thinker. In what follows I would like to set out 
the evidence for my own reading of her as a revolutionary thinker in the most 
radical of senses. I will argue that she is truly revolutionary, according Agamben's 
task of the genuine revolution which 'is never merely to 'change the world', but 
also - and above all - to 'change time". 
The primary reason for suggesting that Irigaray might be a thinker of revolution is 
that her work embodies a hope for radical change. Radical change is not 
necessarily synonymous with revolution, but if revolution can be described as an 
attempt at total transformation then the modification envisaged by Irigaray must 
be fairly close to this aspiration. She would have us alter the very logos of our 
existence which colours and forms our thought of/and being and truth. If 
4 woman' and women 3 obtain a recognition and symbolic expression of their own 
sexuality and subjectivity then the the symbolic order will be 'changed, changed 
4 
utterly', to quote Yeats on the Irish revolution of 1916 . 
I -1 1 will be using both terms 'woman' and 'women' here to emphasise the difference between 
'woman' as the theoretical or cultural representation of the female and feminine, and 'women' as 
the concrete and specific examples of the lived experience of the female and the feminine. While 
it would be tempting to explain this in terms of 'woman' as universal. and 'women' as particular, 
this would miss the emphasis of Irigaray's project which aims to rework the relationship of 
universal to particular through disturbing the categories of 'woman' and 'women'. For the 
remainder of this text 'Woman' will be used without quotation marks. 
' W. B. Yeats, 'Easter, 1916', The Works of W. B. Yeats, Ware, Wordworth Editions, 1994, p. 152. 
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This utter change will emerge from her attempts to disrupt philosophical and 
theoretical discourse. I will be reading this as a possible candidate for revolution 
as an interruption of history. By challenging the phallocentric and phallocratic 
philosophical tradition and its discourse she sets the scene for a change in all 
discourses, 
it is indeed precisely philosophical discourse that we have to challenge, and 
disrupt, inasmuch as this discourse sets forth the law for all others, 
inasmuch as it constitutes the discourse on discourse. 5 
To set out to change all discourse by disrupting philosophical discourse can 
easily be translated into revolutionary terms because it is an aspiration to 
radicalise the whole of our social, cultural, political and economic order. 
Why must this transformation necessarily involve revolution instead of revision? 
An adequate theory of sexual difference could perhaps be constructed using the 
already available theoretical tools and methods. Revisionist tactics will not work 
for Irigaray because she considers the problem to be so deeply embedded within 
the available theoretical tools and materials themselves. To construct any sort of 
theory is already to be complicit in the exelusion and repression of woman 
because there is no place for her within theoretical discourse. Irigaray's repeated 
claim is that the existence of theoretical discourse is dependent on the exclusion 
and repression of woman and so, no matter how sophisticated the theory, it will 
Luce Irigaray, This,, 5ax Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1985, p. 74. 
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never be able to properly recognise and articulate the specificity of femaleness 
and femininity. 
Indeed Irigaray's concerns relate to many of those that we have seen emerge in 
our examination of Benjamin's theory. Her desire to avoid complicity with the 
existent system reminds us of Benjamin's own concern with complicity in his 
'Critique of Violence' essay 6. Her claim that theoretical and philosophical 
discourse it itself dependent on the exclusion and suppression of women also 
relates to the questions of representation and philosophical presentation raised in 
chapter 3. Indeed these concerns also bring us back to the questions about 
theatrical models for the staging of philosophy and history, as well as to the 
issues concerning the relationship between tragedy and history. 
In a discussion of her interpretive strategy in reading the texts that define the 
history of philosophy Irigaray begins to question 'the conditions under which 
systematicity ifseýf is possible 7 She identifies part of these conditions of 
possibility for the systernaticity of philosophy to be 
the scenography that makes representation feasible, representation as 
defined in philosophy, that is, the architectonics of its theatre, its framing 
in space-time, its geometric organization, its props, its actors, their 
respective positions, their dialogues, indeed their tragic relations 
8. 
6 Benjamin, 'Critique of Violence', in One WQv Street. 
7 This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 74. 
8 This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 75. 
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Much of her writing can then be read as an analysis of how philosophy presents 
and represents itself Just as we have seen that for Benjamin philosophy must 
continually confront the question of presentation, so for Irigaray it must confront 
the question of the conditions for presentation. The conditions which ground the 
presentations of history's form and content as well as it's space-time. My own 
reading here will be primarily concerned with her thinking of the way this space- 
time has been framed within philosophy and philosophy's thinking of history. 
The easiest way to convey her assessment of the philosophical, theoretical and 
cultural exclusion of woman and women is simply to quote the title of one of the 
chapters of her Speculum of the Other Woman; 'Any Theory of the "Subject 11) 
Has Always Been Appropriated by the "Masculine" (mascufln). '9 From this title 
we can derive a fair assessment of her evaluation of the history of Western 
Philosophy, as well as the social, cultural and symbolic systems that are based on 
its theoretical constructions. Although we could criticise Irigaray here for her 
tendency to represent the whole of Western Philosophy as a phallocentric 
enterprise, what is at issue is not whether there have been exceptions to this 
monolithic misogyny, but how this appropriation of the subject has worked. 
Although Irigaray is concerned primarily with psychoanalytic theories of the 
subject in the 'Any Theory of the Subject" chapter, I shall be reading it as 
9 Ltice I rigaray, Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, 1985, p. 133. While 'masculin' is translated here as 'masculine' it can mean both male and 
masculine. Likewise. where Irigaray uses fiminin' this can mean either, or both, feminine or 
female. This complicates the texts leaving the interpretation of whether the reference is to nature, 
culture, or both, a difficult one. 
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applicable to strictly philosophical theories, such as Kant's, as a paradigmatic 
account of the philosophical subject. What brings all these theories together, for 
Irigaray, is that, as theories, they all participate in the symbolic order. The 
'Symbolic' is a Lacanian psychoanalytic term which refers to the ability of the 
subject to participate in language (Iangue)10. Language here doesn't only refer to 
words, vocabulary and grammatical rules, but, as Joan W. Scott explains, 
languageis 
rather, a meaning constituting system: that is, any system - strictly verbal 
or other - through which meaning is constructed and cultural practices 
organised and by which, accordingly, people represent and understand 
their world, including who they are and how they relate to others. ' 
Theories are not only products of language users they can also be historical 
interventions into, or influences on, the way we use, think about, and construct 
language. Irigaray's point is that the symbolic that these theories are necessarily 
and inextricably a part of, is itself a gendered system. In Speculum she traces the 
masculinisation of the symbolic and of all theories, using examples from Plato 
through to Lacan. 12 To try to sum up this book we could say that the whole of our 
'0 For a full and accessible account of Lacan's system and theory see Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques 
Lacan; A Feminist Introduction, London, Routledge, 1990. 
11 Scott, Joan C. 'Deconstructing Equal ity-Versus-Difference: Or, the Uses of poststructuralist 
Theory for Feminism', Feminist Studies 14, no. I (Spring 1988), p. 34. 
12 With regard to Plato, she executes a lengthy reading of his Myth of the Cave from Republic part 
Seven, section 7, in which she is able to give a convincing account of how it is a foundational 
move of philosophy to exclude woman and women. See Speculum of the Other Woman, p 243- 
3e1 365.1 will not try to present a synopsis of her ingenious deconstruction of Plato her , but w 11 
merely hint at the associations she makes between the shape of the cave, the womb, and Plato's 
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culture is based on the exclusion of women and women. A theme that occurs 
again and again throughout her texts is that this exclusion is more than just a 
privileging of the male or masculine position - it is not just a crude attempt to 
enable men to reach and maintain positions of symbolic power - it is also 
necessary to the whole functioning and maintenance of the system. In the final 
note of the book she puts it thus: 
in relation to the working of theory, the/a woman fulfils a twofold 
function - as the mute outside that sustains all systernaticity (de dehors 
mutique soutenant toute systimaticiti); as a maternal and still silent 
ground that nourishes all foundations (maternel (encore) silencieux dont 
se nourrit toutfondement) ... 
13 
. 
If the symbolic is really a male or masculine symbolic that depends on the 
exclusion of woman and women, and if theory is automatically implicated in this 
exclusion, the problem then becomes one of trying to find a place or method by 
which woman and women can enter into language. Part of the reason that 
Irigaray's writing is so impenetrable and strange is that she is attempting to use a 
language, which she doesn't consider to be her own, - it is not her mother tongue 
(langue), we might say - to express and create a symbolic that would include the 
female and feminine. She can only do this with the resources available to her and 
therefore uses a strategy of mimicry to unfaithfully repeat, distort, and therefore, 
subvert the symbolic that is attempting to exclude her. She writes, 
privileging of the philosopher's movement away from this 'Hystera' (or womb) towards the sun. 
This chapter will focus instead on Irigaray's relationship to Benjmain and Kant. 
I -, Speculum, p 365. 
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That place may only emerge if the feminine is granted its own 
94 specificity" in its relation to language. Which implies a logic other than 
the one imposed by discursive coherence. I have attempted to practice that 
14 
other "logic" in the writing of Speculum - ... 
Irigaray considers the masculinisation of the symbolic, and therefore Western 
culture as a whole, to be so successfully hegemonic that it even effects the 
representations of a female/feminine imaginary. The 'Imaginary' is another 
Lacanian psychoanalytic term which describes the stage in the formation of the 
ego in which an infant can recognise himself or herself as 'whole'. Because this 
stage precedes the symbolic and full entry into language it has often been used by 
feminist theorists to try and construct a developmental stage that might be 
described as more authentically feminine. 15 According to Lacan this stage 
involves an intellectual act of re-cognition in which many of the distinctions and 
ruptures of the mature ego are enacted. Here we discover the distinctions between 
self and other, subject and object. This recognition takes place in a mirror, but, 
for Irigaray, the (Lacanian) theory behind this already denies a woman's 
4 specificity of her own relationship to the imaginary' 16 because it is constructed 
14 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, trans. Catherine Porter, 1985b, Ithaca, Cornell University 
Press, p 153. 
15 Examples of very different uses of the imaginary in Feminist Theory include Michelle Le 
Doeuff, The Philosophical Imaginaty, trans. C. Gordon, London, Athlone Press, 1989; Moira 
Gatens, Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality, London, Routledge, 1996; Drucilla 
Cornell, The Imaginary Domain: Abortion, Pornography and Sexual Harassment, London, 
Routledge, 1995. 
16 Speculum, p 133. 
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according to what the male gaze would see in a flat mirror. In Irigaray's words, 
17 it 'reflects the greater part of women's sexual organs only as a hole (trou)' . 
Irigaray's task is not only to try and disrupt the symbolic enough to create a place 
for a female/feminine symbolic, it is also an attempt to refigure the imaginary in 
such a way that it would allow her to see her own specificity in her relationship to 
it. She repeatedly mimics the positions that she considers culture and theory to 
have attributed to women in order to undermine those cultures and theories. By 
drawing attention to oppositions such as 'subject' and 'object', and 'sun' and 
4 earth', she is able to emphasise how deeply embedded such binary oppositions 
are in the representations of the male/female opposition. By taking woman's 
position as the one that is already given to her in the symbolic Irigaray shows 
how woman is actually the ground (the earth) upon which man has built his 
theoretical abstractions. 
According to Irigaray, the philosophical subject is only able to set itself up as a 
subject if it has an appropriate and compliant object to reflect its self-image. 
Irigaray plays with the idea of woman as the mirror in which man sees an inferior 
copy of himself. In fact, rather than thinking of the universal subject as the 
standard by which other subjects are measured, Irigaray suggests that this abstract 
standard can only exist because woman is, 
a bench mark (reperage) that is ultimately more crucial than the subject,, 
for he can sustain himself only by bouncing back off some objectiveness, 
some objective (de quelque objectivite, de quelque objectij) ... 
18 
17 
Ibid., p 89. 
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These theories of the subject make woman into a flat, static, mirror or object in 
order to be able to erect the male human's status as subject. If woman is allowed 
to move, or to curve, or to show herself as she really might be in her own 
subjectivity, then the male theorists' erections would collapse. 
It is Kant's transcendental self that Irigaray takes as a prime example of a 
construction of the universal subject. The transcendental self, in Kant's system, 
is what needs to be presupposed in order to bring all the elements of experience 
together into an understandable whole. It does this through applying the 
categories and forms, that are the basic framework and structure of our thinking, 
to our perceptions. This not only brings our experience together into a coherent 
whole, it also makes the T that is experiencing into a single, coherent self 
However, for Irigaray, it is the transcendental nature of this self that is another 
symptom of the theoretical forgetting of woman and the mother. Because it is 
transcendental it stands out from, or above, the material world that it both 
projects and perceives: 
Rising to a perspective that would dominate the totality (tout), to the 
vantage point of greatest power, he [the male theorist of the subject 
(Kant/Lacan)] thus cuts himself off from the bedrock (ainsi se scinde-t-il 
de son assise matirielle), from his empirical relationship with the matrix 
(matriciel) that he claims to survey. 19 
'8 Ibid.. p 133. 
'9 Ibid., p 133-4. The reference to the matrix is part of a continuing play between matter, mater, 
and matrix, which again, is mimicking the positioning of woman as nature, earth, or ground. 
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Kant's transcendental subject, and any theory of the subject according to IrigaraYý 
distances him from the earth /woman /mother . 
20 By doing so he distances himself 
from the sine qua non of his existence, subjectivity and life itself It is these 
movements of theoretical abstraction that Irigaray reads as having used woman as 
a ground or foundation on which to build higher and more ethereal structures and 
systems which can then leave behind the bedrock of their abstracted being. From 
Plato's attempts to move towards the sun and the heavenly world of forms, 
through the universalisation of the Kantian transcendental self, to the self- 
reflexive Lacanian subject, these theories can all be seen to function on the 
exclusion of woman. 
What is required is a revolution involving not only the theoretical superstructure, 
but also its base. This revolution will bring to light, not only what the 
philosophers are trying to reach or create, but also what it is that they are trying to 
move away from, forget, or destroy. As far as Irigaray is concerned, we could say 
that, without the Mother there would be no life, without the concrete there would 
be no abstract, and without the particular there would be no universal. She would 
like a closer examination and non-misogynistic evaluation of the particular, if 
that is to be the position that woman is assigned. In a way that is analogous with 
Benjamin's concern for and attention to specificity, higaray calls for an 
attentiveness to the specificity of each woman's hic et nunc. She emphasises the 
20 The problem, for Irigaray, writing in French, is one of the language of subjectivity itself 
Another reason why any theory of the subject is always appropriated by the masculine is that the 
sub ect in French is a masculine noun (le sujet). While the subject is nominally neutral in English, j 
Irigaray's analysis shows how this gendering is still at work at a deeper level. 
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radical difference not just between men, and their death driven futurity and 
finitude, and women, but also between women themselves. 
Not only is woman positioned as object, matter and ground etcetera, but this 
ground must be formed out of inert matter if it is to provide the stable foundation 
for man's status as a subject. This inertia is not only a lack of movement, or 
change, it is also a way of making woman silent and unrepresentable within 
theory and culture. Taking the Kantian transcendental subject as paradigmatic, 
Irigaray re-interprets its powers of projection. The Kantian subject projects and 
represents the object or objective world through its framework of space and time, 
the categories, and the schemata of the imagination. But this is much more than a 
neutral attempt to make sense of the chaos. Irigaray states that man 'projects a 
something to absorb, to take, to see, to possess ... as well as a patch of ground 
to stand upon, a mirror to catch his reflection. -)21 
Irigaray reverses the positions here. She would consider the truth of the matter to 
be that woman is already there and, as the forgotten mother creates and sustains 
the subject in a way that is opposed to the Kantian account that has the object as a 
projection and construction of the subject. Kant recognises the necessity of the 
ob ect for the formation of the subject, but refuses to allow the object her own j 
voice or representation. To allow the object to speak would upset the unity and 
coherence of the subject who needed this myth of projection and inertia to 
become a transcendent subject in the first place: 
21 Ibid., p 134. 
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the silent allegiance of the one (1'un(e)) guarantees the auto-sufficiency 
(Vauto-suffisance), the auto-nomy (Vauto-nomie) of the other as long as 
no questioning of this mutism as a symptom - of historical repression 
(refoulement) - is required. But what if the object started to speak (se 
22 
mettait a parler)?... 
Irigaray's revolution can partly be considered as taking up the position of the 
object in order to maintain a radical difference from the universal subject that has 
been constructed by theory, She could be described as trying to elaborate a theory 
of the speaking object. However, this does not mean that she wants to passively 
accept the role that has been given to woman by a phallocentric culture. The 
inertia and silence of the object is only the inertia and silence given to it by the 
theories that require these qualities in order to create and maintain their positions. 
Woman and the object only appear to be silent because theory and culture refuse 
to listen properly, or to be sensitive to their movements and presence. What 
would enable us to hear woman and the object as well as feel their presence and 
movement would be a completely different theory of subject and object. It would 
be one in which the dichotomy of subject and object would no longer be 
dependent on the ob ect simply being an inert, reflection of the subject. It would j 
be a theory in which the object would be granted existence in her own right. 
Irigaray tries to express a theory of radical difference which would move beyond 
the fixed poles of sameness and difference. She doesn't just take up difference as 
the opposite of sameness or equality. Instead, she tries to develop a notion of 
22 Ibid.. p 135. 
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difference that is no longer allied to the sense that it is still just one term or pole 
of a binary opposition. With reference to sexual difference in particular, she 
suggests that male/masculine (masculin) and female/feminine (fiminin), are 
terms 
that cannot fittingly be designated by the number "two" and the adjective 
"different",, if only because they are not susceptible to comparison. To use 
such terms serves only to reiterate a movement begun long since, that is, 
the movement to speak of the "other" in a language already systematized 
by/for the same. 
23 
The difference at stake here is no longer to be thought of as what is different 
from the same. To be different in the prevailing phallocentric symbolic is simply 
to be different from the same, to be the object of the subject or to be the 
imperfect copy of that subject. What Irigaray would like us to recognise is a 
radical alterity that she calls the 'other of the other' that escapes being 
represented as the 'other of the same'. These terms are again responses to 
Lacanian theory which explicitly refused the thought of the 'Other of the 
Other 24 . For, Lacan this 
'Other' is a further aspect of the rupture or 'cut' that 
fon-ns the subject. This splitting occurs at the same time as the subject recognises 
that it is distinguished from the mother. Lacan identifies 'the Mother' as that 
which actually occupies 'the place of the Other'. 
25 So higaray is not only making 
a direct challenge to Lacan's theory but also to all theories in which the only 
23 Ibid., p 119. 
14 Jacques Lacan, tcrits: A 5election, trans. Alan Sheridan, London, Tavistock Publications, 
1977, p. 3 11. Irigaray does not capitalise 'other' as does Lacan, thus reflecting the less 
transcendent nature of her 'other. I shall follow Irigaray in the non-capitalisation of 'other'. 
25 Lacan, tcrits, p. 3 11. 
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possible 'other' was to be the 'other' of the masculine same. The -other of the 
other' would be an otherness that is not derivative of, and without reference to 
the masculinised theory that privileges the same. 
Irigaray even questions the possibility of trying to construct another theory from 
this mimetic procedure, sometimes seeing it as an ongoing revolution, a 
permanent challenge to the status quo, rather than an attempt to construct a new 
order. If revision is not feasible revolution must be brought into play: 
The issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would be 
the subject or the object, but of jamming ( d'enrayer) the mechanism itself 
26 (elle-meme), 
.. 
This jamming will also have to operate according to a revolutionary logic if it is 
not to return or recapture woman for phallocracy, and according to Irigaray, this 
resource is available through the 'disruptive excess' which 'is possible on the 
feminine side. '27 
Revolution has at least two components, destruction and creation; for the new to 
emerge, the old must give way in an act of destructive creation or creative 
destruction. For Irigaray, one of the stages of her challenge to phallocentric 
culture, along with an interrogation of the conditions of the possibility of its 
metaphysical systernaticity and a psychoanalysis of its philosophical discourse, 
'is to work at "destroying " the discursive mechanism'. 
28 Again the logic and 
26 This Sew, p. 7 8. 
This Sex, p. 78. 
28 Th is Say, p. 7 6. 
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method need to avoid complicity and possible recapture. So Ifigaray elects to use 
the mimicry of femininity and the style of the feminine because '[i]ts "style" 
resists and explodes every fin-nly established form, figure, idea or concept. , 29 
The destruction of phallocentric discourse and the power structure that it sets up 
and maintains will come about through a questioning or interrogation of the 
assumptions about sex and gender that support that discourse. For Irigaray this 
interrogation is indeed revolutionary because; 
if, by exploits of her hand, woman were to reopen paths into (once again) 
a/one logos (dans un (encore) logos) that connotes her as castrated... then a 
certain sense, which still constitutes the sense of history also, will undergo ( 
s'en trouvera soumis) unparalleled interrogation, revolution. 30 
This unparalleled interrogation is revolutionary because it shakes the certainties 
of the supposed conditions of the possibilities of the systernaticity and 
completeness of metaphysical discourse. By questioning the heretofore hidden 
motives of the logos she is questioning the whole of the extant interpretation of 
hi story. 
Irigaray even plays with her revolutionary thinking in tenns of planetary rotation. 
By following this metaphor we can see that Kant's own 'Copernican revolution' 
placed man at the centre of the universe and, in some respects, was no advance 
on ancient theories that ascribed maleness to the sun and femaleness to the earth. 
29 This Sex, p. 79. 
30 Speculum, p. 142. 
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He further distances himself from woman who becomes a satellite spinning 
around him and reflecting his light. But the earth might have her own revolution: 
If the earth turned and more especially turned upon herself, the erection of 
the subject might thereby be disconcerted and risk losing its elevation and 
penetration. 
31 
As we have seen this revolution would be the revolution of the object, since she 
has not had the status of subject other than as a defective copy of the same, male 
subject. This poses a threat to the same, male, subject because he has always 
required the object to ground and reinforce his own subjecthood. Without the 
support of the object, the subject is in imminent danger of collapse. 
As well as invoking the destructive aspects of revolution Irigaray also undertakes 
a creative process. Indeed, in true revolutionary fashion the creative aspect cannot 
be separated from the destructive. In creating a voice for woman, and trying to 
find a language in which woman and women can articulate their own specificity, 
Irigaray is destroying the language which is not hers, because it has depended on 
woman9s silence for its own utterance and amplification. The unparalleled 
interrogation mentioned above will lead to the previously unthought and 
unthinkable. If woman who has been relegated to the position of passive, aphasic, 
object starts to speak, if she becomes a subject in her own right, then that which 
was unimaginable for phallocratic discourse would have happened. What could 
be more revolutionary than bringing about the unimaginable? What will also be 
involved in the emergence of the unimaginable will be a reworking of the 
revolutionary dialectic of destruction and creation. What will also be destroyed in 
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a creative revolution will be destruction itself As we will see later in the 
conclusion to this thesis, here again, Irigaray comes close to Benjamin in the 
links that are made between creative revolution and destruction. 
The revolution of the object into the unimaginable female, feminine subject will 
not come about through a Hegelian type of dialectical movement; through a 
struggle for recognition between consciousnesses such as that of the 'master' and 
his 'slave'. 32 As 'matter' and 'mirror' woman has always been the ground of the 
male subject's own recognition, and so this revolution is about the 'mirror' 
coming to recognise herself, not in or through the subject's eyes - which would 
be the only option according to this dialectic - but through her own eyes. Indeed, 
frigaray challenges this whole specular metaphorics of sight, often preferring the 
completion to come about through touch. 
Irigaray's revolution is of the most radical kind. Since the unimaginable cannot be 
programmed, even to plan an outcome might be considered as reactionary. Thus, 
if the articulation of femininity is to come from a different symbolic economy it 
will 
necessitate operations as yet non-existent (non encore existantes), whose 
complexity and subtlety can only be guessed at without prejudicing the 
results. Without a teleology already in operation somewhere. 33 
Ibid., p. 13-33. 
This Hegelian dialectic can still be traced in Lacan's work. See Teresa Brennan. Between 
Feminism and Psychoanalysis, London, Routledge, 1989, for a reading of Lacan in which he is I 
seen to rework Hegel. 
5peculum, P. 139. 
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This revolution will have no telos, neither will it have an arche; it is an anarchic 
revolution because, if it were to follow any of the principles laid down by the 
economy of the same, it would fail to create any real difference. Irigaray's is 
another afformative revolution; positing no definite programme. Her new era of 
history will only emerge from the fracturing of discourse, syntax, teleology and 
representation. Even the method she suggests for carrying this out sounds 
anarchic: 
Turn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. Rack it with radical 
convulsions, carry back, reimport (reporter, re-importer), those crises that 
her "body" suffers in her impotence to say what disturbs her... 34 
Irigaray's Benjaminian Revolution 
Having argued that Irigaray can be read as a revolutionary thinker and a thinker 
of revolution I will now develop a reading of her work as brushing history against 
the grain. This is also what Joanna Hodge has in mind when she rewrites 
Benjamin to say that, 
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a 
document of misogyny. And just as such a document is not free of 
misogyny, so misogyny taints also the manner in which it was transmitted 
from one owner to another. A historical materialist therefore dissociates 
herself from it as far as possible. She regards it as her task to brush 
Ibid., p. 142. 
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history against the grain. 35 
Many feminist critiques of history and the philosophy of history will try to show 
how woman and women have been excluded, marginalised and ignored by those 
who have been in the position to decide which events and characters merit a 
place or role in history. An essential part of a feminist brushing of history against 
the grain will then be to remember the forgotten and buried history of woman and 
women. It will be the attempt to find her/their story and the attempt to tell it in 
the hope that it will be heard, listened to, and understood. More than this, 
however it will also be an attempt to experience this history through a 
rememberance (Eingedenken) that brings it together with the present in order to 
project a more just future. 
The relationship of woman and women to history is one of absence or, at best, of 
playing a supporting role. A feminist critique of history would suggest that it has 
been too frequently viewed as something that has been made by 'great men'. A 
general critique of the 'great-man' theory of history would refute the possibility 
of individuals imposing their views and actions on history 36 .A feminist critique, 
such as Irigaray's, is not only a critique of the 'great-man' theory it is also a 
critique of less explicitly gendered views of history. For example although the 
nineteenth century 'Whig' interpretation of history would consider itself to be a 
Joanna Hodge, 'Irigaray Reading Heidegger', in Engaging with Irigaray, eds. Burke. Schor & 
Whitford, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, p. 191. 
3" Recent examples of this theory include A. J. P. Taylor's comment that 'the history of modem 
Europe can be written in terms of three titans: Napoleon, Bismarck, and Lenin. ' (A. J. P. Taylor, 
From Napoleon to Stalin: Comments on European Histoýy. London, H. Hamilton, 1950, p. 74. ) 
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universal theory based on progressive liberal principles, a feminist reading would 
still attempt to show the 'gender blindness' at work in this theory. 37 
Irigaray's critique of history can be compared with Benjamin's when it is applied 
to various theories of history. It too will show the problematic commitment to a 
linear narrative of progress in the 'Whig' interpretation of history. Although she 
doesn't engage directly with historians or philosophers of history we could also 
use Irigaray to show the masculinist heroics embedded in theories as diverse as 
Spengler's and Toynbee's analysis of the Western civilisation as attributable to a 
circular patterning of history, and Fisher's outright rejection of any meaning or 
pattern of history at all. 38 Irigaray is most likely to have been most directly 
influenced by the theories of history and historiography of Fernand Braudel and 
the Annales historians. Their stiructuralist inspired rejection of the 'pure facts' of 
history also showed a healthy hostility to the emphasis on both 'action -heroes' 
and individual events. This method lends itself to a feminist reading which would 
be able to explain the relationships of gender and power in tenns which could 
also be developed in a post-structuralist reading. More significantly it also 
produced a theory of historical time which not only avoids the time of linear 
narrative, but also proposes multiple and different layers of time within history. 
39 
37 For an analysis and strident critique of the 'Whig' view of history - one that is also 'gender 
blind' - see Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of 
History, London, Bell 193 1. 
38 Spengler, Decline of the West, 2 Vols. Trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, New York, Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1922. Toynbee, Arnold J. A Study of History, 10 Vols., London, Oxford University Press, 
193-33-48; H. A. L. Fisher .4 History of 
Europe, London, Arnold, 1934. 
39 See Fernand Braudel. On ffistoiý% trans. Sarah Matthews, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 
1980. 
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Irigaray can be read as agreeing with Benjamin that history is the history of the 
victors. This history of victory has been so successful that it has become 
increasingly more difficult to remember woman and women who have been 
portrayed as so soundly vanquished that their voices can no longer be heard. 
While Irigaray accepts the exclusion of women from history she rejects the view 
that would attribute to them the status of victims. What Irigaray offers us is a way 
to hear the voices of those women again. The fact that they cannot be heard is not 
the same as the claim that they have been silenced. Where feminism could build 
on a project of brushing history against the grain is that, in a similar way that 
Benjamin considers cultural treasures to owe their very existence to the 
anonymous as well as the heroic, 40 we also owe our own very existence to 
another kind of invisible and forgotten presence, the mother. Irigaray takes her 
place in this struggle as the one who most forcefully shows how the mother has 
originally and repeatedly been anonymised or written out of history. It is higaray 
who, through her readings of various originary myths, tells us that this culture not 
only has the anonymous mother to thank for its existence but that it has the 
murder of the mother to thank for its existence. 
This can be seen most clearly in Irigaray's reading of Aeschlus' Oresteia, in a 
lecture entitiled 'Body against Body: in Relation to the Mother'. Clytemnestra is 
murdered by the 'hero' of that piece, Orestes (her son), and he is then vindicated 
by Apollo and Athena. This is traditionally read as a description of the foundation 
of the Greek city state on the principles of justice and rationality. However, 
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Irigaray sees in it something much more disturbing. For her, 
One thing is plain, not only in everyday events but in the whole social 
scene: our society and our culture operate on the basis of an original 
matricide. 
41 
This matricide is not only representative of the attempt to silence and sideline 
women and woman,, it is also one of the original attempts to maintain the power 
of patriarchy - the power of the husband and the father. 
We can start to discern the form of revolution at work in Irigaray's texts from her 
references to this original matricide. She suggests that, 
The substratum is the woman who reproduces the social order, who is 
made this order's infrastructure: the whole of our western culture is based 
upon the murder of the mother. The man-god-father killed the mother in 
order to take power. And isn't there a fluidity, some flood, that could 
shake the social order? And if we make the foundations of the social 
order shift, then everything will shift. That is why they are so careffil to 
42 keep us on a leash... 
As with all of higarays writings it is useful to take note of the form and rhetoric 
of this statement, as well as its explicit content. Again we are presented with the 
claim that the whole of western culture is based on an original matricide. There 
are at least two ways to read this claim: either as a straightforward 'fact' that can 
40 Benjamin, 'On the Concept of History', Thesis VII, Illuminations, p. 248. 
41 frigaray, 'Body Against Body: In Relation to the Mother' in Sexes and Genealogies, trans. 
Gillian C. Gill, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, p. 11. 
42 Irigaray, 'Women-Mothers, the Silent Substratum of the Social Order' in The Irigaray Reader, 
11: ý 
p. 47. 
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be affirmed or denied, or as a deliberately insolent rhetorical strategy that is both 
playing philosophy at its own game while trying to undermine and change the 
rules of the game altogether. I will read such statements in the latter spirit as this 
fits more comfortably with her strategy of mimesis. Here, Irigaray's hyperbolic 
accusation is followed by a more tentative question about the form and 
possibility of revolution in a way that reflects the contrast between what we 
might call the ancien regime and the 'new order'. In other words the 'bad' old 
order can be seen in the form of a set of definite, unambigous, confident and 
hyperbolic pronouncements. The revolution yet to come, on the other hand, is 
posed as a question, one that has not yet taken definite form. The fluidity 
suggested by the metaphor of a flood may be the fluidity of the logic of a system 
that is not defined in such a rigid fashion. If the revolution is to come as a flood 
then the 'everything' that will shift will necessarily include the ways of thinking 
and structuring thought and representation. The flood may well free 'everything' 
up pennanently, rather than settling back down into different, rigid fonnations. 
There will be a two-fold movement involved in any feminist brushing of history 
against the grain. There will be an instigation of an alternative temporality of 
history alongside the more familiar practice of actively seeking historical 
instances of particular women's contributions to history. Although Irigaray is 
aware of the latter, in as much as she calls on women 'not to forget moreover that 
we already have a history, that certain women, despite all the cultural obstacles, 
have made their mark upon history and all too often have been forgotten by 
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us. 43 , she rarely puts this into practice. Her contribution to brushing history 
against the grain is the more abstract, and perhaps also, the more radical gesture 
of transfiguring our conception of the shape of history itself . Her concern 
is, 
along with Benjamin's, with the form of history rather than its content. Both of 
these thinkers are trying to describe a more inclusive form of history and 
historical time. The suggestion is that the reason for the lack of female figures in 
history is not just due to lack of research , but due to the fact that our concept of 
history is another aspect of a patriarchal culture that excludes woman and 
women. So the dominant modes of conceptualising history must be made more 
inclusive. The fonn must be changed in order for the content to be properly 
revolutionised. It is time to change time. 
It is the emphatic sense of remembrance (Eingedenken) as practice and its 
accompanying experience (Erfahrung) that was found in Benjamin's texts that 
can also be put to work in Irigaray's texts. If, as she suggests, Western culture is 
based on the murder of the mother, to remember that murder is also to create an 
experienee. To remember the murder of the mother is also to remember the 
original exclusion of woman from the symbolic order, which necessarily includes 
history. Irigaray's remembranee, in this ease, is a remembranee of something that 
is outside the given symbolic order, and if we can bring Irigaray together with 
Benjamin in brushing history against the grain we can have a political experience 
of something outside the symbolic order. In this case brushing history against the 
grain will create the possibility for a new symbolic order which will include a 
place for the mother. To retrace the history of the exclusion of women from 
43 Irigaray, 'Body Against Body: In Relation to the Mother', p. 19. 
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Western culture will begin to destroy that very culture of exclusion. Irigaray's 
brushing of history against the grain will instigate a logic of inclusion in place of 
the phallocentric logic of exclusion. Indeed, the strict, binary opposition between 
inclusion and exclusion will also be challenged as a result of this process-44 
Trigaray's relationship to the Western philosophical tradition is, in some ways, 
similar to Benjamin's relationship to tradition itself His messianism was part of 
a Judaic tradition which is, at the same time, critical of that tradition. Indeed, one 
aspect of what is philosophically interesting about Judaism is that it could be 
described as a tradition of critique. To some extent Irigaray could be described as 
remaining within, or carrying on, the Western philosophical tradition, by carrying 
out her critique of it. I would argue that she remains within its discourse of 
rationality by trying to construct a female rationality, and is not, as is sometimes 
assumed, carrying out a wholesale destruction of rationality. She also uses the 
traditional texts of the Western philosophical canon - Plato, Aristotle, Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche, etcetera - and makes them reveal their own silencing and 
excluding moves and gestures. In Benjamin's terms she makes them reveal their 
own barbarity. 
It is in relation to thinking of meaning in history, and its relation to making 
history, that we find a relevant example of how Irigaray brushes history against 
the grain. Thinking of history in terms of genealogy we are faced with seemingly 
insunuountable difficulties in trying to trace a maternal history in patriarchal or 
44 1 am also including the 'homogenisation' described by Cavarero in the introduction under the 
rubric of 'exclusion', as it is an inclusion that disempowers. 
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Patrilineal societies. In patrilineal societies woman has no name of her own: hers 
is either the name of the father or of the husband. If her history cannot be the 
history of her name it must be the history of her blood. For Irigaray the maternal 
genealogy is that of the sang, the blood that passes from mother to child. This is 
the sang rouge, the red blood which, for Irigaray, belongs to the 'other of the 
other'; that is, the other which is not constructed as an inferior resemblance of the 
male. To posit woman as the 'other of the other' relieves her from her role as 
man' s reflection, it gives her space to create her own identity, rationality and, of 
course, history. Irigaray reads the symbolic order of patriarchy as endowing 
woman with only white blood, sang blanc, which is a French homophone of 
semblant, semblance. To trace the history of her (red) blood therefore creates an 
identity which is no longer a mere resemblance. 
in a reading of the myth of Antigone, Irigaray sees the point at which this blood 
tie with the mother becomes buried in history. 45 Because Antigone privileges the 
blood tie over the polis she is excluded from the polis. The matemal blood tie is 
written out of history as no longer able to be a recognisable criteria for 
citizenship or subjecthood. The exclusion that has taken place here is also shown 
to lead to the forgetting of the necessity of blood for life. Although Woman is 
excluded from the polis, the polis is dependent on her blood for its existence. As 
Irigaray puts it, 
Woman is the guardian of the blood. But as both she and it ( celui- 
cilcelle-ci) have had to use their substance to nourish the universal 
45 frigaray's readings of the myth of Antigone will be explored in the next chapter as part of an 
investigation into her relationship to Hegel and the dialectic. 
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consciousness of self, it is in the form of bloodless shadows - of 
unconscious fantasies - that they maintain an underground subsistence. 
Powerless on earth, she remains the very ground in which manifest mind 
46 (Vesprit) secretly sets its roots and draws its strength . 
Irigaray goes on to suggest that this exclusion has been sustained through an 
active forgetting. Man has memory and history only at the expense of woman 
forgetting herself This selflessness involves the destruction and forgetting of 
woman's self so that man can have a soul, a community, and a history. If woman 
is to be remembered by brushing history against the grain then the vampire of 
phallocentric reason that has fed and thrived for so long on the blood of maternal 
genealogy will have to look elsewhere for its nourishment. As higaray warns us, 
at times the forces of the world below become hostile because they have 
been denied the right to live in daylight. These forces rise up and threaten 
47 
to lay waste the community. To turn it upside down... 
As in Benjamin, there would seem to be an active remembrance at work here. 
One which works as in a 'counter-striving disposition' to the active forgetting of 
phallocentric reason. This would empower the already buried, the vanquished of 
history to rise up and destroy the present order: to 'turn it upside down'. Because 
frigaray's project is about exploring and creating possibilities for woman and 
women to be able to create their own identities and histories, rather than to try 
and participate in a phallocentric history that will only make space for them as 
46 Speculum, p. '212 5. 
47 Ibid., p. 225. 
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imitation, it is a challenge to the whole of the history of the West. If she is right 
1-11, about the murderous and excluding moves that have been carried out since the 
beginning of Western civilization, then to actively remember these moves is the 
first step on the way to creating a new history,, a history which will include 
woman and women. 
Brushing history against the grain through the alternative symbolic of maternal- 
genealogy is also a way of reintroducing meaning into the history of woman. In 
this blood-history, the sang (blood), is also a homophone of sens (sense or 
meaning), and this is played on so that to remember the sang is also to remember 
both the blood and the meaning of woman in history. This meaning is both what 
can be understood about woman and women in history, and the creation of value 
for woman and women in history. 
A striking similarity between Benjamin's and Irigaray's thinking can be seen in 
Benjamin's messianism. and Irigaray's notion of 'parousia'. Parousia has a 
Christian messianic meaning of the second coming of Christ, and this is 
important for Irigaray's attempt to usher in a new symbolic order; but in using 
this term she is also playing with Heidegger's use of it in Being and Time where 
he translates it as 'Presence'. 48 In Irigaray's usage 'parousia' is both able to do 
similar work in a critique of the metaphysics of presence as Benjamin's Now- 
time (Jetztzeit) and also offer a hope of redemption. We have seen that for 
Benjamin the coming of the Messiah is like an interruption in history which 
destroys and completes history at the same time as it inaugurates a new historical 
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era and temporality. For Irigaray, 'parousia 
involves the remoulding of the world, of discourse: another morning, a 
new era in history, in the universe. The end of times, and the access to 
one time, to one space-time, that are different. 49 
This 'parousia' is needed if woman and women are to be able to take their place 
as speaking and thinking subjects in their own right. The third age that she 
envisages as following this 'parousia' will recover woman's history; it will 
remember woman and women as the real basis of man's being or becoming; the 
basis that has actively been forgotten. She writes that 'just as it is impossible to 
suppress "the gods of the underworld, " so we cannot, short of death or a turning 
back, annihilate our living roots. ' 50 We could indeed bring this move under the 
heading of brushing history against the grain in that it is an attempt to uncover 
the, buried and forgotten basis of our existence through remembrance. There is 
an active forgetting at work in man's exclusion of woman and the other, and what 
will come about with this 'parousia', or perhaps what will bring the 'parousia' 
about., is the remembering of 'the other and his own becoming'. 51 
Like Benjamin's messianic interruption, Irigaray's parousia produces a new 
52 
temporality: it sets up 'a space, a space-time for sexual difference' . This will 
also be a heterogenous temPorality of non-linearity. Such a heterogenous time 
'8 See Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 1962, p. 47. 
49 lrigaray,. 4n Ethics ofSexual Difference, trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill, London, 
Athlone Press, 1993, p. 140. 
50 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 142. 
51 Ibid., p. 142. 
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breaks open the realm of identity where woman must be relegated to semblance 
and to the 'other of the same'. Through her plurality, excess, and fluidity woman 
will be able to live and experience the full history of her difference. This new 
space-time is needed because of the heretofore untheorised and unarticulated 
radical alterity of having a different space-time for the maternal-feminine. And 
again, as in Benjamin, this 'parousia' which will initiate a new temporality is 
much more than a utopian hope for some unspecified future; it is a promise in the 
here and now. Just as in Ben amin's theology, 'For every second of time was the i 
strait gate through which the Messiah might enter )53 , so for Irigaray, 
Does parousia correspond to the expectation of a future not only as a 
utopia or a destiny but also as a here and now, the willed construction of 
a bridge in the present between past and future. 54 
Here we are given a hope or a promise for justice; a hope that this justice might 
emerge in the present through something like the blasting open of the continuum 
of history. The construction of this bridge which joins the past to the future might 
operate on similar principles of construction as the dialectical image which re- 
experiences the Then in the Now. Irigaray's 'parousia' will annunciate and 
engender the anonymous in its destruction of the barbarism of cultural history. It 
will complete history which will mean giving a voice that can be understood to 
the forgotten woman and women of history. However, before going on to explore 
the use Irigaray makes of this parousia it will be helpful to understand how the 
52 lbid, p. 145. 
il Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 255. 
54 Ethics of Sýxual Difference, p. 147. 
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linked notion of utopia also operates in her writing. 
Irigaray's anti-Utopianisms and Utopianisms 
The question of utopianism in Irigaray's work is one fraught with tensions from 
the very start. Irigaray is, of course, a thinker of difference - and sexual 
difference in particular. It is this concentration on difference that convinces 
commentators such as Jean-Joseph Goux to describe her as an anti-utopian 
thinker. But as the title of his paper 'Luce Irigaray versus the Utopia of the 
Neutral sex' 55 shows, this is only a criticism of one very specific utopia. This 
utopia of the neutral sex is described by Goux as 'the immanent logic of 
modernity )56 What he characterises as modernity's egalitarianism is also reflected 
in certain literary utopias which envisaged a society of sexless subjects - Goux's 
own example being Anatole France's Sur la pierre blanche. This egalitarianism 
can also be seen to be manifested in various forms of feminisms which demanded 
equal rights and status for women and men. Goux follows the historical trajectory 
of the various manifestations of this desire for emancipation through equality. He 
describes the various stages, starting with the pre-modem, in which sexual 
inequality was regarded as part of the natural or god-given order; this is followed 
by the modern which is characterised by a desire for equality of the sexes. What 
he then calls the ultra-modem result of this modem egalitarianism led to a kind of 
55 In Engaging wiih Irigaray, . eds. 
Carolyn Burke, Naomi Schor. and Margaret Whitford, New 
York, Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 175-190. 
56 
Ibid., p. 178. 
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sexual neutralisation - the utopia of the neutral sex . It is Irigaray whom he 
consi ers to be the postmodern champion of sexual difference. It is she who is 
able to show the complicity of egalitarianism in patriarchy and who therefore, 
initiates an attempt to undermine this dangerous neutralisation of difference. 
According to Goux, the later Irigaray is able to show that the claims of 
egalitarianism are no longer able to undermine the patriarchal system of 
domination that they originally intended to set to rights. He suggests that these 
57 
egalitarian claims 'are complicit with the deep logic of this domination' . On a 
closer inspection of the morphology and rationality of this so-called neutral sex, 
it turns out in fact to be a 'masculine neuter'. 58 The dream of the ultimate 
equality of the sexes is in fact another disappointing wish for sameness and 
homogeneity - it is the dream of the ultimate maleness of all humanity in which 
Mankind would really be universal. Irigaray does indeed specifically comment on 
equality feminisms, stating that; 'at the level of superficial cultural critique, they 
are well founded, but as a means of liberating women they are utopian. ' 59 To 
emphasise the pejorative aspect of her designation of 'utopian' she develops this 
theme of the wish for the resolution of differences in the most hyperbolic fashion: 
To wish to get rid of sexual difference is to call for a genocide more 
radical than any form of destruction there has ever been in History. 60 
" Ibid., p. 180. 
58 Ibid., p. 177. 
59 Irigaray, 
_/ 
. c, tu, nous: Towards a Culture of Difference, trans. Alison Martin, London, 
Routledge, 1993, p. 12 
60 Ibid p. 12 
204 
She invokes the totalitarian face of utopianism through the signification of it as 
participat ng in the most abhorrent of contemporary political practices - 
genocide. If we are to take Irigaray at her word here, then how could we even 
contemplate striving for the equality of women and men. The force of her 
language leaves no room for doubt that - in her later work at least - the struggle 
for equality is no longer an unproblematic assumption of feminism. 
However, it could also be argued that the Irigaray of the above statement is more 
concerned with equality than the earlier Irigaray, even though this is spelled out 
in terms of equality through difference. Only a few lines later, in the same 
paragraph, she sets out her project in terms of balance: 
It is quite simply a matter of social justice to balance out this power of the 
one sex over the other by giving, or giving back, cultural values to female 
sexua ity. 
61 
Admittedly this is not the identity-equality that Goux interprets as the dream of 
modemity and the reality of ultra-modemity. For him, Irigaray's exaggerated 
rhetoric about the genocidal consequences of egalitarianism is an example of 
what he describes as 'real postmodemism'. 62 However, only a few lines further 
Irigaray goes on to develop her notion of balance, in order to suggest a way to 
work towards equality between men and women. But again it is equality through 
difference: 
61 lbid p. 1 33 
62 Engaging with Irigaray, p. 188. 
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Equality between men and women cannot be achieved without a theory of 
gender as sexed and a rewriting of the rights and obligations of each sex, 
qua different, in social rights and obligations. 63 
I would suggest that instead of this being classed as 'real postmodemism' 
according to his definition this is rather an example of his 'ultramodemism' 
because of the emphasis on rights and obligations. 
Irigaray's call for an equality in difference that recognises and values those 
differences would be better expressed in terms of an equivalent social visibility 
and status. Gail Schwab reads Irigaray as proposing a principle of equivalence, 
suggesting that such a principle 'moves beyond the sameness implicit in the 
concept of equality, and recognises the importance of multiplicity and variety in 
human experience and life in general i, 64 . It is just such a concentration on 
multiplicity and difference that has always contributed to Irigaray's theoretical 
innovation and appeal. Schwab is also right in pointing out that theorists such as 
Drucilla Cornell draw on Irigaray's work in order to posit a system of equivalent 
rights that would affirm sexual difference. 
However, Schwab fails to take account of Irigaray's most extreme anti- 
egalitarian moments, such as the invocation of genocide cited above. Nor does 
she consider the possibility of institutional inequality that might arise from such a 
rigid division of the sexes in law. It is in order to avoid such possibilities that 
Cornell returns to the notion of equality. Cornell's claim that 'We need a vision 
63 - je, tu, nous, p. 13 
64Gail Schwab, 'Women and the Law in Irigarayan Theory', in Metaphilosophy, Vol. 27 
January/April 1996, p 152. 
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of equality if we are to protect equivalent rights from degenerating into a new 
defense of separate but equal 65 seems like a necessary supplement to Irigaray's 
proposals. Comefl suggests the introduction of a programme of rights of 
equivalence which would also be transformative because they would not only be 
in place to enable women to participate in the male world, but 
Rather, they are designed to enable women to value the choices [they] 
make about [their] lives and work without the shame of [their] 'sex', even 
if such choices do not fit into the pre-established social world. 66 
Indeed this equivalence could act as the universal of mediation for which Irigaray 
has mobilised. 67 As a principle it could mediate between equality and difference, 
opening up the desired space of communication and recognition. 
However, Irigaray's insistence on the irreducible differences between the sexes or 
genders often leads to accusations of essentialism - whether this is seen as 
biological, psychological or social. But to assert that differences are irreducible is 
not the same thing as asserting the essences of two different sexes. Even though 
she often articulates sexual difference in morphological terms, these 
morphologies can still be interpreted as open to negotiation and evolution over 
time. 
Although it should be clear by now that there is a definite critique of at least one 
form of utopianism in Irigaray's more recent work, this cannot be extended into a 
05 Drucilla Cornell, Tranýfbrmations, 1993, London, Routledge, p 155. 
"6Ibid. p 14 1. 
67 See, in particular 'The Universal as Mediation' in Sexes and Genealogies, pp. 12 7-149, for 
Irigaray's reading of Hegel in which she advocates a rethinking of the universal as mediation. 
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generalised critique of utopianism itself. There is a definite tension in her work. 
On the one hand she is vehemently affirming difference, and she is also refusing 
equality and the whole progressive, teleological and universalist impulses and 
explanations that are implicit in egalitarianism. On the other hand, however, she 
wants an equality of differenee to be aehieved through reeognising what she 
claims to be the universality of sexual difference. It is in her book I Love To You 
that she calls for the instigation of a new era of meaningful communication and 
exchange between the sexes. In the chapter entitled Sexual Difference as 
Universa ý8 she argues that it is only through a recognition and valorisation of 
this universal difference that a utopia of difference will emerge. Although she 
doesn't use the term 'utopia' to describe her project here, the emerging thought 
takes place in a discussion of teleology. For Irigaray, teleology doesn't have to be 
an unswerving and unstinting, linear progression towards a pre-decided and fixed 
goal. Instead it is a process of conversing and communicating which will lead to 
'the establishment of another era of civilization )69 .I will call this goal a utopia, 
because it is an explicit vision of an ideal existence. In her own words it is, 
a new economy of existence or being which is neither that of mastery nor 
that of slavery but rather of exchange with no preconstituted object - vital 
exchange, cultural exchange, of words, gestures, etc., an exchange thus 
able to communicate at times, to commune ... 
beyond any exchange of 
objects. 
70 
68 Irigaray, I Love To You: Sketchfor a Felicity Within History, trans. Alison Martin, London, 
Routledge, 1996, pp. 4348. 
69 Ibid., p. 45 
70 Ibid., PA-S 
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This ideal of communicating exchange is a utopia of sexual difference which 
differs from her earlier work in that it is no longer about discovering or creating 
or uncovering a speech or symbolic order that would be appropriate for woman 
or women. Now she seems more concerned with not only producing and 
validating this discourse, but also of having significant communicative exchange 
between the different discourses of male and female or masculine and feminine. 
She asks, 
Isn't it time for us to become capable not only of speech but also of 
speaking to one another. 
71 
This utopia will also have a proper 'culture of the female' as well as the 
imperative to recognise and cherish difference. However, because Irigaray insists 
on transforming it into a universal, we find sexual difference raised to that most 
respectable and elusive of philosophical categories. Rather than a utopia with a 
universal neutral sex we are presented with a universalised, utopia of two sexes. 
What is most worrying about this particular universalism is her refusal to extend 
the horizontal model of communication between the sexes to the problem of race. 
She goes so far as to claim that 'the problem of race is, in fact; a secondary 
problem' 72 . If we were to mimic 
Irigaray's own hyperbolicism, we could ask if 
there is not a latent or implicit danger of genocide lurking in this relegation of 
other differences. To universalise sexual difference in this way is to prioritise and 
privilege it whilst at the same time to particularise racial difference and all other 
71 
Ibid., p. 45 
72 Ibid., p. 47 
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differences. This is where her own utopia begins to resemble the kind of utopias 
of sameness that she needs to avoid. Even though hers is not a teleology of 
mastery, but of communication; even though hers is not a universalism of 
sameness. but of difference, the harmony and difference are limited. The 
potential closure of utopia has perhaps been weakened by the forces of 
communication in relation to sexual difference, but they have also been 
recaptured by the forces of teleology and universalism - the forces of closure. 
It is my worries about this relegation of racial and other 'others' that lead me to 
propose Irigaray's earlier work as a more useful utopianism of difference. I 
would argue that the change that Irigaray advocates in her earlier work is the 
change from the desire for universal sameness and stasis to a state of difference 
and dynamism. In wanting to instigate a new logic of change, mobility and fluid 
negotiable boundaries which avoid all closure and circumvention, she is at her 
most radically utopian. Utopianism is about positing another place which is 
nowhere yet. It is about creating a future that is completely different from the 
present. So it is also about otherness, even though the always present danger of 
utopianism is that this otherness is always threatening to collapse into a sameness 
more 'same' than we have ever yet experienced. 
What is interesting about her early work is that it is not necessarily positing an 
ideal state; she is positing an elsewhere which is now nowhere: a place (and time) 
where woman and women could be woman and women instead of inferior men. 
And according to Irigaray this 'elsewhere' is only now nowhere according to the 
prevailing phallogocentric symbolic order. In other words. it cannot be 
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represented in that order and must remain outside -a nowhere, or elsewhere with 
no symbolic validation. This is radically utopian in that it cannot, and need not, 
be expressed in the terms of the given (masculine) symbolic order. We could say 
that she is already elsewhere - she is now - elsewhere. So this utopianism is 
already one that starts from elsewhere in order to arrive at other 'elsewheres', 
rather than one that sets out from a now-here in order to arrive at a nowhere. 
Irigaray does manage to express this departure towards utopianism in her early 
work, but at this stage it is not a teleological utopianism. It does not set off from 
an arche in order to arrive at a telos as the result of a linear progression: 'she sets 
off in all directions leaving "him" unable to discern the coherence of any 
meaning ... When she returns, it is to set off again from elsewhere. ' 
73 In 
attempting to articulate this elsewhere Irigaray is already speaking from it. So in 
this case utopia is not the creation or the positing of a nowhere or elsewhere, it is 
the ability to hear and understand the elsewhere. To the extent that we can name 
this elsewhere we might call it the 'female imaginary'. Irigaray stresses the 
plurality of this imaginary and along with this its fluidity. Once again, this is not 
a fixed utopia - an ideal state or place. Rather it is experienced processes that 
cannot be understood by the logic of sameness that constructs utopia as a fixed 
end-state. To be able to understand these fluid utopias of difference, 
One would have to listen with another ear, as if hearing an "other 
meaning " always in the process of weaving itself, of embracing itseýf with 
This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 29 
III 
words, but also of getting rid of words in order not to become fixed, 
congealed in them. 
74 
This movement towards utopia is an ongoing process then, which cannot be fixed 
in its attempt to reach an elsewhere. The nature of utopian desire is reformulated 
as a challenge to the idea of utopia as end-state, goal or closure. We need to listen 
differently to make sense of these utopias because they are articulated in a 
different register, from a different place, and in a different time. According to 
Irigaray, what is involved is: 
a different economy more than anything else, one that upsets the linearity 
of a project, undermines the goal-object of a desire, diffuses the 
polarization toward a single pleasure, disconcerts fidelity to a single 
discourse ... 
75 
. 
Indeed the ambiguity of these utopias is reflected in Irigaray's own denial of them 
as utopias, at the same time as she affirms their power for political motivation. 
She claims that she is 'a political militant for the impossible, which is not to say a 
utopian. Rather, I want what is yet to be as the only possibility of a future'. 76 
However, having stated that Irigaray's utopianism does not posit an ideal state, 
this doesn't limit it to a strictly critical role either. We can also detect a positive 
or constructive moment that projects a utopia of limitless abundance and 
plurality: 'A sort of expanding universe to which no limits could be fixed and 
74 
Ibid., p. 29 
75 
Ibid.. p. 30 
76 
Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 10. 
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which would not be incoherence nonetheless. 77 But neither should we pass over 
the critical moment. Margaret Whitford describes Irigaray's early position in 
terms of destruction and dismantling78. She sees the 'philosophical terrorism' of 
Speculum of the Other Woman as an attempt to undo patriarchal structures . 
79 But 
although this is a destructive text it is important to remember that Irigaray's 
destruction is also a creative act. The attempt to upset the hegemony and 
complacency of the male symbolic order was not conducted through a nihilistic 
critique of the metaphysics of presence. The dismantling that was taking place 
was being done in order to show what lay buried and hidden, behind, beneath, 
and outside it. The destruction was being carried out in order to help the 
construction of female subjectivities. To put it bluntly it could also be seen as a 
project of liberation - whose liberty is both negative and positive. What she is 
trying to move towards is a freedom from patriarchy which would be free to 
become something else (elsewhere): not a liberty in equality, but a liberty in and 
of difference. In one of her most utopic reveries Irigaray describes this as a place 
of inclusion and liberation: a place where, 
There is room enough for everything to exist. Everything is worth 
exchanging, nothing is privileged, nothing is refused. Exchange? 
Everything is exchanged, yet there are no transactions. Between us, there 
are no proprietors, no purchasers, no determinable objects, no prices. Our 
bodies are nourished by mutual pleasure. Our abundance is inexhaustible: 
it knows neither want nor plenty. Since we give each other (our) all, with 
77ThiS Se. y Which Is Not One, p. 31 
78 Whitford, ' Irigaray, Utopia and the Death Drive', in Engaging with Irigarav, p. 381. 
-1) Ibid., p. 381. 
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nothing held back, nothing hoarded, our exchanges are without terms, 
80 
without end. How can I say it? The language we know is so limited ... 
To imagine a utopia is usually to imagine a different place, a non-place, that is - 
a place which is not-yet. For Irigaray however, this place is not not-yet, her 
elsewhere is here and now. Her utopia is a process or place of becoming that 
merely needs to be recognised as such. A utopia of movement, but 'These 
movements cannot be described as the passage from a beginning to an end. 
These movements are a passage, but a passage as a place for moving through, not 
a place to stop and take root, or become fixed. A passage is a way to somewhere, 
it is also a way to elsewhere. The utopianism of this passage is more plausible 
than what we might characterise as a traditional utopian passage, because that 
would be a passage to nowhere. Elsewhere is somewhere; it is a somewhere that 
could be anywhere. For the early Irigaray 'elsewhere' is a utopia where we can, 
Let all our imperatives be only appeals to move, to be moved, together. 
Let's never lay down the law to each other, or moralize, or make war. ' 82 
This desire for a place without law, moralising or war would seem to me to be 
the most utopian of desires. And it is this early utopian refusal to moralise or 
make laws that sits uneasily with the later works which pay more attention to 
issues of legislation, civil rights and the like. The earlier utopia in which nothing 
is privileged also seems to be at odds with the later affirmation of hierarchies 
This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 213-4. 
81 Ibid., p. 214. 
82 Ibid., p. 217. 
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within symbolic orders and the universalisation of sexual difference. Perhaps 
IrigaraY's most utopian writings are also her most impossible. But their 
impossibility can also create possibilities as a result of their critical and liberating 
moments. Her early destruction of philosophical, discursive, and perhaps even 
ideological closure held out a promise of openness, difference and movement. If 
her own writing has not subsequently lived up to this, must we still reject the 
original promise? Must we return to stasis, closure and exclusion, or can we still 
make use of her most utopian promise of the elsewhere? 
Rhythms of Love and Mucous 
The question of the status of the historical and revolutionary time at work in 
Irigaray's texts can also be approached through the question of rhythm. Irigaray 
tends to associate woman with what she terms 'cosmic rhythms'. These are the 
rhythms of the natural cycles of 'germination, birth, and growth in accordance 
with the natural economy-). 83 These are also the rhythms of the body that have 
been forgotten by patriarchal culture. higaray contrasts these natural rhythms 
with the teleological, instrumental and exploitative rhythms of modem 
agriculture and industry. Although it would be legitimate to criticise Irigaray here 
for replicating a binary mode of thinking that would position the female/feminine 
on the side of the natural and the male/masculine on the side of the cultural, we 
can again allow her this mimetic move in order to problematise those divisions in 
a more unexpected and original manner. These evocations of the cosmic rhythms 
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of nature and the body are further attempts to remember what history has 
forgotten - primarily, life. 
The cultivation of nature becomes exploitation, which risks destroying the 
vitality of the soil and the fertility of the great cosmic rhythms. This is the 
danger we incur when we forget what we have received from the body, 
our debt toward that which gives and renews life. When we forget our 
gratitude toward the living being that man is at every instant. 84 
These rhythmic rememberings take place in the chapter in which Irigaray can be 
associated most closely with a Benjaminian project of brushing history against 
the grain. It is only a few pages further on that she will write that 'We have to 
move against the current of history for things to be any different. . .' 
85 To 
remember the gifts of life, fertility and growth in the rhythms of the cosmos is 
also to remember these things through a different time. Just as we have seen that 
Benjamin's rememberings in his dialectical images involve not just a knowledge 
of history, but a different experience of it, so Irigaray's evocation of fertility and 
life and generation also involve a different experience of pre-history through a 
different relationship with the rhythms of history. For her the current of current 
history is still flowing strongly in only one direction. 
Irigaray also associates these cosmic rhythms with love. The different rhythms 
that Irigaray identifies are also rhythms of love, and for her, there are many 
" Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 100. 
S4 Ibid., p. 100. 
85 Ibid., p. 104. 
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different kinds of love. To identify just three, there is 'Love of Same', 'Love of 
Other', 'Love Between Us'. These all involve different attitudes and directions of 
relationship, as well as different temporalities of loving. While we might 
presume from Irigaray's constant championing of difference that 'Love of Same 
would be something to be challenged, she in fact describes it in quite positive 
terms. The 'same' at work here is variously described as 'the archaic', 'that 
which primevally and necessarily has conceived, given birth, nourished, 
warmed', and 'indifferentiation from the earth-mother, the first living dwelling 
place. ' 86 So again we can see more evidence in Irigaray for a thinking of 
sameness; for a different universal that does provide some generality or 
commonality for human existence. For Irigaray there is a same that needs to be 
loved. Although she describes this in terms of 'the archaic' etc., it is not to be 
thought of as an origin that would act as a ground or base for all other love and 
experience. Irigaray does associate this same with the ontic, but at the same time 
refuses its assimilation into an 'ontic-ontological split'. 87 This love of the same is 
a recognition of the necessity and universality of bodies and matter in space-time. 
It seems that, according to Irigaray, this love of the same is forgotten by man as 
another aspect of the ancient turn from the affirmation of the body in earlier 
cultures to the abstracted rationalism of post-Socratic philosophy. Another 
example of tuming away from life. 
86 Ibid., p. 75. 
87 There is an engagement with Heidegger at work here in her analysis of the 'ontic-ontological 
split'. She follows Heidegger to a certain extent in suggesting that this would 'merely be an effect 
offorgetting', while she is also critical of what she would consider to be Heidegger's own 
forgetting of the archaic same or the 'earth-mother' when she continues with her description of 
this forgetting as 'the result of a jump between the body or the flesh of that which is and that 
which wishes to be. ' Irigaray, An Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 97. 
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Although this love of the same sounds like it might be an exclusively female or 
feminine love,, Irigaray suggests that it also difficult for women to achieve 
because the symbolism is not immediately available within the prevailing cultural 
hegemony. Love of the same would have to be more in tune with the cosmic 
rhythms of nature than the manufactured beats of culture. Love of same 
obviously also has homosexual connotations, however it must be different to the 
'hom(m)osexual' label that Irigaray used to describe most post-Platonic, male 
theory in Speculum, where the same is linked to the figure of man who has 
forgotten his bodily and material nature. Irigaray also suggests that this love 
among or between women is also the love of and for the mother and daughter. 
She does this by playing on the theme of doubleness which is not strictly two, 
with reference to female morphology: 
If women are to establish or make possible a love among us, or a love for 
the feminine among us, women need to double and play what we are 
twice over, lovingly. Whether it be 
love for the nourishing envelope, both inner and outer, for its skins 
and its mucous membranes. 
- love of the body: both of that body we give and of that body we 
give each other back in return 
Women must love one another both as mothers, with a maternal love, 
and as daughters, with a filial love. Both of them. In a female whole that, 
furthermore is not closed off. Constituting, perhaps, both of them in one 
female whole that is not closed up, the sign of infinity? Achieving, 
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through their relations with each other, a path into infinity that is always 
88 open, in-finite. 
Again she is not completely rejecting the traditional philosophical notions of 
n I... absolutes, such as infinity. She is reworking them in what she would consider to 
be a female or feminine way, in order to bring them back into contact with the 
living matterlmater from which they originated. This produces not only a 
different topology of the loving subject - one that is not closed off, but open to 
infinite possibilities - but also a different temporality. 
This temporality arises from her thinking of the mucous. Mucous represents the 
fluid matter which Irigaray takes to be another forgotten aspect of Western, 
masculinised theory. 89 Mucous provides a link between the living body and birth 
as well as the sexual act that gave rise to the living body. Irigaray again plays on 
the exclusion of women from previous theory. She takes up the common theme 
of women's inferiority, in particular the assumption that women do not really 
have a soul - or at least as fully developed a soul as men. Rather than arguing 
that women do indeed have souls she plays with this excluding move to try and 
speculate on what women might have that could be analogous to a soul, but 
different from it. She asks, 
88An Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 97. 
'9 See the chapter 'The "Mechanics" of Fluids'. in This Sex Which Is Not One, for her most direct 
explanation of the need for a reappraisal of fluids in Western thought. 
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Does the mucous perhaps take the place of the soul for women? But of a 
soul that is never spoken? Alien to everything yet said of the soul as 
such? 90 
It would be a soul that is never spoken because it is the soul of a subject that has 
not yet been articulated by maseulinised theory. This is the soul of a different 
kind of subject, if mucous takes the place of the soul this would be a more fluid, 
and a more bodily conception of the subject. A subject that is not based on an 
idea of fixity, permanence and the solidity of substance. Irigaray's mucous 
produces a different thinking of substance which disturbs the traditional 
philosophical thinking of substance by presenting it with its unthought aspects. 91 
Mucous is also representative of a loving exchange, as Whitford puts it, 'it is 
essential to the act of love -) . 
92 
Although thinking of mucous in this way poses challenges to theories of 
substance that would be more concerned with the topology or space of substance, 
Irigaray also implicates it in the temporalities at work in substance. Through the 
metaphor of mucous Irigaray questions the permanence of substance. She 
90 An Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 109. 
91 Whitford suggests that mucous 'represents the non-theorized' and that 'it lends itself to the 
representation of the unthought'. For Irigaray, then, it is time to think the mucous. This will 
present philosophy with one of its greatest challenges because it is linked to her claim that sexual 
difference is the issue of our age. For Irigaray we cannot adumbrate an adequate theory of sexual 
difference without reckoning with the mucous. This thinking of the mucous will disturb the nature 
of philosophical inquiry itself because it elides many philosophical and scientific presumptions 
because it is 'neither simply solid not fluid; it is not stable, it expands, it has no fixed form; it 
expands but not in a shape. Mucous also avoids the visual metaphorics of philosophy because 'it 
cannot be seen in the flat mirror, it is interior; therefore it is more accible to touch than to sight. 
See Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in the Feminine, London, Routledge, 1991, p. 163. 
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produces almost transcendental qualities for mucous when she asks if *mucous 
has no permanence, even though it is the "tissue" for the development of 
duration. The condition of possibility for the extension of time? ' 93 She 
0 
immediately responds to her own confusing question by stating that this would 
only be the case if we stick to the familiar ways of thinking about the subject 
which would appropriate the mucous in order to 'erect itself out of it. So mucous 
is another forgotten, or ignored ground or origin. The dependence on much of 
metaphysics on the solidity and permanence of substance is itself dependent on 
the fluidity and transience of mucous. 
Parousia and the Between 
Irigaray's invocation of the mucous also takes place in her discussons of 
parousia. Parousia also relates to utopianisms, both as a utopia and as a 'here and 
now') as well as moving beyond them to become an 'atopia' that would be 'an 
inscription in the flesh'. 94 On returning to the notion of parousia we can ask: 
why, if these voices are to be truly woman and women's own voices and not that 
of a transcendent god, does Irigaray associate them with 'parousia"? The answer 
seems to be. because the god at work in this 'parousia' is not 'He who forms the 
transcendental keystone of a discourse used by single gender, of a monosexed 
92 Whitford, Luce Irigaray: Philosophy in The Feminine, p. 163. 
93 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 109. 
94 Ibid., p. 147. 
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truth. ' Neither are we offered a god of 'truth or morality" 95 , 
but a 'realization - 
here and now - in and through the body'. 96 She even suggests that this kind of 
(parousia' is something that can be found in both Nietzsche and Heidegger. She 
associates the promise of the presence of god with Heidegger's statement that 
'Only a god can save us now' as well as with Nietzsche's attempt to overcome 
the need for such a god in his creation of transvaluated values. 97 For Irigaray, 
however, parousia is the creation of what she calls the 'sensible transcendental': 
the emergence of a language that is capable of remembering woman and mother 
whilst being able to speak meaningfully and be understood in the polis. It would 
not only be the coming of god, but also the coming of 'the other'. 98 
For Irigaray the advent of this new era of the 'sensible transcendental' would also 
be the advent of an era of non-instrumental reason. Reason will be brought back 
to the body, and its limits and boundaries will be transgressed through its new 
fluid or mucous nature. The rigidity of instrumental reason also resulted from a 
forgetting of the elemental sources of existence; indeed for Irigaray these are the 
four ancient elements, earth, air, fire and water. The remembrance taking place 
here is a remembrance of the elemental which will lead to a new relationship and 
experience of the body. She associates 'parousia' with the element of air in 
particular. Air is 'this first fluid given us gratis and free of interest in the 
mother's blood, given us again when we are born' 99 , and the god that arrives with 
L)5 Ibid., p. 140. 
96 Ibid., p. 147. 
97 Ibid., p. 128-9. 
98 
Ibid., p. 147. 
99 Ibid., p. 127. 
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parousia' is 'a god carried on the breath of the cosmos, the song of the poets, the 
respiration of lovers. "00 These elemental reminiscences are part of an 
engagement with Heidegger's apparent resignation that only a god can save us 
now. Irigaray sees the source of this resignation in Heidegger's forgetting of the 
elemental air, and sexual difference. 101 She, however, is not prepared to wait in 
hopeless resignation for the 'parousia', instead she sees a chance to create a new 
era through remembering these fluid and different others: 
This creation would be our opportunity, from the humblest detail of 
everyday life to the "grandest, " by means of the opening of a sensible 
transcendental that comes into being through us, of which we would be 
the mediators and bridges. Not only in mourning for the dead God of 
Nietzsche, not waiting passively for the god to come, but by conjuring 
him up among us, within us, as resurrection and transfiguration of blood,, 
of flesh, though a language and an ethics that is ours. 102 
The annunciation of the 'sensible transcendental' will break down or pass 
through the boundaries between the sensible and the transcendental. This can 
only be achieved by a fluid or mucous logic such as that inscribed in Irigaray's 
texts. According to Irigaray, masculine reason cannot allow for the thought of the 
sensible and the transcendental coming into contact or having any kind of 
'00 Ibid., p. 129. 
101 See Irigaray's The Forgetting ofAir, trans. Mary Beth Mader, London, Athlone Press, 1999, 
for an extended meditation and 'elemental critique'. See also Tina Chanter's Ethics of Eros: 
lrigarqv's Rewriting of the Philosophers, London, Routledge, 1995, and Ellen Mortensen's The 
Feminine and Nihilism: Luce Irigaray ivith Nietzsche and Heidegger, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1995, for further discussions of Irigaray's engagement with Heidegger. 
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relationship of exchange. But Irigaray's mucous parousia means that what 
appears is not an immobile and rigid 'God of immutable, stable truth' 103; it is 
something much less stable and much more fluid. 
These notions of mueous and fluidity in Irigaray's texts work as a way of taking 
apart and renegotiating the rigid structures and boundaries of phallocentric 
reason. The fluidity of mucous guarantees it a mobility that enables it to move 
around and through these boundaries. This is a mobility of flux and change which 
can also help in introducing notions of plurality and multiplicity. One way of 
trying to come to terms with this thought of the mucous in its relation to the 
(sensible transcendental' is to think of ectoplasm, which is supposed to be a 
mucous deposit left in the material world by ghosts or spirits. 104 This is the kind 
of mucous that can pass between and be at home in both the material and the 
spiritual, the human and the divine or the sensible and the transcendental. 
It is in this mediation or the between of the sensible and the transcendental that 
we find Irigaray using the figure of the angel. For Irigaray the angel is a familiar 
figure that can successfully carry out the work of the 'between'. Because the 
angel is the messenger of god, s/he can pass through the boundaries between 
102 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 129. 
103 Ibid., p. I 10. 
' 04 The Encyclopeedia Britanica describes ectoplasm as 'a mysterious, usually light-coloured, 
viscous substance that is said to exude from the body of a spiritualist meduim in trance and may 
then take the shape of a face, a hand, or a complete body. It is normally visible only in the 
darkened atmosphere of a s6ance. Ectoplasm is said to be the substance involved in the 
materialization of spiritual bodies, and the levitation of material objects is commonly explained 
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heaven and earth. frigaray's angel has much greater powers of agency in brushing 
history against the grain than Benjamin's. While his angel of history looks on 
impotently and in horror, Irigaray's 
goes from one side to the other, reworking every deadline. changing every 
decision, thwarting all repetition. Angels destroy the monstrous, that 
which hampers the possibility of a new age. 105 
While Benjamin's angel of history is able to show us a picture of history that 
does not conform to instrumental reason or the ideology of progress, it is not able 
to mediate between heaven and earth. Although it is the 'between' it is not able to 
bring the mundane into contact with the heavenly. Benjamin's angel also avoids 
the mediation that may implicate it in a certain complicity in the horror of 
progress. However, in endowing her angels with powers of transfonuation, 
Irigaray doesn't have to make them part of a teleological framework. Theirs is the 
mediation of a 'between' which is not a means to an end, or a progressive 
narrative. The mucous mediation of Irigaray's angels actually appear to do the 
work that Benjamin gives to remembrance (Eingedenken), because they are the 
mediators of that which has not yet happened, of what is still going to 
happen, of what is on the horizon. Endlessly reopening the enclosure of 
the universe, of universes, identities, the unfolding of actions, of 
history. 1 06 
by the gradual buildup of columns of ectoplasm underneath the objects. At the end of a s6ance the 
ectoplasm disappears, allegedly by returning to the medium's body'. (www. britannica. com) 
105 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 15. 
106 Ibid., p. 15. 
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These angels open up a closed history in a way that means it can be brushed 
against te grain. In Benjamin's terms, frigaray's angels are 'historical 
materialists' rather than 'historicists': They are the agents who can bring about a 
hope for the future through an experience of the past in the time of the now, 
rather than the forgetful believers in progress. 
Peter Fenves draws parallels between the politics of pure means investigated in 
Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence' essay and Irigaray's explorations of sexual 
difference. 107 He argues that both Benjamin and Irigaray are attempting to 'move 
outside the space of the legal order'. 108 He makes the link between Benjamin and 
Irigaray through Benjamin's notion of 'pure means' (reine Mittel), arguing that 
Irigaray's use of mucous and angels both exhibit the properties of these pure 
means. For Benjamin at least, the General Strike was one example of pure means. 
This would be a means that had no real use for an end. Pure means can either be 
read as means-in-themselves, - which would relate them to Kant's account of 
ends-in-themselves - or as means with deferred or suspended ends. Fenves 
suggests that pure means are not means-in-themselves because this would endow 
them with perfection, which would, by definition, mean that they had reached 
their end. 109 On the other hand, to read them as means purified of their ends 
through the deferral or suspension of those ends would accord with the 
discussion of the temporality of afformativity in Chapter 1. The temporality of 
these pure means is not homogenous, empty time, because they are not 
107 Peter Fenves, ' "Out of the Order of Number": Benjamin and Irigaray Toward a Politics of 
Pure Means', in Diacritics, Spring 1998, p. 43-58. 
108 Fenves, out of the Order of Number', p. 45. 
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Participating in any continuous movement towards some kind of perfection. 
In making a comparison between Benjamin and Irigaray Fenves is following 
Benjamin's suggestion that conversation (Unterredung) could also act as a pure 
means. ' 10 This would also fit with Irigaray's projeet of using language to ereate 
more fulfilled relations between individuals. However,, Fenves,, then goes on to 
suggest that this also would include angels as a 'pure means of 
communication'). ]" While this description of angels would work for Irigaray's 
angels who move to and fro opening up avenues of communication, it is not so 
clear that Benjamin's angels can be so easily reduced to sheer media. 112 Indeed 
Benjamin's description of the angel of history is that its has its mouth open, but it 
seems to be incapable of communicating anything to us. Fenves concentrates on 
the spatial aspects of pure means; the space traversed by the angels, at the 
expense of ignoring the temporal consequences of the actions of angels. Indeed, 
the main difference between Irigaray's and Benjamin's angels are that Irigaray's 
angels are active in mediating, crossing boundaries and openening spaces. 
Benjamin's angels, on the other hand are usually more like impotent witnesses, 
unable to help. The most they do is to appear only to disappear. As Benjamin 
puts it, these angels are like the ones who 'according to the Talmud, are at each 
moment created anew in countless throngs, and who, once they have raised their 
109 Ibid., p. 47. 
110 Ibid., p. 48. Fenves quotes from Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence', p. 244. 
"I Fenves, 'Out of the Order of Number', p. 50. 
112 This interpretation of angels as communicating media can also be attributed to Michel Serres. 
See hisAngels. - A Modern Myth, trans. F. Cowper. Paris: Flammarion, 1995. 
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voices before God, cease and pass into nothingness. ' 113 
Fenves' reading of Benjamin and Irigaray stresses the Mittel: the middle as well 
as the means. It is true to say that Irigaray is a thinker of the between, in both 
spatial and temporal ten-ns, but whether this is a 'pure' between; an unmediated 
middleness, is still debatable. Fenves argues that the mucous does the work of the 
'between', because it is a material medium of difference. ' 14 Whilst I would agree 
with this, it is the attribution of purity to the mucous that may prove problematic 
in trying to read Irigaray in this way. I would suggest that hers is not a 'between' 
of purity, it is a 'between' that elides both purity and its dialectical partner, 
impurity. This is neither a pure or polluted between, it is a between that doesn't 
reject foreign bodies, and yet expects a relationship of mutual desire and respect 
before incorporating them into itself While Benjamin's treatment of pure means 
may well have benefited from a more fluid thinking of difference, Fenves' 
suggestion that 'the critique of violence cannot, in short, do without a thought of 
mucous as reine Mittel' 115 is certainly misleading. 
Although angels are useful in helping us to conceive of the sensible 
transcendental, Irigaray does not leave the brushing of history against the grain to 
angels alone. I would suggest that she would have herself and all women, brush 
history against the grain when she writes that 
I search for myself, as if I had been assimilated into maleness. I ought to 
113 Benjamin, 'Karl Kraus' in Selected Writings, Vol. 2., p. 457. 
"' Fenves, 'Out of the Order of Number', p. 54. 
"' Ibid., p. 54. 
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reconstitute myself on the basis of a disassimilation.... Rise again from 
the traces of a culture,, of works already produced by the other. Searching 
through what is in them - for what is not there. What allowed them to be, 
for what is not there. Their conditions of possibility, for what is not 
there. 1 
16 
There is also no apparent reason why this disassimilation should not also be 
extended to the productions of other 'others'. 
This passage could act as a summary of both Irigaray's method and her 
constructive project of producing female identity which is not just the other of a 
male identity. The method is similar to Benjamin's in that it looks for what 
history owes its existence to and has barbarically buried, brutalised or 
anonymised. By looking at who has been included in history she also discovers 
who has been excluded from history. Woman and other 'others' will appear from 
a reconstitution of their history as well as from a transfiguration of history. 
Irigaray's brushing of history against the grain is an urgent attempt to usher in 
justice for the heretofore forgotten, excluded, and vanquished. Because it is a 
hopeful leap into radical difference it involves different logics of fluidity in order 
to explode the boundaries and rigidity of the ideologies of progress and 
misogyny. The 'cultural (r)evolution' 117 that she advocates is based on her fluid 
logic of mediation and inclusion. What this cultural change also demands are 
116 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 9-10. 
117 See Irigaray, I Love to You, p. 130. 'We know practically nothing about sharing between 
ourselves as persons, about the sharing of love between two persons. The transition from one 
stage of individual and collective History to another still needs to be realized by us. 
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alternative temporalities of justice: mucousic temporalities of the now-here 
which will produce a visible audible and tangible elsewhere. 
The foundation for this cultural (r)evolution, its most radical locus, lies in changing 
relations between man and woman, men and women. ' 
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Chapter 5. 
Irigaray's Revolutionary Antigones: 
The Ironic and the Irenic. 
In this chapter I will be developing the themes of the staging of history and its 
possible tragic interpretation through some of Irigaray's readings of others' 
readings of the myth of Antigone. This will also involve an investigation into 
Irigaray's relationship to the dialectic. Hers is another example of thinking that is 
both dialectical and non-dialectical -1 Where it can be described as dialectical, this 
will be seen to be a radical reworking of the dialectic; a dialectic without conflict 
and driven by sexual difference. 
Sexual difference is, as it were, the most powerful motor of a dialectic 
without masters or slaves. This dialectic does not have to be tragic 
because it renders obsolete a certain number of oppositions required for 
the dialectic of a unique and solipsistic subject. 2 
Irigaray comes back to the figure of Antigone time and again, as Antigone seems 
to have come back time and again to haunt philosophy. 3 My point of departure 
will be to refer to Irigaray's own staging and her own point of departure in which 
she states that 
1 In the essay 'Universal as Mediation' in which she reworks Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit, she 
asks herself 'Will this be dialectical thinking? In one sense, yes, in another, no. As the genders are 
neither opposed nor in contradiction. ' (Sexes and Genealogies, p. 140. ) 
2 Irigaray, I Love To You, p. 51. 
'The suggestion of Antigone as some kind of spectral presence in philosophy that continually 
returns to trouble that rational discipline, is one that is taken up by Kelly Oliver in her own 
reading of Hegel's use of Antigone. See Kelly Oliver, 'Antigone's Ghost: Undermining Hegel's 
Phenomenology ofSpirit' in 4vpatia, 1.1 1996, pp. 67-90. 
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In order to stage what is at stake in this task, I shall once again take the figure 
of Antigone - in Sophocles, H61derlin, Hegel, and Brecht - as my first point 
of departure. 4 
We can see from the start, then, that there are many Antigones, for Irigaray. Not 
only does she draw attention to the various representations that we can discover 
in the historical, philosophical and theatrical, traditions, there are also many 
different representations of Antigone at work in Irigaray's texts themselves. 
Sometimes the figure of Antigone is taken to be ahistorical, belonging to a world 
that does not participate in the cultural development of the community 5. As we 
shall see this is quite a common reading and is used by Irigaray to emphasise the 
exclusion of women from representations of culture and history. At other times 
Irigaray presents Antigone as 'a production of culture written by men alone' 61 
which emphasises that Antigone can also be read as an exclusively male 
representation of woman. 
Luisa Muraro identifies certain stages in Irigaray's representations of the figure of 
Antigone. The first representation is in Speculum (1974), where Antigone is 
portrayed as being sacrificed for the maintenance of the symbolic order. Muraro 
suggests that this representation is similar to the later one of the Ethics of Sexual 
Difference (1984), where 'Antigone symbolises the imprisonment of woman in a 
symbolic order that is not her oNArn. i, 
7 She then suggests that there is a turning 
4 Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not One, p. 167. 
5 See Irigaray, Thinking the Difference: For a Peaceful Revolution, trans. Karin Montin, London, 
Athlone, 1994, p. 70- 
I rigaray, An Ethics ofSexual Difference, pp. 118-119. 
Luisa Muraro, 'Female Genealogies', in Engaging with Irigaray, p. 328. 
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point in IrigaraY's treatment of Antigone. Whereas Irigaray had previously read 
Antigone as embodying a notion of female-female relations, Muraro suggests that 
from the essay 'The Universal as Mediation' (1986) onwards, Antigone is used 
more positively as a defender of the community -a community that includes 
female-male relations. While it is true to say that Irigaray identifies her project of 
the 'ethics of the couple' in the 'Universal as Mediation' essay, I will be arguing 
that in the Ethics of Sexual Difference, there is already an attempt to use the 
figure of Antigone to instigate an ethics based on a more general loving 
relationship. Muraro still considers the representation of Antigone to be a 
negative one, citing Irigaray's desire to avoid 'Antigone's fate'. 8 However while 
it would obviously be good sense to avoid Antigone's fate, I will be arguing that 
Irigaray also sets Antigone up as a model for a loving ethics of sexual difference. 
Throughout her various discussions and commentaries on the various uses of 
Antigone, Irigaray is not always, if ever, identifying with Antigone or identifying 
Antigone with woman. She has a somewhat ambivalent attitude to this character 
who is sometimes presented as a male fantasy or myth which denies any of the 
qualities that would be proper to woman herself At other times Antigone is used 
positively as a potentially subversive resource that could help in the revolutionary 
disruption of patriarchy by use of its own attempt to contain these revolutionary 
Antigones in its representations. My own purpose in this chapter is not to decide 
which of these Antigones provides the correct reading of Sophocles, Hegel, 
H61derlin, or Brecht, but to try and discover how Irigaray's Antigones can 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the historical time involved in what I 
Ibid., p. 328. 
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have identified as Irigaray's revolutionary project. In order to do this we must 
first examine, more closely, the uses that higaray makes of the figure of 
Antigone. 
Eternal Irony of the Community 
The first time Irigaray makes use of the figure of Antigone is in the chapter of 
Speculum entitled 'The Eternal Irony of the Community'. The phrase 'the eternal 
irony of the community' is Hegel's. It occurs during his discussion of woman's 
position in the ethical world in section 475 of the Phenomenology of Spirit. This 
section itself is part of Hegel's analysis of Spirit (Geist), in particular his 
analysis of the universalism of the ethical life of a community. In order to explain 
the historical and ethical move from a subjective ethical universal to a more 
substantive one, Hegel starts by examining the ethical world as exemplified by 
Greek tragedy. During this stage of history there is still a division in the life of 
the Spirit. In the later Lectures on the Philosophy of History, this would, of 
course, be attributed to spirit's consciousness of freedom not having completed 
its journey yet because the individual and the state still cannot be rationally 
identified. 'It thus splits itself up into distinct ethical substances, into a human 
and a divine law. '9 Hegel sees this in the division of the community between the 
law of the family and the law of the state. The law of the family is also the divine 
9 Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirif, §445, p. 266. 
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law and is supported by the reverence for dead ancestors. Hegel suggests that this 
law of the family is interpreted intuitively by the females of the family: 
the feminine. ) in the form of the sister, has the highest intuitive awareness 
of what is ethical. She does not attain to a consciousness of it, or to the 
objective existence of it, because the law of the Family is an implicit, 
inner essence which is not exposed to the daylight of consciousness, but 
remains an inner feeling and the divine element that is exempt from an 
existence in the real world. ' 0 
The state law on the other hand is human law and is laid down, interpreted, and 
enforced by the males of the community: 
The brother leaves this immediate, elemental, and therefore, strictly 
speaking, negative ethical life of the Family, in order to aquire and 
produce the ethical life that is conscious of itself and actual. 
He passes from the divine law, within whose sphere he lived, over 
to human law. 11 
It is inevitable then, that these two laws will come into conflict, both within the 
individual and the community. Hegel reads Sophocles' Antigone as a prime 
example of this conflict in which Antigone's intuitive interpretation of the law of 
the family requires her to bury her dead brother (Polynices) against the express 
instructions of the human. state law as decreed by the King (Creon). Hegel's 
concern is with the dialectical overcoming of this division. He will attempt to 
elaborate a theory in which the division between the divine and family ethical 
10 Ibid., §457, p. 274. 
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law, and the human, state law can be superseded so as to allow a rational 
identification between both prescriptions and imperatives. 
What is at stake here, for Hegel, is the clash of two different universals. The 
universal (Allgemein) of the family, and the universal of the state. The conflict is 
between two aspects of ethical life, but it also reflects the conflicts that take place 
within individuals and is therefore partly responsible for the rise of 
individualism. Hegel finds himself in the difficult position of admitting that these 
two laws require each other, claiming 'Neither of the two is by itself absolutely 
va i 112 wh le, at the same time, also appearing to privilege the overcoming or 
supersession of the law of the family: 
Human law in its universal existence is the community, in its activity in 
genera is te manhood of the community, in its real and effective activity 
is the government. It is, moves, and maintains itself by consuming and 
absorbing into itself the separatism of the Penates, or the separation into 
independent families presided over by womankind, and by keeping them 
dissolved in the fluid continuity of its own nature. But the Family is, at 
the same time, in general its element, the individual consciousness the 
basis of its general activity. Since the community only gets an existence 
through its interference with the happiness of the Family, and by 
dissolving [individual] self-consciousness into the universal, it creates for 
itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an 
internal enemy-womankind in general. Womankind-the everlasting 
" Ibid., §§458459, p. 275. 
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irony [in the life] of the community-changes by intrigue the universal 
end of the government into a private end, transfonns its universal activity 
into a work of some particular individual and perverts the universal 
property of the state into a possession and ornament for the Family. 
Woman in this way turns to ridicule the earnest wisdom of mature age 
which, indifferent to purely private pleasures and enjoyments, as well as 
to playing an active part, only thinks of and cares for the universal. She 
makes this wisdom an object of derision for raw and irresPonsible youth 
and unworthy of their enthusiasm. 13 
From this quotation it is not difficult to understand why it would even cause the 
mildest of feminist hackles to be raised. Although Antigone is not actually 
mentioned in this section and is only referred to once in the text and twice in 
fI ootnotes in the Phenomenoloýý, it is clear that Hegel's model of female ethical 
action is based on Antigone's actions. Hegel is not merely stating that there 
would be no community without individuals, he is describing a situation in which 
there is an irreproachable antagonism between the public and the private. Hegel 
positions woman as having the main responsibiity for the Family, because she 'is 
14 
associated with these household gods [Penates] . This, according to Hegel, 
situates her as being an internal enemy of the state. This formulation also tends to 
position woman as traitorous to the community, forever on the verge of 
destroying its well guarded and hard-won power. 
12 Ibid., §460, p. 276. 
13 Ibid., §475, p. 288. 
" Ibid., §457, p. 274. 
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As we have seen before, and will see again, I-rigaray takes up the position that 
Hegel has given her. However she takes it up in such a way that she can subvert 
the rigidly structured system that this positioning was attempting to reinforce in 
the first place. However Irigaray takes up the position of traitorous enemy within 
the community in order to try and challenge the rigid demarcations that are laid 
out in the Hegelian text. To do this she has to do what Hegel would expect her to 
do, while at the same time confounding his expectations in the very act of 
carrying them out. Although woman is positioned by Hegel as the traitor within, 
Irigaray challenges and confuses this expectation by remaining faithful to Hegel's 
indictments. She acts out the part of the faithful traitor, thus confusing and 
threatening the position of the untrusting state. 
The above quotation also reminds us of the dependence of Hegel's dialectic on 
setting up contradictions that must then be overcome The contradictions at work 
here include the contradiction between love and law. Antigone's love for her 
brother brings her into conflict with the law of the state. The contradiction 
(Widerspruch) at work here is between human law, which is male and concerned 
with the government of the community or the polis, and the divine law, which is 
female and concerned with the individual and the home or the oikos. When the 
male brother moves out of the family into the human law he leaves the sister 
behind with the wives who become, 
the head of the household and the guardian of the divine law. In this way, 
the two sexes overcome their [merely] natural being and appear in their 
ethical significance. as diverse beings who share between them the two 
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distinctions belonging to the ethical substance. These two universal 
beings of the ethical world have, therefore, their specific individuality in 
naturally distinct self-consciousnesses 15 
The conflict then is between the universals of the state and the blood. This is the 
contradiction that must be overcome in order to produce the next shape or image 
of the development of Spirit. 
Kelly Oliver takes the 1960's feminist slogan of "the personal is the political" as 
the focus' 6 of her reading of Hegel's use of Antigone in his discussion of the 
ethical order. She concurs that for Hegel, the split between the personal and the 
political is part of a whole gallery of contradictions that need to be dialectically 
superseded. The split between the personal and the political is also associated 
with the difference between the family and the community or nation. Yhese pairs 
of contradictory opposites also map onto the split between the natural and the 
cultural. According to Hegel, the family still functions as a natural ethical 
community while the state or nation functions as a cultural ethical community. 
The contradictions are not as uncomplicated as may be assumed for Hegel, 
because the cultural community is not so much the contradictory opposite of the 
natural community, but that which results from the dialectical supersession of the 
contradictions at work within the natural community. However Oliver finds an 
unresolved contradiction at work in Hegel's attempt to overcome all these latent 
15 Ibid., §459, p. 275. 
16 Oliver, 'Antigone's Ghost: Undoing Hegel's Phenomenology ofSpirit' in Hypatia, 1.1,1996, 
pp. 67-90. 
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contradictions. According to her reading, Hegel's attempt results in its own 
contradictions, paradoxes and uncomfortable ironies. 
For Hegel the family facilitates the transition between individual and community; 
it provides the means by which the passage can be made from the unconscious, 
immediate ethical order, to the conscious ethical order that will be mediated by 
reason. Oliver describes Hegel's project in the Phenomenology as an attempt to 
c conceptualize consciousness'. She then goes on to suggest that, for Hegel, 
the goal of philosophy is to articulate fully the meaning of consciousness 
such that there is no difference between that meaning and its articulation. 
If this goal is reached, nothing remains unconscious or unspoken. To say 
that the rational is the real and that the real is the rational is to say that 
only what can be conceptualized is real and that everything real can be 
conceptua ized. 
17 
Oliver then identifies the problem that she sees as coming back to haunt the 
Hegelian enterprise as being that, according to Hegel's own story, woman is not 
18 
conceptualised and 'is in principle unconceptualizable'. If the purpose of the 
dialectical method is to bring unconscious elements to consciousness, then it 
would seem to be committed to also bringing the (unconscious) feminine element 
to consciousness. However, in order to make the transition to the ethical world, 
the feminine must be left behind to remain unconscious. 
17 Ibid., p. 70. 
" Ibid., p. 70. 
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I take issue with Oliver's reading of Hegel here. While it is true to say that he 
must leave the feminine and the family in an undeveloped ethical position, his 
system does provide a place for them in its memory. Although they are seen as 
being surpassed or superseded, they are also preserved by the Hegelian 
Aujhebung. They are not completely forgotten, rather woman, nature and the 
family are a necessary memory for Hegel in order to bring about the ethical order 
of the state. They are indeed brought to consciousness, but as soon as they are, 
they are also banished because of the paradoxical nature of their involvement. 
Woman and the family are the uncomfortable necessity for all cultural 
production. They are not completely forgotten, merely remembered as little as 
possible. This forgetting is another symptom of the value attributed to women 
within both Greek and modem culture. 
Whether we agree with Oliver's reading or not depends on how we are to 
understand Hegel's dialectic. Just as we have seen in Chapter 3 that Benjwnin 
made his own use of the term Aujhebung, I will also suggest that Irigaray reworks 
this concept in order to produce different versions of the dialectic. According to 
Hegel, the development of the ethical understanding in the community, the 
family (which can be equated with woman) must be superseded. The ethics of the 
modem state (Moralitdt) for Hegel, stresses the role of the will and intentions of 
the individual. On the other hand the ethics of the Greek state (Sittlichkeit) are 
more concerned with the actual deeds of the agent rather than any individualised 
intentions. It is this return of the individual in modernity that leads to the 
contradiction between public and private. The dialectical treatment of this 
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contradiction also reflects the dialectical treatment of the family/state 
contradiction in ancient Greece. 
The development of spirit that takes it from the private to the public will involve 
an Au)hebung of woman and the family. In Hegel's story this movement needs to 
leave the woman and family behind. Although Aujhebung involves cancellation it 
will not be the kind of cancellation that wipes the slate clean. It will be a 
cancellation that also preserves what it has cancelled. We have already seen that 
the necessary forgetting of women is also a necessary forgetting of the necessity 
of women and the family in order to provide the material conditions of possibility 
for that forgetting to take place. This dialectical cancellation will always also 
preserve what has been cancelled. 
Irigaray's version of the dialectic emphasises the preservative aspect of the 
Aujhebung. However, this preservation of what has gone before in Hegel's 
dialectical method can also be considered to be a restrictive and oppressive 
measure. This is the kind of preservation that is practised on dead things. It is the 
preservation of the specimen jar and the preservation of interesting curios that 
pose no threat due to their inanimate nature and their containment. Even though it 
could be argued that nothing is forgotten in the Hegelian system, all those things 
that have been preserved and superseded have at the same time been killed or 
captured. 
This preservation is also the preservation within a certain conception of history, 
where what has been superseded is relegated to the past, which, accordin to the 9 
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Hegelian, schema, removes it from the progressive dynamic process. There is 
another kind of forgetting at work here. The forgetting of other modes of 
becoming and different, non-teleological movements-19 It is by remembering 
these other forms of movement that Irigaray may provoke a rupture in the 
Hegelian dialectic which has tried to contain them. These dangerous resources 
may now prove useful for a revolutionary project such as Benjamin's or 
Irigaray's, who both see potential contemporary relevance and possibilities for a 
past that can be conceived as dynamic and accessible. 
The preservative aspect of the Hegelian dialectic would also be at odds with 
Oliver's reading of Hegel in which she understands woman to be 'in principle 
unconceptualizable 20 . 
Rather, it could be argued that Hegel's system really 
demands the conceptualisation of woman, only it is at the same time a 
conceptualisation of all that threatens its own conceptualisability. Hegel's 
dialectic, if it does contain this ghost of Antigone, tries to exorcise it through an 
act of preservation rather than expulsion. It could be said that in its erasure of 
woman and the family it also preserves them. 
Christine Battersby outlines several versions of Antigone and draws attention to 
the fact that in the "Eternal Irony of the Community' chapter in Speculum Irigaray 
is not only engaging with Hegel, but also with Lacan 21 . It 
is this engagement with 
Lacan that is often passed over in the commentaries on Irigaray's use of 
19 These different movements will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
20 Oliver, 'Antigone's Ghost', p. 65. 
244 
Antigone. The significant difference between Hegel's and Lacan's readings of 
Antigone is given by Battersby as the fact that Hegel still allows woman to 
4represent another universal - spiritualized 'nature", whereas 'For Lacan, by 
contrast, nature no longer exists. And neither does 'woman' - except in so far as 
she acts as the necessary limit to the oedipalized self ý22 Indeed, it seems that 
Oliver is reading Hegel's dialectic through a Lacanian framework in which 
woman is man's 'Other'. The ironic threat posed by Antigone/woman in the 
Lacanian system becomes 'the threat of the dissolution of the self into the 
23 Otherness that bounds it' . This dissolution of the self into otherness is at odds 
with Hegel's emphasis on the necessary dissolution of the individual into the 
community. Battersby shows how Irigaray develops a reading of Antigone that 
plays with both of these versions in order to give "woman' an identity that is 
more than man's 'Other' 924 . 
To return to the long quotation from Hegel, we can see that 'Womankind-the 
everlasting irony [in the life] of the community-changes by intrigue the 
universa end of the government into a private end, transforms its universal 
activity into a work of some particular individual and perverts the universal 
property of the state into a possession and ornament for the Family. ' So Irigaray 
is, to a certain extent, doing exactly what Hegel would have her do; she does in a 
sense pervert (verkehrt) 'the universal property of the state'. According to Carol 
2' See the chapter entitled 'Antigones of Gender' in, Christine Battersby, The Phenomenal 
Woman: Feminist Metaphysics and the Patterns ofIdentity, Cambridge, Polity, 1998. 
22 Battersby, The Phenomenal Woman, p. 112. 
23, Ibid., p. I 11. 
24 Ibid., p. 112 
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Jacobs, Hegel uses verkehrt here to signify the *non-dialectical alteration, 
opposition' that is at work in woman's ironic threat. However, although Irigaray 
is playing her ironic and perverted role, she is also ironically perverting Hegel's 
expectations in that there is also a dialectical rather than a purely oppositional 
impetus to her intervention. Irigaray's intention to complete or reverse the 
dialectic 25 suggests there would be no significant difference between a 
completion and a reversal or as if it were possible to do both of these. Indeed, this 
is probably another playful, ironic moment that shows a sophisticated 
understanding of the seemingly paradoxical nature of the Hegelian dialectic at the 
same time as it is poking fun at its tendency to have its speculative cake and eat 
it. 
It is woman's necessity in Hegel's dialectical process that provides the irony. It is 
women who make the functioning and stability of the polis possible, while at the 
same time being defined as outsiders who pose a threat. It will be useful to take a 
brief look at how this irony works in Hegel's accusation (or resigned statement) 
about woman being the eternal irony of the community. On first sight it looks 
like it is irony in the sense of a rather unfortunate but unavoidable contradiction. 
In other words Hegel considers it ironic that the spirit can only make progress 
along its development to absolute reason by being necessarily helped by matter 
and non-reason. By identifying woman with irony, Hegel comes close to 
admitting a contradiction that cannot be resolved through a dialectical 
supersession. Irony, by definition, would suggest contradiction, as it seems that 
2' See Ethics qfSexual Difference, p. I 10 where she suggests that 'the mucous represents perhaps 
something that would accomplish or reverse the dialectic'. 
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the irony is also that there will always be contradiction at heart and hearth of the 
community. 26 The contradiction of the fact that reason and its political 
community needs maternal birth and nurture in order to undertake its serious 
projects. 
Irigaray is not only insisting on remembering the role of woman, nature, mother 
and family within the development of history, she is also stressing the value that 
has been attributed to these necessary figures. To paraphrase Irigaray's reading of 
Hegel, we could say that Hegel's attitude to woman's role in the ethical state is 
one of a necessary evil. Her eternal irony is that she reminds us of the nuisance of 
the natural. This is, of course also the nuisance of nascence; the uncomfortable, 
and often unwelcome, gift of birth. Irigaray, then, is attempting to develop a new- 
sense from her critique of the nuisance of nascence. 
Woman's irony is a serious business for Hegel, one that has undesirable effects 
on the equally serious business of philosophy and the state. For Irigaray the irony 
is also an opportunity to undermine both the whole business of philosophy and its 
26 Irony, in Hegel, differs from the irony of the German Romantics, which was an acceptance of 
the contradictory and paradoxical nature of the world and merely played with the contradictions 
without either trying to supersede them or privilege either one. This, according to Hegel ends in 
the conceit attributed to Friedrich von Schlegel of the 'principle of subjectivity knowing itself as 
supreme'. It also differs from the irony at work in Greek tragedy which produced the opposite of 
the wishes or desires of the protagonist. Although he traces the use of irony back to Plato's 
Socratic dialogues, Hegel points out that Socrates' irony was a method directed against the 
I conceit of the Sophists and the uneducated. What he treated ironically, however, was only their 
type of mind, not the Idea itself. ' For Hegel, irony has both negative and positive connotations, 
indeed it drives the need to overcome contradiction which is 'dialectic in the strict sense. i. e. 
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seriousness. Hegel's use of the tragic irony of Antigone is taken up by Irigaray to 
be put to comic effect. She uses it to poke fun at the self-important, grand 
gestures of those male philosophers who try their best to deny their own 
dependence on bodies and matter. Irigaray is always being ironic, she is 
constantly making comical use of irony. In doing so she deliberately offends the 
nonns of the philosophico-academic discourse in such a way that she is also able 
to go beyond its abstract nature. By laughing at the po-faced seriousness of its 
practices and practitioners she draws attention to the insecurities and obsessions, 
the fears and denials that may be at work behind the purely rational facade. 
There is very often a mischievousness at work in Irigaray's writing. This can be 
traced to a tradition of female engagement with philosophy and philosophers that 
goes back as far as the putative founder of Western philosophy himself - Thales. 
Adriana Cavarero draws attention to this alternative tradition of feminine 
laughter which she considers to be providing a corrective aspect to the tendency 
of philosophy to be life-negating. 27 Cavarero discovers, what she tenns a 
'feminine realism' in the figure of the maidservant of Thrace whom we encounter 
in Plato's Theaetetus. 28 This maidservant is described by Plato as laughing at 
Thales, who fell into a well because he was concentrating on the sky and the stars 
instead of paying attention to more worldly concerns. It is Thales' concern with 
the heavenly and all that is not of this world, and the assumption in this that what 
is heavenly is somehow more real, that Cavarero identifies as symptomatic of 
dialectic as the pulsating drive of speculative enquiry. ' See, Hegel, Philosophy of Right, § 140, p. 
101. 
27 See Adriana Cavarero, In Spite of Plato, Cambridge, Polity, 1995, chapter 2, 'The Maidservant 
from Thrace'. 
248 
Western philosophy's rejection of the material, living world. She provides a 
reading of Pan-nenides' rejection of change and all subsequent philosophies of 
being as implicated not only in a rejection of life but also in a misogynistic 
rejection of woman's contribution to life. She argues that philosophy's obsession 
with being is partly the result of Greeks' failure to distinguish between 'the 
4ý 29 existential" and the "predicative" valence of the verb to be (einai)'. What then 
follows from this is the identification of being with eternity and immutability, 
thus exiling reality and its truth firom the realm of the living, changing, and 
transient world. The world where humans are born, grow, change, and die. 
What feminine realism finds so amusing is that this unchanging world of static 
truth and absolute sameness could be so interesting to the great philosophers who 
are supposedly intelligent men. Although we could rescue Hegel from being 
labelled as one of these laughable philosophers of being by positioning him as a 
philosopher of change and becoming, there is something that would still appeal 
to the jocular maiden in his insistence that 'the real is the rational' or his highly 
obtuse and abstract method and writing. There is still a negation of reality hidden 
in his philosophical idealism. The kind of abstraction at work in Hegel is what 
Cavarero terms 'dematerialization' - the rendering of material truth to an 
immaterial ideal. 
The laughter of Cavarero's feminine realism is itself a critique of this idealism: 
It has the merit of condensing in a moment pregnant with truth the boring 
futility of argument. The maidservant's argument is strong with the power 
28 Plato, Theaetetus, 174a. 
29 Cavarero, In Spite oj'Plato, p. 39. 
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of facts, with the power of one who belongs to this world where she has 
her roots and lives out her existence. 30 
At the same time it is also an attempt to show the existence of a female tradition 
of a more 'realistic' philosophy that bases itself in the material and bodily aspects 
of human existence. The 'laughter itself becomes the figure of a female symbolic 
order' that is more concerned with a 'sense of life'31 . 
Although Irigaray could not be considered strictly as a feminine realist along the 
same lines as Cavarero, she nonetheless participates in this tradition of life 
affirming laughter: 
It is better to laugh than indulge in murderous fanaticism! Yet the limit is 
hard to make out. We have to laugh while remaining vigilant, laugh to 
keep the worst at bay and keep our good health, laugh to ward of 
immediate acts of violence and to give ourselves breathing space. 32 
Irigaray's use of the figure of Antigone, is probably best labelled as tragi-comic, 
because her light-hearted jibes at the likes of Hegel's 'problem' with women 
have also a serious side. She is concerned not only with the fictional or 
mythological violence done to Antigone, but also with the culture of violence and 
death that both Sophocles' play and Hegel's philosophy play a part in. 
That woman is concerned with life more that death is a position that Irigaray 
wants to repeat faithfully in her mimetic re-presentations of the myth of 
30 Ibid., p. 36. 
Ibid., p. 56. 
32 Sexes and Genealogies, p. 115. 
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Antigone. This is staged in contradistinction to Hegel who is usually read as 
positioning Antigone as concerned with death and the rights of the dead. He 
emphasised how, in Sophocles' tragedy, it is Antigone who insists on performing 
a burial and the taking care of the dead. In Hegel's account of the family in 
Phenomenology, one of its primary tasks is that it takes care of these rights in 
order to allow the particular man, the one who has died to find his true place 
among the universal, spirit. Irigaray's re-readings tend to subvert this view by 
showing how Antigone's insistence on burying her brother Polynices, also creates 
repercussions for the degree and status of life that she experiences under the 
patriarchal regime. As we have seen there is no room for woman to become fully 
conscious in Hegel's ethical world. Irigaray describes Antigone's struggle as an 
attempt to achieve a 'for-ilself, or consciousness. She argues that, because 
women have no language sexed as female, they are used in the 
elaboration of a so-called neuter language where in fact they are deprived 
of speech. And this makes it hard for a woman to achieve afor-itself, and 
to construct a place between the in-itseýf and thefor-itseýf In the terms of 
the Hegelian dialectic, this situation might be analyzed as the female 
remaining in the plant world without any chance of creating an animal 
territory for herself . 
33 
The for-itself (ffir sich) for Hegel, can become aware of its own self and is able to 
express this. The plant-like in-itself (an-sich) has no similar potential: plants do 
not have the potential to either become aware of or to express themselves; they 
are excluded from becoming for-itself The need to construct a place between the 
in-itself and the for-itself is Irigaray's reworking of the Hegelian being-in-and- 
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for-self (Anundfiirsichsein), which brings the in-itself and the for-itself together 
in an infinite identification. 34 The 'between' would, once again, be the 
communicating mediation of the sensible and the transcendental, as well as 
something between the public and the private, and the conscious and the 
unconscious. Irigaray is suggesting that the amount or quality of life allotted to 
woman in the Hegelian dialectic is that of plant life. Irigaray goes on to show 
how Antigone exemplifies this when she is walled up in the cave because she 
becomes 'like a plant buried in a stone cave which can only live if it manages to 
get out of its tomb, rise up to the light .. .' 
35 Irigaray suggests that by trying to 
establish herfor-itseýf Antigone takes the only action that is left to her in order to 
escape the confines of the male ethical order. If to live is to get out of the tomb, 
then Antigone's irony increases because she only escapes this tomb by killing 
herself 
This concern with death in both Hegel's and Irigaray's treatments of Antigone 
also confronts the question of war. There are all sorts of ironies surrounding 
Polynices' death. Not the least of these is the fact that he was killed by his own 
brother Eteocles, and that Eteocles also died in the struggle with his brother. That 
this war was being fought between brothers can be taken as an example of the 
3 33 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 107. 
ý, 4 Simone de Beauvoir redescribed this using the terms of French existentialism: 'To become God 
is to accomplish the impossible synthesis of the en-soi and the pour-soi. ' (The Second Sex, trans. 
H. M. Parshley, London, Picador. 1988. p. 644) Irigaray's use of in-itself and for-itself here is also 
marked by Beauvoir's analyses of the existentialists' Hegelian tendency to reduce woman to the 
'en-soi, or fixed, lower nature'. (The Second Sex, p. 624). 
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investment in death and war that Irigaray describes in patriarchal culture. it is war 
that creates both heroes and traitors, the only difference seemingly being that the 
hero will have fought on the victor's side while the traitor will have been on the 
side of the vanquished. For Hegel, war serves a useful purpose in binding the 
community together through a rejection of individual or natural existence: 
In order not to let them become rooted and set in this isolation, thereby 
breaking up the whole and letting the [communal] spirit evaporate, 
goveniment has from time to time to shake them to their core by war. By 
this means the government upsets their established order, and violates 
their right to independence, while the individuals who, absorbed in their 
own way of life, break loose from the whole and strive after the inviolable 
independence and security of the person, are made to feel in the task laid 
on them their lord and master, death. 36 
So, according to Hegel, the real master is, in the end, death, and death will always 
take precedence over a life that would be lived individually, or outside the 
community or state. War binds individuals together by creating a common 
enemy, and the life of the state is always of greater importance than the life of the 
individual. Indeed, the individual is what poses a threat to the life of the state. So, 
for Hegel., war is not to protect the state or community from an external threat, it 
serves to prevent it from being fragmented by the conflicting interests of its own 
individualised members. 
35 There is a strange irony in Irigaray's use of the metaphor of struggling to reach the light which 
echoes Plato's myth of the cave considering deconstruction of this move towards the light in the 
final chapter of Speculum. 
,, 
6 Phenomenologi, ofSpirit, §455, pp. 272-273. 
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This threat posed by individualism is linked to the threat posed by woman as the 
interpreter of the law of the family. Hegel identifies the 'duality of a law of 
individuality and a law of universality'. 37 While the family can also be universal 
(das Allgemeine), it is the natural universal in which the individual is first able to 
express itself 'The positive End peculiar to the Family is the individual as 
suc . 
!, 38 This is also borne out by Antigone's wilful disregard for the law of the 
state; the law of universality. 
Although war is seen as a necessary method of binding the community together, 
its blame can still be laid firmly at woman's door, because without her ironic 
threat there would be no danger of fragmentation. However, it would be wrong to 
assume that Irigaray is simply asserting the contrary to Hegel's position on war 
and the polemic. Antigone is not simply an anti-hero. Irigaray is not advocating 
the fragmentation of the state in favour of a more naturalised individual. She is 
proposing a less violent form of mediation that would encourage individuality, 
and also be able to bind the community together at the same time. Hers would not 
be a dialectic based on the polemos, 39 like the master-slave dialectic, because, as 
we have seen,, the ultimate master in this dialectic is always death. For her the 
universal or the commonality of the community (the Allgemeine of the 
Gemeinschaft) is to be brought about, not through conflict or opposition, but 
through co-operation and the affinnation of life, love,, and laughter. If she were to 
37 Ibid., §446, p. 267. 
1 38 Ibid., §45 1, p. 269. 
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merely oppose Hegel's hierarchical contradictions, she would still be 
participating in the war-like logic of his dialectics. She even follows Hegel's lead 
to a certain extent, only to bring into question the hierarchical relationships that 
the Hegelian dialectic is based on. 
Brecht & Ho"Iderlin's Antigones 
Although Irigaray does no more than announce her intention to engage with 
Brecht's Antigone, it will prove useful to try and second guess what an Irigarayan 
reading of Brecht's Antigone might look like. This is relevant to my argument 
because Brecht's play, and his commentaries and notes on it, are also based 
firmly on a polemical model. His is very much a post-war German response to 
Sophocle's tragedy, a production that is attempting to come to terms with the 
aftermath of Nazism. He sees his play as struggling with the problems of creating 
(progressive art in the period of reconstruction' 40 . Taking H61derlin's translation 
of Sophocles as his basis, Brecht adds a prologue set in Berlin at the end of the 
war. The resulting drama Brecht judged to be not just of use or interest at a 
particular time, but one that should last over time. He thus wrote a 'model' in 
order to try and establish the standard for his Antigone. The first interesting 
remark to note in an Irigarayan reading is the almost authoritarian ring to 
Brecht's use of this '-model'. His translators give it the title of 'Masterful 
., g As Irigaray's translator notes 'polemos' is usually translated as 'war', but is also obviously 
connected etymologically to 'polemic'. See An Ethics of Sexual Difference, p. 104. 
40 Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on Theatre, trans. John Willett, Methuen, London, 1964, p. 2 10. 
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Treatment of a Model 541 . Brecht's 'masterful' (souverdn) treatment is not only an 
arrogant claim about the artistic, theoretical, and technical accomplishment of his 
production of the play, it is also 'masterful' in the sense that it is to be obeyed. 
'Our new adaptation cannot be handed over in the usual way to theatres to do 
what they like with. An obligatory model production has been worked out. - -'. 
42 
The gendered repercussions of this mastery cannot go unnoticed, which will 
make participation in a 'pure' Brechtian production problematic. A performer 
would need to be aware of the power relationships at work in a production and 
what degree of 'submission' to the 'master' is required. 
However Brecht also suggests two possible reactions to the model; it can be 
43 
treated 'either slavishly or masterfully (knechtish als auch souverdn) . What is 
also at work here is Brecht's engagement with mimesis and representation. He is 
actively concerned with the traditional aesthetic problems of mimesis, inherited 
from Plato. He writes about copying the model in a manner that brings a Platonic 
schema to mind, while at the same time trying to distance himself from Platonic 
realism. This 'masterful model' is not a Platonic eidos because it can be varied. 
The most successful imitation or mimesis that Brecht desires would be a 
repetition that both imitates and varies the model in a productive fashion. This 
would be the 'masterful' treatment that avoids slavishness. Since Hegel's 
treatment of the master/slave dialectic and Antigone is so well known, it must 
41 Ibid., p. 209- 
42 Ibid., p. 21 1. 
43 Ibid., p. 212. 
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also be assumed that Brecht also had this in mind, as well as the Marxian 
inversion of the Hegelian system. 
If we are to speculate on what Irigaray might do with the Brechtian framework, 
we would have to conclude that she would find great opportunity to play with the 
notion of an unfaithful mimesis that could be derived from Brecht's model. 
However the limitation of the treatment to either slavish or masterful must still be 
too restrictive for Irigaray's expansive and fluid dialectic. She would ask how 
sexual difference is manifested in this model, and how it could be subversively 
imitated to make room for a female/feminine treatment that would be neither 
slavish nor masterful. Brecht's dialectical method is based on contradiction and, 
as we have seen in relation to Hegel, Irigaray states that his 
method is based on contradiction, on contradictory propositions. Yet sex 
does not obey the logic of contradiction. It bends and folds to 
accommodate that logic but it does not conform. Forced to follow that 
logic, it is drawn into a mimetic game that moves faraway from life A4 
This must also apply to Brecht's dialectic of contradiction, which is very much 
based on a polemical model. His polemos is also one of warfare and death which 
closely polices its mimesis. Although Brecht's 'models' leave room for an 
unfaithful treatment, they still conform to the type of gendered logic that higaray 
associates with the rejection of woman, life, and nature. The only kind of 
freedom available in Brecht is the freedom of contradiction and conflict, but 
Irigaray is trying to move away from a logic of contradiction altogether. If 
Ifigaray were to produce a treatment of Brecht's Antigone we would hope that her 
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own particular 'masterful' treatment would be the one that would undermine the 
whole notion of mastery and the masculinised logic that it incorporates. WUle 
she is happy to participate in the game of mimesis, even in the acting and staging 
of roles. she also is looking for a 'new method'. Although the Brechtian notion of 
productive mimesis might prove useful in trying to produce a revolutionary 
attitude and concept of time and history, Irigaray would not be prepared to 
produce a copy, which is what Brecht would demand. 
It is surprising that Irigaray has not yet engaged with Brecht, as they seem to 
share so many concerns. Not only might there be a fruitful exploration of the 
notion of the unfaithful or 'masterful' mimesis in these writers, they are also both 
concerned with mirroring. Commenting on the writing of poetry, Brecht suggests 
that 
Writing poetry has to be viewed as a human activity, a social functionof a 
wholly contradictory and alterable kind, conditioned by history and in 
turn conditioning it. It is the difference between 'mirroring' and 'holding 
up a mirror'. 
45 
This notion of mirroring as being conditioned by history at the same time as 
conditioning it is remarkably close to Irigaray's project. She is taking the position 
of the mirror in Speculum, but is both 'mirroring' the masculine order and 
'holding up a mirror' to it in order to change the condition of history by showing 
how that history has conditioned woman as mirror. Irigaray's mirror would differ 
44 Ifigaray, Sexes and Genealogies, p. 139. 
. 15 Bertolt Brecht, Poems 1913-1956, eds John Willett & Ralph Manheim, London, Methuen, 
1979, p. 483. 
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from Brecht's, in that it would not show the same reflection due to its curved 
surface. Her mirror would multiply truths rather than reflecting a single truth. 
Another shared concern of Brecht and Irigaray is the theme of rhythm. Brecht 
often wrote verse with irregular rhythms in an attempt to counteract the 
'disagreeably lulling, soporific effect 46 of rhythmic poetry. It is not surprising 
that he made this use of rhythmic devices disrupt the soporific continuum 
because his own version of Antigone was based on H61derlin's. As we shall see 
below, H61derlin also laid great emphasis on the dramatic possibilities of rhythm. 
The question of the status of the historical and revolutionary time at work in 
Irigaray's readings of the myth of Antigone can be also be approached through 
the question of rhythm. 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Irigaray also associates these cosmic 
rhythms with love - and this picks up another theme that appears in Hegel's 
representation of Antigone. Peter Szondi states Sophocles' tragedy is, for Hegel, 
one in which 'The collision involved is that of love and law as they confront each 
other in the characters of Antigone and Creon. ' 47 It is clear that Irigaray is taking 
the side of love although this is a love that wants to transfonn the law. It is not in 
opposition to the law, it is a desire that the law allows love to influence its 
justice. Hegel rules out the relationship between husband and wife as unable to 
bring about the movement of the individual from the natural to the cultural realm, 
46 Ibid., p. 470. 
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because it is based on love, not on law. This loving relationship is unable to 
escape from the natural realm. We can assume from this that the kind of loving in 
this relationship is almost an animal instinctual relationship -a proto- 
evolutionary genetic desire for the survival of the species, rather than an ethical 
relationship of responsibility to the other. It is the wife who succumbs to this 
animal desire of the survival of the universality of the species, while the husband 
is rational enough to differentiate a particular relation at stake with an individual 
or person: 
The difference between the ethical life of the woman and that of the man 
consists in just this, that in her vocation as an individual and in her 
pleasure, her interest is centred on the universal and remains alien to the 
particularity of desire; whereas in the husband these two sides are 
separated; and since he possesses as a citizen the self-conscious power of 
universality, he thereby acquires the right of desire and, at the same time, 
preserves his freedom in regard to it. 48 
The different types of desire at work here relate to different kinds of universals. 
The woman's desire is directed towards the universality of the family and the 
household gods; the mans' desire is linked to the universals of the polis and is 
directed towards that of the community. 
As we have also seen from the previous chapter, Irigaray's presentation of the 
mucous as the unspoken and unthought occupant of the place of the soul would 
47 Peter Szondi, 'The Notion of the Tragic in Schelling, Holderlin and Hegel' in On Textual 
Understanding and Other Essays, trans. Harvey Mendelsohn, Minneapolis, University of 
Minnesota Press, 1986, p. 53. 
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also corresponds to the position of Antigone within Hegel's ethical order. 
Antigone undertakes ethical actions and is at the same time denied knowledge of 
them as well as being denied a full ethical consciousness. In as much as Antigone 
also represents a loving approach to ethics rather than a legal one then she is also 
a participant in a muculent model of ethics. 
Irigaray has great hopes for mucous, for her it is even that which 'represents 
something that would accomplish or reverse the dialectic 49 . If it were to 
accomplish the dialectic we can presume that it would produce the contradiction- 
free subject-object. A reversal of the dialectic, on the other hand, might be 
another aspect of brushing history against the grain, one in which all those 
moments and concepts that have been superseded will re-appear from their 
traces. Although the mucous has heretofore been invisible in history, it has left 
traces. Traces of different subjectivities and different temporalities in which those 
subjectivities would operate. The representation of accomplislunent or reversal of 
the dialectic through mucous would, of course be a loving completion rather than 
a polemical one. 
Because Irigaray associates mucous so closely with the act of love, the 
temporality of her revolutionary reversal of the dialectic demands a sensitivity to 
its rhythms. She stresses that this must be an act of openness, both in generosity 
and incompletion. It is the inability to find this rhythm that she posits as another 
48 Hegel, Phenomenology ofSpirit, §457. p. 275. 
49 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. I 10. 
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aspect of nihilism or the 'anxiety of the chasm, of the abyss' 50 . Rather than 
having the more usual attitude of disgust towards the mucous, Irigaray espouses a 
mucouphilian ethics which makes use of the movements associated with the 
mucous to suggest a seamless continuity of duration: 
This failure to embrace the mucous leads to the squandering of its 
abundance, the exploitation of its availability, its joyfulness, its flesh, or 
to the abandonment and repetition of its gesture or gestures of love, which 
become broken and jerky, instead of progressive and inscribed in 
duration. 51 
The fluidity of these loving acts also reflect the continuity of the cosmic rhythms 
discussed above. However, if this fluid continuity is to play a part in the 
accomplishment or reversal of the dialectic it must differ from the 'fluid 
continuity' that Hegel finds in the human law. 52 His fluid continuity is used to 
consume and absorb womankind. This is what he tries to do with Antigone who 
is seen as antithetical to the human law. For Irigaray, Hegel's fluid continuity is 
one that represents a searnlessness and completion that should ideally be free of 
any gaps or holes. For Hegel, this would help in the closure of the totality of the 
system, again reflecting what Irigaray would describe as the anxiety of the chasm 
or abyss. Irigaray's fluid continuity, on the other hand, is one that would 
encourage various lacunae and openings. The fluidity of mucous allows for holes 
to appear in it at the same time that it is continuous. Again there is a generosity at 
work in this thinking of continuity that would always be susceptible to change 
50 Ibid., p. I 11. 
il Ibid., p. I 11. 
52 Phenomenologjý ofSpirit p. 288. 
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and open enough to accommodate any shape that would like to be included in its 
environs . 
53 Irigaray's Antigone would have a rhythm of her own -a rhythm that 
would maintain this inclusive continuity. 
As it was Irigaray's expressed aim to engage with Hblderlin's reading of 
Antigone, and she has not published the results of a sustained engagement, it will 
also be useful to try and ascertain what is at stake in H61derlin's reading. 
H61derlin is also very concerned with rhythm and its liberating potential. For him 
rhythm also provides continuity, although this is the continunuity of a modernity 
that at the same time recognises its radical break from what has gone before. 
H61derlin differs from Nietzsche in that for him God is not dead,, instead the gods 
have merely flown and can still be glimpsed. There is both a memory of the gods 
and a futural preparation for their coming in H61derlin's poetry. Ifigaray remarks 
on H61derlin's preparation for the gods when she writes that, 
H61derlin says that the gods come to us on a certain wind that blows from 
the icy cold of the north to the place where every sun rises: the East 
The god would refer back to a time before our space-time was formed 
into a closed world by an economy of natural elements forced to bow to 
man's affect and will.. .. 
54 
This would be the preparation for an ancient god of a pre-historic or pre- 
patriarchal time -a matriarchal god that would not create the separation of nature 
and culture that would disrupt the cosmic rhythms of a more inclusive space- 
i It is her insistence on continuity and the progressive nature of this continuity that would place 
her at odds with Benjamin's revolutionary temporality. This tension between these thinkers will 
be explored in chapter 8. 
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time. Irigaray does make some suggestions as to what some of the characteristics 
of this god might be, and these are also linked to her thinking of the mucous: 
Because the mucous has a special touch and properties, it would stand in 
the way of the transcendence of a God that was alien to the flesh, a God 
of immutable, stable truth. On the contrary the mucous would summon 
the god to return or to come in a new incarnation... . 
55 
This would be a fleshy, or sensible god of fluid, dynamic truth. This is also the 
paradoxical message of her presentation of the 'sensible transcendental'. 
H61derlin could be described as trying to summon up a poetic formula that will 
recognise the disruptive, or disjunctive, nature of modernity at the same time as it 
tries to fill in the gaps that may be left by this disruptive thinking. Peter Szondi 
describes how H61derlin is able to produce a dialectic that functions according to 
a thinking of the tragic relation between nature and art as well as between God 
and man. This differs from the Hegelian dialectic that requires the mediation of 
more abstract or rational antitheses, while still adhering to Szondi's definition of 
the dialectic as 'the unity of contradictory terms, the turning of one term into its 
opposite, the act by which a tenn posits the negation of itself, and self- 
division'. 56 For H61derlin, it is the tragic relationship between god and man that 
must be thought in any philosophy of history, and it is the distance that has 
appeared between them that marks modernity's historical specificity. However; 
. 4n Dhics ofSexual 
Difference, p. 128. 
55 
,4n Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. I 10. 
56 Peter Szondi, 'The Notion of the Tragic in Schelling, H61derlin and Hegel', p. 189. 
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H61derlin's dialectical constructions do indeed try to unite these tragically 
contradictory terms when he suggests that history would be a night in which, 
God and man, in order that the course of the world have no lacunae and 
that the memory of the Celestial Ones will not come to an end, reveal 
themselves in the all-forgetting form of faithlessness, for divine 
faithlessness is what is best remembered. 57 
It is this 'divine faithlessness' that signifies the paradoxical and utopian nature of 
H61derlin's reading of modernity. It is the tragic force that would cover over the 
lacunae in history, through an act of all-forgetting remembrance. 
Irigaray may also have this version of the dialectic in her sights when she 
announces her mucosic intention to accomplish or reverse the dialectic. Rather 
than an all-forgetting faithlessness that must be posited to cover over the lacunae 
in the historical course of the world, frigaray's method could be described as an 
all-remembering faithfulness. It would be an all-inclusive remembering as well as 
a specific remembering of sexual difference. H61derlin's paradoxical notion of 
divine faithlessness reinforces the sense of a godless modernity while at the same 
time projecting a futural re-appearance of the gods. While it would also be 
possible to read H61derlin's hymns as expressing nostalgia and regret at the flight 
of the gods, we must also agree with Szondi's interpretation that they act as a 
preparation for the coming of the gods. 58 Szondi also suggests that their utopian 
57 Hblderlin, Sdmiliche Werke, p. 202. 
58 Szondi, 'The Notion of the Tragic in Schelling, H61derlin and Hegel', p. 48. 
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structure can be discerned in their 'extremely intense rhythM"59 . This rhythm and 
its interruption is also crucial to Hblderlin's conception of tragedy in Antigone. 
Irigaray's reversal or accomplishment of Hblderlin's dialectic can be seen most 
clearly in her transposition of his 'divine faithlessness' into her 'sensible 
transcendental'. This clearly accords with Szondi's definition of the dialectic, 
specifically in providing a 'unity of contradictory terms'. It also accomplishes a 
reversal that is not just a mere copy or miffor image. The reversal consists in 
bringing the sensible and the transcendental together in a way reminiscent of their 
divorce in H61derlin's tragic separations. At the same time we can also discern 
the accomplishment of the dialectic in Irigaray's own preparation for the arrival 
of the gods, or God. This is not only incidentally an accomplishment at the same 
time as it is a reversal, it is an accomplishment at the same time because it is an 
accomplishment 'also as a here and now, the willed construction of a bridge in 
the present between the past and the future'. 60 Irigaray's version of parousia 
literally incorporates a different temporality, in that it would be an 'inscription in 
the flesh' in which God would become 'a realization-here and now-in and 
through the body -) - 
61 Just as in Christ's first coming, this would be an incarnation 
in all its fleshy reality. This is not necessarily the re-appearance of a Christ-like 
figure, for Irigaray. It would be the emergence of a new historical era in which 
spirit and flesh can come together in all bodies, including female, bodies. This 
59 Ibid., p. 48. 
60 Ethics ofSexual Difference, p. 147. 
61 Ibid., p. 148. 
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new ethical era would again be sensitive to the material rhythms of the cosmos as 
well as the transcendental rhythms of the spirit. 
As I have mentioned above, the rhythms, of the text were important to H61derlin, 
and he invests his writing, both theoretically and practically, with rhythmic 
cadences. What is also very pertinent is that his own understanding of Antigone is 
that it is a play steeped in revolutionary significances. According to George 
Steiner., H61derlin's reading differs from Hegel's, because Hegel considered the 
play to be 'a dialectic of perfect equilibrium between Creon and Antigone'. 62 
H61derlin on the other hand considers the play to be representative of a moment 
of 'national reversal and revolution (Vdterlandische Umkehr) ý63 in which Creon 
and Antigone both worship the same gods, but experience their respective 
relationships to these gods in completely different ways. These differences will 
become manifest in the differences of the laws that they follow. H61derlin 
portrays Antigone as lawless (gesetzlos), which Steiner suggests 'exceeds 
legalism and the statutory but is in inevitable antithesis to them'. 64This reading 
of Antigone's resistance as revolutionary also ties in with Irigaray's use of 
Antigone as a figure that might exceed the prevailing legalism through her 
lawlessness. 
What is even more appropriate (and appropriable) for Irigaray in H61derlin's 
reading and translation of Antigone is the transfon-native nature of time 
62 George Steiner, Antigones, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984, p. 40-41. 
(13 ]bid., p. 81. 
64 Ibid., p. 83. 
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embedded in it. Steiner suggests that H61derlin attributed 'a mystery of purpose 
and of generative energy' to time which is itself 'transformative of the classical 
text'. 65 Indeed it is not only the text that is to be transformed, Steiner shows how 
there is a radical and ontological thinking of time in Hblderlin's work that can be 
used to explain his practice of translation. Hblderlin chose to translate Sophocles' 
Antigone, not only because he considered it to be a revolutionary work, but also 
because he considered it the right time to transform the work and release its 
hidden and contemporary energies, resonances and rhythms. It is in some remarks 
on Sophocles' Oedipus that H61derlin draws attention to the notion of 'divine 
faithlessness' mentioned above, and it is at these moments that he identifies a 
moment of pure human suffering in which 'there exists nothing but the 
conditions of time and space'. However it is also at these moments that a 
4 categorical reversal (Umkehr)' of both time and the tragic figure takes place. 66 
H61derlin also associates this 'categorical reversal' with the rhythm of tragedy. 
He identifies a 'rhythmic sequence of representations wherein transport 
represents itself . 'Transport', 
here, would be understood as the empathetic 
understanding or emotional immersion of the audience in the play. However, in 
order for the representation as a whole to be successful, the rhythms of the series 
of representations that make up the drama must be carefully balanced. H61derlin 
suggests that, in tragedy at least, there must be a point of balance, and this he 
65 Ibid., p. 72. 
66 H61derlin, 'Remarks on Oedipus' in Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. Thomas Pfau, Albany, 
SUNY, 1988, p. 108. 
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calls the 'cesura, the pure word,, the counter-rhythmic rupture'. 67 H61derlin's 
interpretation differs subtly from Hegel's, in that the crux of the tragedy; its 
moment of balance, is not modelled on an equilibrium. The point of balance will 
not be in the middle because the weight of the rhythms is not distributed evenly 
throughout the play. H61derlin even provides a useful diagram to show where the 
cesura lies in Antigone (about one third of the way into the play). H61derlin's 
dialectic operates here on a moment of rupture rather than a smooth progression. 
H61derlin finds these moments of counter-rhythmic rupture in the speeches of 
Tieresias. Steiner suggests that there is indeed a categorical reversal of time and 
values here because 'there can be no more cataclysmic Umkehr and inversion of 
values than the exposure of the stinking dead on the earth's sunlit surface and the 
relegation of the living to the lightless underground death. ý68 
It is this reversal of time and values that can resonate again in an Irigarayan 
reading of H61derlin's Antigone. The opening word of H61derlin's Antigone is 
'Gemeinsamschwesterliches! ' which could be translated as 'shared sisterlyness'. 
This is a word ripe for feminist reappropriation, even according to H61derlin's 
own theory and practice of translation in which the translation should result in a 
temporal transformation which releases the energies of the original. It is 
especially appropriate for an Irigarayan, mimetic reworking as it already has 
connotations of genealogy. blood-relations and destiny. Her own reworkings of 
Antigone might be elaborations on the theme of a revolutionary and timely 
Gemeinsamschwesterliches in the here and now. Although H61clerlin treats 
67 1bid- p. 1021. 
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Antigone as a patriotic revolutionary text, it would be a relatively small step to 
reinterpret it as a feminist revolutionary text through attending to this 
Gemeinsamschwesterfiches. Indeed in her most recently published book, Entre 
Orient et Occident, Ifigaray finally brings Antigone and H61derlin together in a 
renunciation of the logic of humanist patriarchy. She suggests that, 
Antigone and Holderlin will be able to reject nostalgias of the still too 
simple, immediate and ego-logical kind, in order to attempt to build 
spiritual linics between their singularities 69 
Irigaray opens this book with a quote from Sophocles' Antigone, which in most 
English translations reads something like: 'Wonders are many on the earth, and 
the greatest of these is man 970 . However there is a different nuance in the French 
version in that the translation of the Greek 'deinos' is 'inquietantes', which has 
connotations more of disturbing and worrying than wondering7l. In fact, the 
French version is closer to the Greek which is more like 'fearful' or 'dreadful'. 
Irigaray plays on this disturbing and worrying, and what is most worrying for her 
about the present epoch is that man still presumes, just as he did in SoPhocles' 
text, that he could conquer and control everything under the heavens. Sophocles 
is acutely aware of the dangers of man's hubris. The chorus warns that the man 
who doesn't uphold 'his country's laws and the justice of heaven' will be 
68 Steiner, Antigones, p. 100. 
69 Irigaray, Entre Orient et Occident, Paris, Bernard Grasset, 1999, p. 3 1. 'Antigone et H61derlin 
pourront y renoncer ei des nostalgies encore trop simple, imm9diates et jgologiques, pour tenter 
de bdtir des liens spirituels entre leurs singularibis. ' 
70 Sophocles, Antigone, 332-333. 
71 Entre Orient ef Occident p . 
9. 
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spurned 72 . Irigaray seems to be sharing this sentiment about respecting the laws 
of the state and the justice of heaven. Although this appears to be a far cry from 
the earlier, almost anarchistic reading of Antigone, the emphasis would be on the 
justice of heaven or the cosmic laws. Indeed, this would fit with Hegel's reading 
of Antigone as intuitively interpreting the divine law of the family. 
Although, in Irigaray's earlier readings, Antigone generally represents either the 
imprisonment or exclusion of woman from a symbolic order or culture that is not 
her own, in her later work she has come to represent a more mediating figure. 
Antigone is also brought in to suggest that there can and should be a mutual and 
shared . respect 
between the two different cultures (male/masculine and 
female/feminine). In an essay calling for civil rights and responsibilities for the 
two sexes, frigaray portrays Antigone as an almost conservative character. She 
states that 'Antigone upholds the need to observe order', particularly with respect 
to 'the cosmic order' and respect for maternal genealogY73 . Antigone's respect for 
order here is important to Irigaray because it is one of the few places that the 
ancient link between the civil and the religious remains unbroken. Irigaray 
suggests that the need to respect both the laws of the state and the laws of heaven 
are manifested in the figure of Antigone. She takes Antigone to be undertaking a 
major historical intervention when she states that 'Antigone pits one order 
72 Sophocles, Antigone. 367-375. 
71 Irigaray, 'Civil Rights and Responsibilities for the Two Sexes', in Thinking the Difference, 
London, Athlone, 1994, p. 68. 
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against another at the time of the advent of male regal power. * 74 So Antigone also 
represents the passage between the matriarchal and the patriarchal. 
Irigaray suggests that in the pre-historic time of women's law, the civil and the 
religious were not strictly separated. So to say that Antigone respects the cosmic 
order is not necessarily to say that she also opposes the civil order. For the later 
Irigaray she opposes the rule 'of Creon and the patriarchal order that this 
represents. However, this again is not an opposition or contradiction based on the 
polemos. Antigone's respect for the cosmic order and its rhythms also keeps open 
the opportunity to have other civic orders (male/masculine and female/feminine) 
functioning in harmony within that cosmos. As the subtitle of Thinking Me 
Difference states, her revolution would be moving 'towards a peaceful 
revolution' 75 . The rhythm of this revolution would, of course, not be the warlike, 
violent rhythms of the Hegelian dialectic. In Derrida's reading of the passage in 
the Phenomenology that deals with the necessity of war to keep the cornmunity 
from fragmenting, he comments that 'Intermittence-jerking rhythm-is an 
essential rule. If there were only war, the community's natural being-there would 
be destroyed ý76 This jerky rhythm of war echoes the jerky rhythm that I-rigaray 
ascribes to those who fail to embrace the mucous. The nature of the temporalities 
suggested by the smoother rhythms of the mucous will be explored in the next 
chapter. 
74 Irigaray, Thinking the Difference, p. 68. 
'75 
The original French title Le Temps de la difte'rance is even more interesting because it also 
suggests the 'time' of this thinking of difference. 
Derrida, Glas, trans. John P. Leavey Jr. and Richard Rand. Universitv of Nebraska Press, 
Lincoln, 1986 p. 147. 
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Chapter 6. 
Not Dancing but Swimming? Space, Time and 
Movement in Nietzsche and Irigaray. 
In this chapter I would like to explore Irigaray's relationship to Nietzsche; her 
debts and differences, criticisms and complaints, in order to elucidate further 
aspects of the conception of time that might be at work in what I consider to be 
her revolutionary attempt to change our culture. This will be based on a reading 
of her text, Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche', as this his her most sustained 
engagement with his work. I will focus on three main topics: namely space, 
movement and time. I intend to show how Irigaray's use of space, movement and 
time are criticisms of Nietzsche's use of these terms at the same time as they can 
also be described as further developments of them. I will also try to develop 
Irigaray's criticisms further than she explicitly takes them in order to try and open 
up a more flexible and inclusive formulation of temporality. 
The title of Marine Lover ofFriedrich Nietzsche gives us a good clue to the kind 
of relationship that Irigaray would like to forge with Nietzsche. In this text the 
authorial voice positions itself through a loving relationship with Nietzsche, 
becoming Ariadne to his Dionysus or Echo to his Narcissus. But as we shall see, 
this loving relationship doesn't automatically lead to the most comprehensive or 
accurate account of Nietzsche's work. The author's passionate engagement 
sometimes produces an almost unrecognisable Nietzsche, and we need to bear in 
mind that this is not always a text that is 'faithful' to Nietzsche due to her method 
of engaging with him as a lover rather than as a scholar. 
'Trigaray, L. Marine Lover ofFriedrich NieLsche, trans. G. C. Gill, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1991. 
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Irigaray's method is not one of the rigorous philosopher, spotting the howlers, 
non sequitors, fallacious arguments or self-contradictions within Nietzsche's 
work. To take that kind of approach to Nietzsche's work would be most likely to 
end up completely misrepresenting him anyway. Instead she engages amorously 
with his work. This does not mean that she positions herself as simply adoring 
Nietzsche or that she turns him into an infallible philosophical hero. This is a 
much more Gallic affair, one in which the lovers are passionate in every aspect, 
in their agreements and disagreements, in their misunderstandings and jealousies, 
as well as in their desires. This is not an affair in which the participants try to 
conform to each others ideals, (to become the same brings boredom and kills 
love), instead the differences are maintained thus keeping the interest alive and 
frustrated. Irigaray's affair with Nietzsche is a love of different bodies, different 
times, different voices, different lives, and different spaces. 
Different Spaces: The Mountains and the Sea 
Again the title is useful in informing us of the kind of space within which 
Irigaray would positioning herself The author is the Marine Lover: a sea creature 
more at home in the deep, dark depths of the ocean than on dry land. The first 
part of the book is given the title of 'Speaking of Immemorial Waters' and is a 
meditation on this imagined female/feminine (fiminin) aquatic space. In this 
section Irigaray contrasts her own imaginary of the sea and its enveloping fluidity 
and darkness against Nietzsche"s imagery of mountains and light and air in his 
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Thus Spoke Zarathustra. ' 
Nietzsche uses Zarathustra to announce the doctrine of the Ubermensch who 
ýshall be the meaning of the earth! ', and Zarathustra also entreats his audience to 
(remain true to the earth, and do not believe those who speak to you of 
superterrestrial hopes! ý3 These professions of fidelity to the earth are 
characteristic of Nietzsche's rejection of all that he called nihilism. Nihilism, for 
Nietzsche, would include any explanation of meaning that bases its truth outside 
this temporal world. He considers Platonism and Christianity as two particular 
forms of nihilism, because both place an absolute truth in a realm outside this 
world. By so doing, they deny value to this joyful and painful existence that we 
experience between birth and death. 
Through the two dominant themes of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the annunciation 
of the Ubermensch and the vision of the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche could be 
described as bringing philosophy and metaphysics firmly down to earth. The 
Ubermensch doesn't represent a superterrestrial hope because it is a hope that 
belongs to the earth. Indeed, the Ubermensch would be more at home on the 
earth than the humans who, according to Nietzsche, still hanker after 'that 'other 
4 
world". that inhuman, dehumanised world which is a heavenly Nothing' . 
The 'overcoming' that Nietzsche desires will not be a supernatural, or even 
I -Nietzsche, F. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsworth, , 
Penguin, 1969. 
I -1 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 42. 
' Ibid., p. 59. 
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extraterrestrial transcendence, it will be a movement that takes place within the 
boundaries of the earth. Indeed these boundaries will no longer be the familiar 
space-time boundaries of a Kantian world. What's more, it will rejoice at what 
might be seen as having to take place within such a limited field. Although 
subject to more than one interpretation (as we will later see), the doctrine of the 
eternal recurrence can be read as a kind of existential test of the ability to do 
without any hope of 'a heavenly Nothing'. If we can affirm life, as it is, without 
the safety net of metaphysical stories, then we also are affmning our worldly 
existence as the only existence available to us. ' The thought of the etemal 
recurrence is a worldly (irdisch) 6 response to the Christian suggestion that we are 
only passing through this world on our way to a better one in which there is no 
suffering. This attempt to sideline worldly pain and suffering is seen by 
Nietzsche as the most dishonest of gestures which weakens humanity. He would 
prefer a greater honesty, one that can speak the truth that this is all that there is 
and there is nothing better or more comfortable to look forward to'. Life is not 
something to be endured so as to gain a just reward, life is to be affirmed. 
However, this greater honesty requires greater strength because life is easier to 
endure if we are to be rewarded with paradise. It is the Obermensch who would 
have the strength to affirm the meaning of the earth through his actions and 
through a transformed relation to space and time. 
50ther readings suggest that this is another form of metaphysics itself, as for example by 
Heidegger in his study of Nietzsche. Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 4 vols, trans. Davis Krell, New 
York, Harper & Row, 1979.1 shall return to these interpretations in the 'Different Times' section 
of this chapter. 
6, Worldly' is working here to evoke both the Christianity that Nietzsche is rejecting as well as the 
'earthly' resonances of the Gennan 'irdisch'. 
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But even though one can interpret Nietzsche as a thinker of the irdisch, Irigaray 
still sees him as privileging one of its regions over the other spaces. In the first 
section of Marine Lover she is engaging with Thus Spoke Zarathustra and one of 
her concerns here is to draw attention to the physical geography within which 
Nietzsche places Zarathustra. Zarathustra is most at home on top of his mountain. 
This is where he does his thinking and meditating and it is also where his most 
faithful companions are, his Eagle and his Serpent. Although Zarathustra goes 
down from his mountain to disseminate his wisdom, and his journeys take him 
up and down the mountain, Irigaray maintains that Nietzsche still privileges 
height. Zarathustra is never comfortable down among the people where he tries to 
make himself heard in the marketplace. 
However the space that Irigaray describes for Nietzsche/Zarathustra is one that is 
still caught within many of the metaphysical delusions from which he has tried to 
extract himself According to Irigaray's reading Zarathustra's 'descending' 
(Untergehen) and 'ascending' (Aufgehen) place him firmly within a tradition of 
vertical, hierarchical thought, especially since the German terms 'Untergehen' 
and 'Aufgehen' have the connotations of perishing and dying and reviving or 
being reborn. Although Nietzsche reverses the polarities so that the text equates 
self overcoming with a deepening of time, it is still height and depth that is 
privileged. The problem with this verticality is that it is still reminiscent of the 
kind of transcendence that Nietzsche wants to overcome. 
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While these movements are taken by Irigaray to be vertical, Nietzsche most often 
juxtaposes going down (Untergehen) with going over (Obergehen), which is 
more of a horizontal movement. Nietzsche is usually thought of as being more 
concerned with Ubergehen than Aufgehen. His 'overcomings' then, are 
movements across. This is not to deny Zarathustra's *actual' movements up and 
down the mountains or his love of the high and airy places. This is an aspect of 
Irigaray's deliberate mis-reading of Nietzsche - reading Nietzsche against the 
grain - in that she concentrates on the direction of the relationship between 
mountain and earth, which is a vertical one. For her, Nietzsche's metaphors of 
ascending and descending still privilege height. To go up is to be over and above, 
superior. More than this, Zarathustra's peregrinations to the top of the mountains 
also bring him closer to the sun. 
It is ironic then if we remember that the first words of Plato's Republic are 'I 
went down'. 7 Plato's text also plays with the notion of first having to descend to 
the world of ignorance before the philosopher can properly ascend to the heights 
of true knowledge. This metaphor of Socrates' descent is fully cashed out in the 
myth of the cave as aj oumey into the inferior world of appearances in order to 
7, I went down yesterday to the Piraeus with Glaucon, son of Ariston. I wanted to say a prayer to 
the goddess and also to see what they would make of the festival, as this was the first time they 
were holding it. ' Plato, Republic 1,1,327. What is also interesting about this 'going down' is that 
the scene describes Plato going to a festival of the goddess. This has also been interpreted as 
another attempt to displace the worship of the goddess in Greek culture. See Christine Battersby 
'Her Blood and His Mirror: Mary Coleridge, Luce Irigaray and the Female Self in Beyond 
Representation: Philosopki, and the Poetic Imagination, ed. Richard Eldridge, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University press, 1996. 
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8 teach men how to philosophise and follow the truth back up to the sun. What is 
ironic then is that Nietzsche's Zarathustra appears to be re-enacting this whole 
scene of what he would describe as the birth of nihilism. The first section of 
Nietzsche's text tells us about the beginning of Zarathustra's own descent 
(Untergehen) in order to share his wisdom with the people. Just as in the allegory 
of the cave in the Republic, where the sun represents absolute knowledge or the 
good, Zarathustra also looks to the sun as a source of wisdom. His own first 
words are addressed to the sun and it is the highest point of the sun - noon - that 
he reappropriates as his own most potent and significant moment: 'Great star! 
What would your happiness be, if you had not those for whom you shine! '9 
Irigaray sees Zarathustra as yet another manifestation of a long tradition of 
heliocentrism in Western thought which tends to equate the sun and its light with 
all that is good and true. The movement that is associated with this heliocentrism 
is also the vertical one where to 'go up' towards the sun is to approach the g(o)od 
or the true. whereas to descend away from it - to tunnel underground or dive into 
and under the ocean - is to move towards the shadowy, illusory evils of darkness. 
Irigaray's most sustained critique of this metaphysics of 'going up' towards the 
sun/truth/g(o)od is to be found in Speculum where she offers an extended 
analysis of Plato's myth of the cave. Marine Lover positions Nietzsche's anti- 
Platonism as still implicitly caught within the logic of verticality. " 
' See Plato's Republic, part VII, section 7. 
9 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 39. 
10 Although it appears to be the verticality of the thought that is Irigaray's main concern here, her 
own work maintains a place for vertical relationships such as female genealogies. For her views 
on this see Saxes and Genealogies. New York, Columbia, 1993. This maintenance of vertical 
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The portrayal of Nietzsche that Irigaray presents to us is one in which he does not 
seem to realise the existence of subterranean or submarine space. The only space 
he seems to recognise is from the ground up. And here we see another wilful 
misrepresentation of Nietzsche creeping in. For even though Nietzsche 
problematises and disturbs our notions of surface and depth and could even be 
argued to reinvigorate the heretofore degraded notion of surface, it is his 
projection of woman as surface that Irigaray turns back on him as a blind spot in 
his thinking. Irigaray responds to Nietzsche's maxim that 'Women are considered 
deep - why? because one can never discover any bottom to them. Women are not 
even shallow. "' She suggests that Nietzsche has failed to familiarise himself 
with a different kind of space. Despite the 'up' and 'down' movements, 
Nietzsche remains nonetheless fixed in a vertical axis that privileges the 
mountainous and airy heights. She uses the metaphor of the sea to articulate this 
women's space, and is able to make its 'host of sparkling surfaces' 'equally deep 
and superficial' 12 . Nietzsche can only appreciate the reflective surface of 
woman/the sea, because his 
loftiest gaze does not penetrate thus far into her depths and is still unable 
to unfold all the membranes she offers to bathe his contemplations. 13 
relationships and practices of thought alongside, or perpendicular to, the horizontal is also an 
aspect of her own work which can prove problematic. For example when it is linked to the 
practice of affidamento by some Italian feminist groups. See Christine Battersby, The 
Phenomenal Woman, Oxford, Polity, 1998 p. 119 for a criticism of this practice. 
'' Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, , trans, R. J. Hollingdale, Harmondsorth, Penguin, 1968, p. 25. 
12 Marine Loi, er, p. 46. 
13, Ibid.. p. 47. 
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In the section of Marine Lover entitled 'Veiled Lips' (Levres voilees) Irigaray 
discusses what I shall call the logic of castration". This is a way of describing 
Irigaray's assessment of the either/or logic of the philosophical tradition. It is 
based on a psychoanalytic reading of this tradition which translates this logic into 
tenns of either having the phallus or being without it. In a discussion of truth she 
appears to be accusing Nietzsche of still succumbing to this binary logic of 
either/or. Either something is true, or it is false, appearance. A more sophisticated 
reading of Nietzsche would show how he undermined the divide between 
appearance and reality in many places in order to produce a more adequate 
representation of lived and experienced existence. 15 However, Irigaray is 
suggesting that his proto-deconstructions still exclude woman from the realm of 
truth. 
Irigaray engages directly with one such occasion; section 232 of Beyond Good 
and Evil. " Here the either/or logic of truth and lies are given by Nietzsche in 
ten-ns of gender: 
From the very first nothing has been more alien, repugnant, inimical to 
woman than truth - her great art is the lie, her supreme concern is 
14, owe this formulation largely to Kelly Oliver who discuses it in her Womanizing Nietzsche, 
London, Routledge, 1995. Although she uses this phrase to frame a discussion on 'Derrida versus 
Lacan on Having and Not Having. ' p. 74-82. She also refers to it as a 'game' as well as an 
'economy' of castration. 
15 In particular see 'How the "Real World" at last Became a Myth", in Nietzsche, Twilight of the 
1dols, p. 40-4 1. Which ends with 'We have abolished the real world: what world is left" The 
apparent world perhaps?... But no! with the real world we have also abolished the apparent 
world! '. 
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appearance and beauty. 17 
Although Irigaray is not trying to represent Nietzsche as adhering to a simple 
binary logic of truth and falsity, she argues that he fails in his attempt to 
appropriate femininity to undermine such a logic. By continuing to associate 
woman with the lie and untruth, Nietzsche uses the logic of castration - the logic 
of the either/or and the excluded middle - even as he undermines the 
'truth'/'appearance' divide. Even if we read this positioning of woman with 
appearance as a cryptic elaboration of a theory whereby appearance and reality 
become proper to one another, Irigaray's reading suggests that this sidelining of 
woman is another aspect of the exclusion of woman which at the same time turns 
woman into a forgotten and invisible ground. In this case 'woman' is functioning 
as a ground for truth. Even though woman, is on occasion, sidelined to merely 
play with appearance, Irigaray suggests that this 'castration' is tantamount to 
making woman the condition for the possibility of truth and representation. By 
making appearance womans primary concern and function, Nietzsche is again 
relegating her to surface, without depth (or shallowness). 
What is intriguing about Irigaray's reading of Nietzsche is that she is obviously 
aware of the subtlety of his own linking of truth and woman and the critique of 
traditional philosophical reason produced by this. On the other hand, what is 
most frustrating in her reading, is her insistence on apparently reading Nietzsche 
as continuing to pursue the methods and stances that he has explicitly criticised. 
It would be easy to reject her interpretation as simply repeating Nietzsche's 
16Friedrich Nietzsche, Bevond Good and Evil, trans R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin 1990. 
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moves without acknowledging her debt to him. However in order to understand 
Irigaray's reading of Nietzsche we need to ask why she chooses to interpret him 
in this way. To simply counteract her idiosyncratic interpretations with more 
sophisticated analysis that would draw attention to Nietzsche's abhorrence of 
binary logics and objectivist thinking would be to miss the subtlety of Irigaray's 
engagement. 18 e need to bear in mind that this is not a 'faithful' reading of 
Nietzsche, and that part of Irigaray's method is to indulge in a 'disruptive excess' 
which is unfamiliar to us because it not the more recognisable rhetorical strategy 
of polemic. 19 Irigaray knows that Nietzsche has complicated this 'logic of 
castration' to such an extent that philosophy can never revert to it without 
engaging with his critique. She is also acutely aware of Nietzsche's conscious 
destabilisation of the gendered aspects of philosophical thinking and writing. 
Perhaps this is why she is in love with him? She makes use of Nietzsche's 
insights to produce a critique of patriarchal culture, but, at the same time she 
doesn't allow the subtlety of Nietzsche's thinking to deflect attention from his 
own implication in that cultural hegemony. 
It may seem ironic that, in The Gay Science, Nietzsche produced his own 
criticisms of thinking that remains caught in the verticality of height and depth 
17 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, p. 232. 
" For more sympathetic readings of Nietzsche that would counteract some of the more obvious 
'excesses' of Irigaray's readings see Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, New York, 
Columbia, 1988; Alexander Nehemas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 1985; Richard Rorty. Contingency, Irony, Solidarity, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989; Alan D. Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question ofInterpretation, London, 
Routledge, 1990. 
19 This Sex, p. 78. 
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precisely through the suggestion that 
Perhaps truth is a woman who has reasons for not letting us see her 
reasons? Perhaps her name is-to speak Greek-Baubo? 
- -What is required for that is to stop courageously at the surface, the fold, 
the skin, to adore appearance ... 
20 
While we might expect Irigaray to treat such insights positively she refuses to 
endorse interpretations of Nietzsche as proto-ferninist. For Irigaray, there is still a 
world of difference between writing like a woman and writing as a woman. 
Irigaray loves Nietzsche enough to grant his wish to have no 'believers', or to 'be 
pronounced holy'. 21 She is not a fawning disciple, but a lover who is 
disappointed by the continued insistence of her lover on maintaining his 
autonomy from her. Irigaray avoids the charge of plagiarising Nietzsche by 
22 
treating him with the disrespect that he requested . By mimicking 
his methods 
and criticisms she is able to show where he has failed to produce the kind of 
mutual reciprocity that she would desire. 
The problem for Irigaray is that although Nietzsche's positioning of woman as 
both truth, and anathema to truth, makes her a ground for truth and 
representation, she is still placed outside by the logic that dictates the inside and 
20 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann, New York, Vintage 1974, p. 38. Baubo 
is an ancient Greek mythical figure who, as a personification of the female genitals, is usually 
represented in the act of boldly exposing herself. See Sarah Koftnan, 'Baub6: Theological 
Perversion and Fetishism', in lVietzsche's New Seas, eds. Michael Allen Gillespie and Tracy B. 
Strong, London, Chicago University Press, 1988, for a reading of Nietzsche's treatment of 'truth 
as woman'. Kofman sees a kind of perversion at work in Nietzsche's text - one that is related to 
his 'indecent glance'. (p. 191 -) 
21 Nietzsche, Ecce Homo, p. 326. 
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the outside, the valorised and the invalid, the potent and the castrated. 'Because 
she is castrated, she is the threat of castration 923 . Woman is both castrated and the 
threat of castration because this logic of castration knows only two possibilities 
in relation to the phallus. There is either a phallus or there is nothing. This rules 
out the possibility of there being something else altogether - something female. 
The logic of castration is another example of the inability to recognise any 'other' 
that is not an 'other of the same'. 
Irigaray again uses female morphology to try and produce a different account of 
truth. Instead of an either phallus/or nothing system where there is one single 
truth, the two female lips direct us towards a kind of thinking that can work with 
more than single units. She suggests that here we have an example of two lips 
that are not two units and at the same time they are both one, and more than one. 
They defy the law of the excluded middle: 
She does not set herself up as one, as a (single) female unit. She is not 
closed up or around one single truth or essence. The essence of truth 
remains foreign to her. She neither has nor is a being. And she does not 
oppose a feminine truth to the masculine truth. Because this would once 
again amount to playing the-man's-game of castration. 24 
The logic of castration can also be traced through the question of nihilism to the 
death of the subject. We could even read into Irigaray's discussion a timely 
22 .I do not want to be a holy man; sooner even a buffoon. ' Ecce Homo, p. 326. 
2.11 Marine Lover, p. 83. 
24 Ibid., p. 86. 
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analysis of deconstruction as an attempt to bridge this abyss through negotiation 
of various binary opposites. Indeed one version of the death of the subject arises 
through a deconstruction of the binary pairing of subject/object. The unviolated 
lips would give us an example of how this pairing pre-empts a deconstructive 
synthesis or abolishment. The two lips are both subject and object, they deny the 
kind of predication that would demand that they be only one or the other at any 
particular time. In a direct comparison with discourse Irigaray states that the 
identity of the sub ect can no longer be established through its relation to the j 
object, and none of these functions is more important than the other. 25 This is not 
the death of the subject, but the start of a different understanding of the subject 
which is not understood as somehow cut off from the object. The sub ect only i 
dies when it (he) tries to violently refuse and violate an understanding of the 
female that can't be quantified and calculated on his terms: 
Glimpsing that she may sub-tend the logic of predication without its 
functioning having anything properly to do with her, leads to the fear that 
she may intervene and upset everything: the death of the subject would be 
nothing less. 
26 
Nothing less than the fear of castration in that the violation takes place in 
reaction to the suspicion that by her very existence, woman has the power to 
destroy his predicated erections. 
Irigaray's characterisation of Nietzsche as adhering to a single, unitary truth, 
seems to ignore his perspectivism, in which there are multiple, perspectival 
25 Ibid., p. 91. 
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truths. If Irigaray's theory could be described as a pluralisation of truth that 
doesn't set up a single feminine truth against a single masculine truth, then we 
might describe it as an eminently Nietzschean manoeuvre. If it is merely a poetic 
way of stating that the binary logic of traditional philosophy can be 
deconstructed, then Irigaray would not have anything to add to either Heidegger 
or Derrida. However, it is much more than this in that it profoundly contributes 
to an analysis of Nietzsche's existential and deconstructive epigones. " 
Ellen Mortensen claims that Irigaray is blind to the question of nihilism. " 
However, I would point out that she engages directly with this problem in her 
lengthy discussion of the logic of castration. Rather than being blind to it, she 
illuminates it more clearly as another aspect of thinking that Nietzsche and his 
followers have failed to transvaluate successfully. The 'nothing' of nihilism 
which presents philosophy with its meaningless abyss can also be read as another 
blind spot of the logic of castration. Irigaray describes the 'nothing' as arising 
from the violent attempt to possess and control this enigmatic sex which is 'more 
than one', and yet is still unquantifiable. She gives a disturbing account of this 
26 Ibid., p. 91. 
27 Indeed it would need to be noted that Marine Lover (Amante marine 1980) is not only an 
engagement with Nietzsche it is also a direct engagement with Derrida's 'feminine' reading of 
Nietzsche in Spurs. (Eperons: Les Styles de Nietzsche, Paris, Flamarion, 1978). For discussions of 
Irigaray's engagement with Spurs see K. Oliver (op. cit. pp. 83 -9 1) and Tina Chanter Ethics of 
Eros; Irigaray's Rewriting of the Philosophers, London, Routledge, 1995, pp. 164-165,239-239. 
28 Mortensen makes this claim in her paper 'Irigaray and Nietzsche: Echo and Narcissus 
revisited? ' in the Fate of the New Nietzsche. eds. K. Ansell-Pearson and H. Caygill, Aldershot, 
Avebury, 1993. 
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process in terms of raping, robing and robbing (violer, voiler, voler) 29 . The two 
lips which confound the logic of castration are violated in an attempt to master 
them, but this violation only separates them and man/Nietzsche 
doesn't know how to bring these/her edges back together again. How is 
the gap thus created to be overcome... Because of him bringing his own 
30 
project to bear, the abyss anses. 
On this reading, then, nihilism arises as a direct result of the violent masculine 
attempt at mastery. Through the imposition of one mode of thinking on another 
in order to try and quantify it, and force it to become amenable to an alien logic, 
an abyss arises. 
At the same time, the only way that a masculine logic of castration can attempt to 
overcome this abyss must also be through an attempt at mastery. Nietzsche's 
thought of the eternal recurrence is described in terms of this mastery. It is an 
attempt to overcome or master the threat of the abyss which only refers back to 
the violator. Nietzsche's 'Thus I willed it (so will ich es)' is his way to deny 
nihilism through the affirmation of the eternal recurrence. But in willing 'it' this 
'I' will also will everything and everyone. Irigaray asks 'The eternal recurrence 
, 31 what is that but the will to recapitulate all projects within yourself9 . In so 
'9 Marine Lover, pp. 103 -110. The French words are also related to the spaces and movement I 
invoke in this chapter. The veil (voile) which is used to cover women can also be the sail of a 
boat. This refers both to the marine motif as well as Derrida's use of the sails in Spurs. The 
robbing (voler) can also be flight, which again brings to mind Nietzsche's attempts at overcoming 
through flight. If flying is what is connected with this robbing, then it is definitely an improper 
movement for woman. 
30 Ibid., p. 105. 
Ibid., p. 69. 
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doing she is drawing attention to Nietzsche own attempts at mastery. 
The problem, for Irigaray, is not that there can be no 'other' at all in Nietzsche's 
putative metaphysics, but that any 'other' will once again, for Irigaray, be the 
'other of the same'. As far as she is eoncemed, any "other', for Nietzsche, will be 
an 'other' that will be generated by and captured within the closed circle of the 
eternal recurrence of another male hom(m)osexual subject. The emergence of a 
real feminine/female other of the other would threaten the mastery that has 
hitherto been the focus of all the investment - on which everything has been 
gambled. The investment is in maintaining 'woman' as the other of the same; and 
Interpreted in this way, she stakes him in a new game without his needing 
to borrow from the kitty (1a cave). And therefore go into debt, risk losing. 
Mastery (La maitrise). Which the other (of the same) threatens him 
with. 
32 
Most commentators tell us that Nietzsche was at least attempting to overcome 
metaphysics, even if they disagree on how successful this overcoming turned out 
to be. 33 What I am suggesting is that this attempt to overcome is already an 
attempt to master - to be bigger, better and harder than metaphysics. But Irigaray 
interprets the whole Western tradition of metaphysics as a tradition of mastery. 
The way to go beyond metaphysics, for her, is not to repeat the same triumphant 
or arrogant gestures of the 'great' philosophers in showing how wrong they were. 
3 32 Ibid., p. 79. 
.. Heidegger is probably the most famous commentator to point out Nietzsche's failure to 
overcome metaphysics. 
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Rather she shows us various aspects of what they have forgotten. Perhaps it is not 
even a question of going beyond metaphysics at all, but of doing a metaphysics 
that is no longer an attempt at mastery. It must also be pointed out that this does 
not imply that it must be a metaphysics of subservience. For Irigaray it would be 
a metaphysics of inclusion and loving exchange. She is neither Nietzsche's 
master or slave, she is his lover. 
In turning Nietzsche back on himself Irigaray is again playing with the idea of 
woman as (reflective) surface at the same time as undoing it. She is also undoing 
the whole specular logic of light and reflection when she uses metaphors of 
sound instead of light. Again declaring her love for Nietzsche, she positions 
herself as Echo - the mythical figure who repeats whatever has been said to her 
and is thus unable to declare her love for Narcissus who is unable to tear himself 
away from his own reflection. " Irigaray considers Nietzsche to be trapped within 
his own metaphysical narcissism. She suggests that this leaves him so self- 
obsessed that even, what he considers to be, his relationships with others are only 
mere reflections. This NarcissusNietzsche is so caught up with his own image 
that he cannot even turn his head to see Echo. The only words he can hear from 
her are also only his own returned to him. Irigaray disturbs the surface of the pool 
that Narcissus/Nietzsche gazes into. She disrupts the whole economy and 
working of the light that supplies the self-same reflection and in so doing she 
allows us to see what lives below the surface. 
,41 am borrowing this insight from Ellen Mortensen's contribution to The Fate of the New 
Nietzsche, Arigaray and Nietzsche: Echo and Narcissus revisitedT eds. K. Ansell-Pearson and 
H. Caygill, Aldershot, Avebury, 1993. 
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Zarathustra's contemplations are staged as prayers to the sun and the sky. His is a 
world of light and air, and the only depth he recognises is that from the top of a 
mountain. As a life affirming philosophy these would seem to be appropriate 
elements to inhabit. The sun is the source of all energy and so has always lent 
itself to worship and adoration. Contrast this then with Irigaray's marine world of 
darkness and the sea. Instead of the life giving energy of sunlight, we are offered 
the dark, unbreathable element of water. This would seem to be a curious choice 
for living space. But there is plenty of life in the ocean. It is the place where life 
(as we know it) emerged. So in some sense we were all born from the sea. In 
another text 'Divine Women', Irigaray reads woman's 'fishy' associations 
through various mermaid myths. In this text she traces a movement from fish to 
bird; from the element of water to the element of air. However although this 
movement ean be attributed to both genders she also points out that: 
The constellation we call Pisces is composed of two fishes: one goes 
upwards to the heavens, the other goes down to the earth, the sea. From 
the reading of these myths that concern us here, it would seem that the 
fish going upward is exclusively a male, the fish going down, a female. 35 
The upward movement is another movement towards transcendence, and even 
divinity. Irigaray is, to a certain extent, advocating this move, for woman, in this 
text. However the air that these becoming-birds must enter will need to be open 
to the specificity of their movements. 'Once we were fishes. It seems that we are 
destined to become birds. None of this is possible unless the air opens up freely 
35 Sexes and Genealogies, p. 60. 
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to our movements. 36 The possible temporalities of this free movement will be 
explored below. 
In Marine Lover Irigaray asks Nietzsche/Zarathustra 
Perched on any mountain peak, hen-nit, tightrope walker or bird, you 
never dwell in the great depths. And as companion you never choose a 
sea creature. Camel, snake, lion, eagle, and doves, monkey and ass, and. . 
. Yes. But no to anything that moves in the water. Why this persistent 
wish for legs, or wings? And never gilIS? 37 
The sea is seen as hostile because of its lack of air and light. But for Irigaray the 
metaphor for a different kind of thinking that will allow for the thought of sexual 
difference is that it is a different kind of breathing. Breathing in the sea is not 
impossible it just a matter of having gills. The sea is often thought of as a hostile, 
alien, environment, as almost belonging to another world. But the sea covers 
more of the world than dry land and it has as many and varied forms of life. 
Irigaray draws an analogy between the sea and woman. Both have been treated as 
alien and yet both could also be described as life giving and life supporting. 38 
The new kind of thinking that she is calling for is one that is not afraid to 
descend, to dive deep into the ocean instead of climbing mountains. It is also one 
that can imagine life in this darkness - life that doesn't look to the sun for its 
source of energy. What becomes apparent when we try to think this is that our 
Ibid., p. 66. 
37 Marine Lover, p. 13. 
38 The life generating and supporting aspects of Irigaray's metaphor of water also refers to the 
amniotic fluid in which we have all lived and swum. 
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way of thinking is so steeped in its heliocentric sun worship that it is almost an 
impossible thought. But there are sea creatures which do not depend on the sun at 
all. In some of the deepest and darkest places in the ocean, clustered around vents 
that release heat from the earth's interior, there are creatures who derive their 
energy from this energy souree alone". In other words they are totally dependent 
on the earth. Some of these fish also manage to produce their own light, emitted 
from bodily lantems. 
Although the discipline of biology can accept the existence of life that doesn't 
depend on solar energy, Irigaray still seems to have difficulty being heard or 
understood when she suggests that woman and women may be able to exist 
without the Nietzschean and Platonic sun, or that there is a different space of 
thought that doesn't need to be preached from mountain tops -a thought that 
doesn't look to the sky for its inspiration but to the earth itself Irigaray as a 
marine lover is much more of a thinker and lover of the (watery) earth than 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra, despite all his claims. We must be careful here not to 
attribute a new kind of binarism to Irigaray. She is not setting up a strict 
opposition between sea and sun, water and air. The earth is largely water just as 
the comon usage of 'man' and 'men' includes women. Irigaray is suggesting that 
the kind of sun and height at work in both Plato and Nietzsche allows no space or 
1 19 Stephen Jay Gould describes this as upsetting biological laws. He remarks; 'An old saw of 
biological pedagogy (I well remember the phrase emblazoned on the chapter heading of my junior 
high school textbook) proclaims, "All energy for biological processes comes ultimately from the 
sun. " ... 
The vent faunas provide the first exception to this venerable rule, for their ultimate 
source of energy comes from the heat of the earth's interior', in Life'S Grandeur, London, 
Vintage, 1997, p. 185. 
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time appropriate to woman. What is required is a thinking that can cope with the 
specificities of a watery earth that is populated by women as well as men. 
It must also be noted that Irigaray is sometimes overly selective in her implied 
references to Nietzsche and as such, she fails to show that he did sometimes have 
an awareness of a marine and submarine perspective. At the beginning of 
Zarathustra's journey he alludes to the sea quite often. Zarathustra is even 
challenged by the hennit as having 'lived in solitude as in the sea, and the sea 
bore you. Alas, do you want to go ashore? 40 Later Zarathustra sails on the sea to 
the Blissful Islands, so he is not altogether unfamiliar with that element. 41 
Nietzsche even goes so far as to position Zarathustra as a fish at one point: a fish 
that is still unable to go deep enough to fathom life (who is represented as 
' changeable and untamed and in everything a woman'). He even hints that 
Zarathustra finds life unfathomable because men 'always endow us [women]with 
your own virtues-). 42 In other words that the only reason this woman (Life) is 
unfathomable is because he is unable or unwilling to use anything other than his 
own logic or criteria. In this respect Irigaray could be said to owe more to her 
lover than she is prepared to admit. 
40 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 40. 
" Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 176. Indeed, Irigaray's reading is at odds with many commentators 
who emphasise Nietzsche's own fascination with the sea. In particular see Karsten Harries, 
'Nietzsche and the Sea', in Nietzsche's New Seas, eds. Gillespie and Strong, pp. 21-44. This 
paper positions Nietzsche as a seafaring explorer. What is also interesting is that Harfies also 
counters Irigaray's claims about Nietzsche's treatment of woman and 'superficiality', suggesting 
that his texts are both a celebration as well as an impatience with superficiality. 
42 Nietzsche. Zarathustra, p. 13 1. 
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Different Movements: The Dancer and The Swimmer 
We will come closer to the nature of the radical difference in Irigaray's thinking 
if we take a closer look at the movements Nietzsche and Irigaray act out in these 
different spaces. Nietzsche and Zarathustra both live their lives on the dry and 
airy land while Irigaray and her sea creature are more at home living in the water. 
Water is an important element for Ifigaray as it is another way to exaggerate the 
fluidity that she ascribes to woman. Fluidity is a commonly recurring motif in her 
work and it acts as another sign of difference that is not just oppositional to the 
dominant masculinist models of thought. Fluidity is given as an alternative to the 
traditional hardness and rigidity of the philosophical tradition, as she presents it. 
But it is also a positive and productive device in that it allows new ways for 
thought to move. 
It is in the movement of their thought that we can find more resonant and 
productive differences between Irigaray and Nietzsche. Because they inhabit 
different spaces Nietzsche and Irigaray need to find different methods of 
expressive locomotion. I am suggesting that one of the aspects of Nietzsche that 
Irigaray is in love with is the fact that his thought does not fit comfortably in the 
hard and rigid mould of most masculinist thought. His is also a fluid thinking in 
that it privileges becoming over being and therefore at least has the advantage of 
some sort of movement and dynamism. 
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What is also interesting is that Nietzsche aligns woman with change and 
becoming in the same section that he positions Zarathustra as a fish that fails to 
fathom the woman called 'Life 943 . But for Irigaray Nietzsche/Zarathustra's 
woman is still unfathomable to him because he is not comfortable in the water: 
he is not at home in the water. If he is a fish, he is very much a fish out of water. 
We could sum this up by saying that Zarathustra is not a swimmer, but a dancer. 
Nietzsche gives movement to Zarathustra in the form of dance. This is one of the 
seductive beauties of Nietzsche's thought and writing. It is the thought of music 
and movement, and Thus Spoke Zarathustra is his most musical text. Zarathustra 
sings and dances all the way through this text. However, Irigaray goes beyond 
Nietzsche in becoming a swimmer rather than a dancer. Zarathustra's dancing is 
a valiant effort to mobilise thought, but according to Irigaray it is once again 
caught within the confines of a reactive project. The problem, for her, is that 
Zarathustra's dancing is an attempt to fly. Yet again it is an attempt to gain 
altitude in order to look down from the heights, perhaps not with a god-like 
perspective, but with one that is certainly more god-like than most earth bound 
humans. 'He who wants to learn to fly one day must learn to stand and to walk 
and to run and to climb and to dance. '44 For Nietzsche, dancing is not only 
favoured because it is the body in its closest communication, appreciation and 
participation with music, but also because it is the nearest that a human can come 
to defying gravity. One thing that Zarathustra is insistent upon is that the spirit of 
gravity should be most vehemently denied. Irigaray interprets this denial as a 
reactive movement in Nietzsche's thinking because it is another attempt to move 
43 Ibid., p. 13 1. 
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away from the earth" 
In as much as Zarathustra's dancing is an attempt to soar over the ground, any 
overcoming resulting from this would still be a kind of transcendent overcoming. 
One that would not be rooted in the earth. Swimming however, is a movement 
through the element or ground of water. It suggests a more immanent relationship 
and a fluid becoming. If this is to be truly ichthyic swimming then it will involve 
the use of gills which further integrates the body of the swimmer with the fluid 
surrounding her. While the fish passes through the water the water also passes 
through her. 
The thought of the eternal recurrence can also be read as a test of Nietzsche's 
anti-gravitational powers of flight. He first introduced this notion in the Gay 
Science under the heading of 'The Greatest Weight': 
This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once 
more and innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, 
but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything 
unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you ... 
46 
This is the thought that is posited as the greatest weight. The test is to overcome 
this crushing weight through its affirmation. The thought of the eternal 
recurrence is the 'hardest' thought - the most manfully potent test. It is another 
44 Ibid., p. 213. 
45 See Gilles Deleuze's Nietzsche and Philosophy. New York, Columbia University Press, 1988 
for an extended discussion of the active and reactive in relation to the will to power in Nietzsche's 
work. 
46 Nietzsche, Gay Science, § 34 1. 
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trial of strength and pain that will prove the manhood of Nietzsche/Zarathustra.. 
This is also an explicitly high and airy thought. When Nietzsche describes its 
genesis as he was out walking in the mountains he recalls that 'it was jotted down 
on a piece of paper with the inscription: "6,000 feet beyond man and time""' 
However, the significance of these different movements through space is not just 
related to the space that they are movements through. What seems even more 
fundamental is what kind of measurement they might have, how could we 
describe them? If we are concerned with more than just the distance moved in 
space we cannot avoid making reference to time, whether this in terms of speeds, 
slownesses or acceleration. 
Although Irigaray draws attention to the ongoing obsession with mastery in 
Nietzsche's texts, she also finds problems in the temporality implicated in the 
notion of eternal recurrence. Her main concern is that the eternal recurrence is 
another method for the production of sameness. And if we are to read the eternal 
recurrence as a trial of strength as well, then it would be an even more 
consciously, self-centred production of sameness than usual. This self- 
centredness is another aspect of the voluntarism that can be found in Nietzsche 
and his 'I willed it thus'. It is ftirther proof of Nietzsche's narcissism in that the 
mastery required is mastery by a solitary individual. However, this objection 
depends on where Nietzsche can be found in this ring of recurrence. Does he 
position himself at its centre. or at a single point on its periphery? Either way this 
is still. according to Irigaray, very much a closed circle from which there is no 
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escape. 
48 
It is escape from this circular trap that Irigaray is seeking, but her movement is 
not just a reaction or ressentimental response to its limiting confines . 
49 Her 
escape from the vicious circle is also a productive move; to try and investigate 
different and differing temporalities which would be more inclusive. Hers would 
be shared and sharing temporalities, rather than an exclusive or selfish one. 'For I 
love to share, whereas you want to keep everything for yourself -)50 
Although the representation of Nietzsche's thought of the eternal recurrence as 
producing sameness can be regarded as a respectable reading, " Nietzsche states 
47 In Ecce Homo, 'Zarathustra §F trans. W. Kaufmann, New York, Vintage, 1989. 
48This criticism appears to be another particularly wilful misreading of Nietzsche who explicitly 
challenged the narcissistic tendencies of the solitary thinker in The Gay Science § 183 when he 
writes that: 'Those who live alone do not speak too loud nor write too loud, for they fear the 
hollow echo-the critique of the nymph Echo. And all voices sound different in solitude. ' 
49Ressentiment is Nietzsches own concept which would best be translated into English as 
ýresentment'. It is part of what Nietzsche terms 'slave morality', essentially a purely reactive 
source of value judgements. This reactivity derives from having to refer to an external source in 
order to make these judgements: 
This inversion of the value-positing eye-this need to direct one's view outward instead 
of back to oneself-is of the essence of ressentiment: in order to exist, slave morality 
always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external 
stimuli in order to act at all-its action is fundamentally reaction. (On the Genealogy of 
Morals p. 3 7) 
Nietzsche's apparent denigration of such external relationships for evaluation, would seem to 
strengthen Irigaray's description of him as selfish and solipsistic. However, to present Nietzsche's 
thought in such a binary manner is again to misrepresent its complexity. Although ressentiment 
obviously has pejorative connotations, it is also a necessary and creative aspect of evaluation, for 
Nietzsche. 
50 Marine Lover, p. II 
5 'For example this view is taken by Nietzsche scholars such as Richard Schacht who sums 
it up as 
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that: 'If the world may be thought of as a certain definite quantity of force ... 
it 
must pass through a calculable number of combinations .. -'. 
52 If we take this as 
a commitment to a finite universe,, and if the ring of recurrence represents 
eternity - which must be taken as infinite - then this 'calculable number of 
combinations' must necessarily be repeated as exactly the same, an infinite 
number of times. 
However Irigaray's reading of the eternal recurrence must be considered as an 
extremely ungenerous reading, especially as it is presented as an amorous 
engagement. There are equally respectable ways of reading the eternal recurrence 
that would view it as antithetical to sameness. Rather than a closed circle 
Nietzsche also represents the eternal recurrence as the 'well of eternity' which 
can be read as a deepening of time in which recurrence and uniqueness come 
together. 53 D. F. Krell goes so far as to suggest that 'the thinking of recurrence 
abolishes the thought of the same"' This can be supported from the version 
presented in the 'Vision and the Riddle' section of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, by 
concentrating on the 'moment' - the gateway on the path of eternity - rather than 
the path itself Moreover, if we interpret this 'moment' as a moment of becoming 
rather than a moment of being, a different understanding begins to emerge. 
ýall events are untimately the same, and so one may likewise speak of the eternal recurrence of the 
same (sort of) events' in Nietzsche, London Routledge, 1983. p. 255. Although his '(sort of)' 
could be unpacked to produce a different reading. 
52 Nietzsche, Will To Power, p. 549. 
5-3 Zarathustra, p. 288. 
54 , To the Orange Grove at the Edge of the Sea' in Nietzsche and the Feminine ed. P. J. Burgard, 
London, University Press of Virginia, 1994. 
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The moment, when it is described as a gateway, already introduces the possibility 
of difference. As a threshold it marks a point of difference where two different 
paths meet: 
They are in opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one 
another: and it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name 
of the gateway is written above it: "Moment". 55 
This moment (Augenblick) can be taken as Nietzsche's version of the 'Now'. 
This would not be an instant of homogenous empty time but an active collision 
56 
of future and past. The moment is always a moment of difference - difference 
between the forces of the past and the forces of the future. Nietzsche's preference 
for becoming rather than being enables the moment to avoid being a point on an 
already determined line. Instead it becomes constitutive of time itself because 
without the moment to produce this synthesis of past and future the circle would 
be broken - there would be no time. As a moment of becoming it is the passing 
of time itself and cannot be abstracted out as a point on a linear series. The 
moment could perhaps be described as pure occurrence, and the eternal 
recurrence would be the whole occurrence of time. 
By being presented as a gateway on the eternal paths of becoming, each moment 
also opens up every possibility of occurrence. Each moment is an active 
constituent in the production of the past as well as the future. And in each 
15 Nietzsche, Zarathustra, p. 178. 
56 Heidegger gives a convincing reading of the moment as this active 'moment' in Niet--Sche, Vol 
11, pp 37-62. 
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moment there is also an eternal recurrence of the same as well as a production of 
difference from itself 
Krell gives a similar interpretation of the eternal recurrence in his reading of 
Marine Lover. " He posits Irigaray's mischievous misreading of the eternal 
recurrence as a kind of ressentiment on her part. Although she does seem to be 
deliberately misreading Nietzsche at this point, Krell also misses some of the 
subtlety and ambiguity at work in this misreading. Irigaray is not just choosing to 
ignore the possibility of using the eternal recurrence as a motif of difference. 
Instead what she is trying to show is that even if it were to be read as a thinking 
of difference, it is still a thinking of difference that arises out of and, ultimately, 
falls back into the same. If it does produce difference or otherness, once again it 
is the 'other of the sarne' rather than the 'other of the other". 
In her loving engagement to and with Nietzsche it is the ring of eternity that gives 
Irigaray the most pain: 
for your eternity, everything should always turn in a circle, and that 
within that ring I should remain - your booty. 
58 
She repeatedly uses the metaphor of the wedding ring with reference to the 
eternal recurrence. It is this sign of love, commitment, co-operation and mutual 
recognition that turns to out play a part in the rejection and exclusion of others 
and mothers. It is the self-sufficiency of Nietzsche's notion that hurts. In rejecting 
i7 David F. Krell, 'To the Orange Grove at the Edge of the Sea' in Nietzsche and the Feminine ed. 
P. J. Burgard, London, University Press of Virginia, 1994. 
58 Marine Lover, p. II- 
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origin for the eternal self-(re)creation of every moment Nietzsche is again 
rejecting te idea of maternal birth in order to try and devise a way of birthing 
himself. 
And your whole will, your eternal recurrence, are these anything more 
than the drearn of one who neither wants to have been bom, nor to 
continue being born, at eveiy instant, of a female other? 59 
So with respect to Krell's reading we could also say that, rather than Irigaray 
producing an inadequate reading of the eternal return, it is Krell who fails to 
register the nature of Nietzsche's attempt at auto-birth". Krell fails to see that at 
the same time that 'the thinking of recurrence abolishes the thought of the 
same% 61 it also abolishes the thought of and debt to the other and the mother. 
In positioning herself as the lover of Nietzsche we might read this as an 
unrequited affair. However in also positioning herself as Ariadne, the lover of 
Dionysus, which would certainly be a well-requited affair, it is still one in which 
the male partner denies any maternal origin. The third and final section of Marine 
Lover is entitled 'When Gods are Born' and is, to a large extent, a meditation on 
the effects of the predominance of myths of motherless gods within Western 
culture. Dionysus is given as another example of a god that managed to evade a 
maternal birth. He gestated in, and was born from, Zeus' thigh after being taken 
from the womb of a dead woman. 
59 
Ibid.. p. 26. 
60This tradition of masculine auto-birth is described by Kelly Oliver in her reading of Marine 
Lover (op. cit. pp. 119-125) 
1 Krell, 'To the Orange Grove at the Edge of the Sea', p. 192. 
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Nietzsche's use of the figure of Dionysus is obviously another aspect that Irigaray 
sees as both useful and dangerous. Dionysus is concerned with bodies and bodily 
passion, which is something that Irigaray would also like to bring back into 
philosophy. But Dionysian bodies tend to be passionately violated - often 
dismembered. The involvement of the figure of Ariadne in this violent and 
violating frenzy is unclear. Was she captured? Did she flee? Or did she really 
wake up with Dionysus' dismembered genitals in her hand? " 
Irigaray's relationship to Nietzsche is equally as unclear. I have already remarked 
that there is to some extent a deliberate and mischievous misreading. Is Irigaray 
also both captivated by and attempting to escape from Nietzsche's clutches? Or is 
she undertaking so violent a deconstruction of his texts that she is performing a 
dismemberment in order to release him from his logic of castration? This would 
be too oppositional a model to force Irigaray's text into because there is 
obviously a fondness at work in her refusal. higaray's is a playful text, perhaps 
even flirtatious, although this could also be a parodic mimicry of the role given to 
her by Nietzsche. Indeed, to judge her texts by conventional scholarly and logical 
standards would miss much of the subtlety of movement that is taking place in 
them. In her relationship with Nietzsche we see Irigaray putting her 'feminine' 
method of having 'afling with the philosophers' into action. 63 
62 This is the version related by Mary Renault in her novel The King Must Die, NY, Pantheon, 
1958. 
63 It is in response to a question about the method adopted for her research that Irigaray refers to 
the kind of loving destruction that could be accomplished through this option. This Sex p. 150. 
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Whatever way we choose to read lrigarayýs relationship to Nietzsche, it is 
impossible to ignore the blatant selectivity at work in it. Krell is able to show 
Irigaray's selectivity in attributing a sea blindness to Nietzsche especially with 
reference to etemity. ' It is in fact in eternity that Nietzsche most clearly sees the 
sea, or rather it is in the sea that Nietzsche locates eternity; 
I seek an eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious 
salves and wines into the sea? -My consolation is that everything that 
has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again. 65 
However it is in his desire for eternity that Irigaray sees another symptom of 
Nietzsche's own nihilism. Through a mischievous mimesis of Nietzsche's own 
thinking -a mimesis that is not wholly parodic - Irigaray moves him into a 
position whereby his own longing for eternity operates in the same way as he had 
accused Christianity and Platonism of ftmctioning. In Irigaray's version there is 
still something of the 'afterworldsman' in this marriage to eternity. And, as 
Ariadne, she is also refusing this marriage. She also hears the music of 
ressentiment in i: 
Eternity, that is the music of one who senses and fears decline. And for 
passing beyond life and death. )66 
The differing senses of movement and time that I have been trying to draw out 
here can perhaps be better imagined through carrying on with this musical 
64See Krell. 'To the Orange Grove at the Edge of the Sea', p. 194. 
65Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufhlann, New York, Vintage, 1968, 
1065. 
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metaphor in order to provide a workable distinction between flux and flowing. 
That is to say between their different modes of becoming. 
In an extended discussion of the eternal recurrence Joan Stambaugh suggests that 
Nietzsche thought of time as a dimension of force and that 'the measure of force 
(as quantity) is fixed, but its essence is in flux... '. " She then advises us that 
'flowing' is derived from the Greek 'rheo' which is also the root of 'rhythm' and 
states that 'A rhythm is precisely not an arbitrary flowing, but the living pulsation 
of movement'. However I would argue that Stambaugh conflates flux and 
flowing, which if properly distinguished could help to understand both the 
common ground and differences between Irigaray and Nietzsche. Flux and 
flowing can be used to correspond to the different movements I have been trying 
to highlight in Irigaray and Nietzsche's texts. If, as Stambaugh suggests, flowing 
is tied to rhythm, then I would like to appropriate flux as the term for a non- 
rhythmic flowing that is implied in Irigaray's text. 
To a certain extent this is my own mischievous misreading of Irigaray's text 
because she does appeal to the rhythm of the ebb and flow of the sea as what has 
6 'always set the rhythm of time. ' 8However this is described as a much freer time 
than the mechanical repetition of the eternal return. The tides change in both time 
and space every day, and they change more due to the gravitational pull of the 
moon than any influence of Nietzsche's sun and its unchanging, circular rhythm. 
('6Marine Lover, P. 27. 
67joanStambaugh The Problem of Time in Nietzsche, London, Bucknell University Press, 1987. 
175. 
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These are the rhythms of the cosmos discussed in the previous chapter. There are, 
of course, patterns that can be discerned in the these rhythms, but these patterns 
defy the measurement or containment of Nietzsche's solar, circular time. 
This is not to say that it is an altogether arbitrary flowing, but that its speeds and 
slownesses are not dictated by what we would normally consider as rhythm. If I 
use the term flow as described by Stambaugh, then it would relate to dance 
because of the regular rhythm associated with that form of movement. I shall use 
flux then to relate to the movement of swimming and drifting in the ocean, 
because this is a movement that is not tied to a regular or mechanical rhythm. 
Irigaray says of Nietzsche, 'he wishes to receive only what beats in time to the 
rhythm he sets... 69 When Nietzsche is setting the rhythm of his dance he is 
setting the repetitive beat of the eternal recurrence. Irigaray refuses to dance to 
his time or his rhythm. Instead she swims, and her swimming doesn't stick 
rigidly to the uniform regularity or fixed structure of a rhythmic beat. 'O 
In order to show how the timing of these swimming strokes are not determined 
by repetitive regular rhythm, we need to focus on the musical aspects of songs, 
melodies or tunes. This can be made more explicit through the seemingly 
68 Marine Lover, p. 14. 
69 Ibid., p. 10. 
'0 Some other commentators see a stronger relation between Irigaray's thinking and dance. My 
claim here is not that Irigaray is anti-dance, but that, if she were a dancer, she would dance to 
different rhythms. See Eluned Summers-Bremner 'Reading Irigaray, Dancing', in Hypatia, 15,1, 
pp. 90-124, for an application of Irigaray's notion of the 'sensible transcendental' to European 
concert dance and dance practice. 
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inappropriate use of 'air' as an alternative word for a tune" -I am thinking of the 
use of this word with particular reference to Irish traditional music where an 
important distinction between air and tune is maintained. In this genre a tune will 
usually be an instrumental piece with a definite time signature and therefore a 
particular rhythm - for example, a jig (6/8 time) or a reel (4/4 time). However an 
air is usually thought of as the tune of a song, and in unaccompanied, old-style 
singing (sean-nos) or the playing of an air on an instrument there is often no 
specified time signature or rhythm. An air unfolds at different speeds and 
rhythms, according to the emphasis and interpretations the text demands and is 
given by the performer. Jigs, reels, hornpipes, slides etcetera are all types of 
dance music and their rhythms are irresistible. But airs, often even called 'slow 
airs' (Fonn Mall) are meditative, haunting pieces with a free musical centre. 
It is this freedom of musical movement that I would like to attribute to Irigaray's 
thinking and writing. If we were to describe her swimming in terms of dancing it 
would be dancing to an air rather than to a tune. It doesn't follow any dictated 
rhythm or limit itself to a periodic return or linear, regular progression. In this 
loving relationship she may well be dancing with Nietzsche, but not according to 
his rhythm or time. Nietzsche was unable to think of time without thinking of 
rhythm. 'Space and time are only measured things, measured by rhythm'. " I 
made the link to time earlier by reference to its ability to measure movement in 
71 Although in a text that engages with Heidegger, Irigaray makes use of the element of air as 
another metaphor for her thinking of sexual difference. Indeed, in this text she also makes use of 
the musical meaning of air as 'a piece of music written for solo voice, accompanying lyrics; a 
tune'. Theforgetting of air p. 5. 
72 Nietzsche, Werke, 10: 168. 
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space. But this isn't quite correct for Irigaray. lrigarayýs time can proceed without 
this measurement. Instead this free flowing, variable time isn't something that 
this musical swimming must fit into. It is part of the expression of the movement 
and is inseparable from it. 
iaran Carson reports an anonymous Fleadh 73 adjudicator admitting that: 
Nifjidir liom a ra ceard e an sean-nos, ach aithnim e nuair a chloisim e 
-I couldn't tell you what the sean-nos is, but I know it when I hear 
it. 74 
Which would suggest that not only is there no measure (rhythm) to it, but that 
there is also no measure (existent logical or discursive framework) by which it 
can be judged. Yet, the singing of these airs is judged successfully at every 
Fleadh. Irigaray's time is as equally difficult to measure and is certainly not the 
measure of anything else. It certainly has cycles and patterns, and these may even 
be regular, but they are not dictated by any cosmic metronome or logic of the 
same. Hers are different rhythms; rhythms of difference. 
Irigaray also attributes this mania for measurement, quantification and 
identification to maritime navigators who set out to measure, chart, and master 
the elemental ocean. But it is this attempt to impose such a rigid grid of space 
and time that cannot cope when faced by a ston-n. This presents a missed moment 
of realization for Irigaray, missed because of the fear of their perception of the 
sea as deep, dark and alien. She describes the scene thus, 
Fleadh, or more properlyfleadh cheoil, can be translated literally as a 'feast of music', it is a 
traditionai music competition. 
'4 Ciaran Carson, Last Night's Fun, London, Pimlico, 1996, p. 93. 
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Might they not then be found bent toward the ground, faced with their 
nothingness, and warding off the abysses? And let no one preach 
immortality to them at that moment. Let no one tell them that it is divine 
to throw oneself into the sea-to forget. And who at that moment still 
thinks of flying upward, in free rapture? Who is still dancing on that 
heaving deck ? 75 
Just as Nietzsche demanded new ears to hear his music Irigaray also demands 
that we dive into the ocean and swim to the music of difference. The timing of 
this music will accord with its irregular and a-rhythmic flux-like airs, which in 
turn depend on a less restrictive patterning of time. 
This change in time can be allied to the Agamben's 'genuine revolution' because 
it is also an attempt to change our culture. This would not be to determine one 
new homogenised time but different times, different experiences of time. 
Rhythmic and a-rhythmic. Not a culture but different cultures that could 
recognise and validate this a-rhythmic experience of time. In the next chapter I 
will explore how Irigaray relates this to the temporality of the body and how it 
might also be productive when allied with Benjamin's different temporalities. 
75 Marine Lover, pp. 49-50. 
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Chapter 7. 
Conclusion 
Two modes of representation are tearing time apart 
Two modes offiction are tearing apart the time ofpresence. (hi garay) 1 
In order to conclude, there needs to be a negotiation taking place between the 
temporalities of historical time and revolution at work in both Benjamin and 
Irigaray. It is important at this stage to bear in mind that these figures represent 
neither two poles of a dialectical opposition that needs to be superseded or 
synthesised, nor two alternatives that need to be brought together into a more 
comprehensive admixture. They are thinkers whose theories and implications may 
be taken to provide useful alternatives in thinking historical time and a 
revolutionary interruption in, and change of, that time. We need to compare, 
contrast, develop and miscegenate these lines of thought to see what may emerge. 
I have appropriated Benjamin's method of montage in order to create my own 
'dialectical image' composed of the tensions between his and Irigaray's versions 
of alternative temporalities of revolution. In this conclusion I will be showing 
how this conjunction will be useful to the thinking of revolution and the 
philosophy of history. According to Benjamin's image logic (see chapter 1) 
montage is not synthesis, but the gathering together of disparate elements and 
forms in a revelatory moment. In putting Benjamin's analysis of modernity and its 
accompanying Jetztzeit, together with Irigaray's uncovering of sexual difference 
and its fluid irregular movements I have produced a constellation of uneasy 
tensions as well as a common purpose of brushing history against the grain. These 
tensions are as important in the revolutionary possibilities of this conjunction as 
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are the similarities. Not only do they act as checks and balances to the various 
excesses and implausibilities of the other,, they also enact the heterogeneity of the 
desired revolution. 
To conclude with a synthesis of Benjamin and Irigaray would be to betray both by 
homogenising two different modes of thinking difference. In the first part of this 
conclusion I will show how these important differences relate to the question of 
revolution and how each thinker is able to contribute to the other. I will also 
convey through the rhythmic and musical motifs how such a tense montage would 
operate. In the second part I will show how this conjunction can contribute to 
current debates about the role of 'new historicism' within the philosophy of 
history. 
Part 1: Different Revolutions 
Throughout this thesis I have been presenting a radical interpretation of revolution 
as an interruption of history because this would also bring about a break with the 
thinking of time that constructs the past as constituent of the present as part of a 
linear and continual progression. Following Agamben's description of a genuine 
revolution I would argue that there are (at least) three elements at work in this 
revolution. The first is the conception of history that is at work in the thinking of 
revolution. In order to allow for this kind of radical disjunction we also require a 
conception of history that would not be able to 'recapture' the revolution as 
another 'stage" or 'era' in its seamless narrative. The second element of revolution 
1 Speculum pp. 353,356. 
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is the experience of time and the representation of this time implicit in the 
conception of history. The third element is the instigation of a new culture that 
would result from the arrangements and experiences involved in thinking and 
living this revolution. 
In terms of these three elements Benjamin is most obviously helpful in providing 
an account of history that allows for disjunction. Along with his critique of 
historicism, the accompanying conception of Jetztzeit also sets out an 
appropriate, revolutionary change in time. On the other hand, Irigaray's major 
contribution is in proposing radical changes in culture. If modernity is founded on 
a break with tradition, then it is not only the conceptions of history and time that 
have been smuggled over into modernity, it is also the invisibility and injustice of 
a culture that is unable to properly account for and value sexual difference. For 
Irigaray the significant moment of our culture is not the transition from pre- 
modernity to modernity - it is not to be thought either as the establishment of the 
Cartesian cogito, the Kantian transcendental subject, or the Nietzschean. death of 
God - but the transition from pre-history to history which she identifies as the 
'original matricide2 . The new culture to 
be instigated by an higarayan revolution 
would be one which would focus on the resurrection of the mother -a culture in 
which women and woman would have cultural significance. Because she has 
diagnosed the murder of the mother as the foundation and support of culture this 
radical reappraisal would make everything change by transforming the foundation 
of social order. 
2 See 'The Bodily Encounter with the Mother' in Irigaray Reader, p. 36. 
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Complicity and Nihilism 
The first problem that we encountered through Benjamin's attempt to think a 
genuine revolution was the problem of complicity. A genuine revolution will be 
one which will not and cannot be tainted by the injustices and barbarity of the 
'old' order. This requirement however is already in danger of running into the 
second of the problems that needs to be thought through: that of nihilism. While 
the problem of complicity can be avoided through structuring revolution on the 
model of an absolute break (with tradition), the negativity and destruction 
associated with this gesture are in danger of eradicating any meaning or purpose 
and therefore any political or ethical justification for the revolution. 
I have used the notion of afformativity in chapter I to describe how Benjamin is 
able to circumvent the problem of complicity. This was developed chapter 2 to 
show how afformativity is an aspect of the 'purity' of Benjamin's method that is 
later developed in terms of a dialectic without mediation. The fulfilment of 
Benjamin's revolution is based on a messianic model in which there is a 
redemption of history rather than a redemption in history. It is the exteriority of 
the Messiah in this model that also guarantees its freedom from complicity. This 
has also been seen to be at work in the creation of the revolutionary state of 
emergency or exception (Ausnahmezustand) as a non-complicitous blasting apart 
of homogenous, empty time. The Messiah does not mediate or negotiate with the 
I powers that be', he redeems and legislates. The same will go for the genuine 
revolution. 
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We have also seen a useful parallel between Benjamin's and Irigaray's 
revolutions through her own use of the messianic motif of parousia. However, 
there is also a significant tension between these two versions of messianic 
intervention. It seems that for Irigaray this parousia requires mediation to bring it 
about as well as being a mediating movement in itself higaray defines the 
relationship of her parousia to history as 'the willed construction of a bridge in the 
present between the past and the future' 3. Her associated notion of the sensible 
transcendental is also described as coming about through a process in which 'we 
would be the mediators and bridges A. These constructions reflect the pacific and 
constructive nature of her revolution as well as showing its necessarily 
complicitous nature. 
The parallels and tensions between Benjamin and Irigaray on this question can 
best be seen through the space, and ultimately the time in and of which this 
mediation will or will not take place. For Benjamin this revolves around the 
question of the middle (die Mitte), while for Irigaray it concerns the 'between'. 
For Irigaray, the 'between' can be understood in tenns of her proposal of a new 
space-time as a temporal, as well as a spatial, interval. She suggests that it is 
desire that occupies the time of this interval, and the time of desire will only 
become a revolutionary time if the relationship which constitutes it changes: if the 
economy of desire itself is altered. The relationships between the subjects and 
An Ethics qfSexual Dýfference, p. 147. 
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objects of desire must be changed in order to usher in the new era. Irigaray 
identifies the necessity for 'a different relationship between man and god(s), man 
and man, man and the world, man and woman. ' 5 Because these relationships are 
those of the 'between', they will be governed by the time of the interval and 
fulfilled by a new desire. Desire is also a revolutionary force in itself My own 
thinking of revolution as an interruption in history draws near to the kind of 
theorisation of desire that Irigaray suggests takes place 'on the basis of certain 
observations about a moment of tension, situated in historical time... -) .6 
Revolutionary desire also functions around a moment of tension in historical time. 
In contrast to the homogenous, empty time that we are attempting to find 
alternatives to, Irigaray's 'between' is not an empty space-time, but one of 
constant negotiation, re-negotiation, and recognition. The time of the interval 
which is also the time of desire is also, inevitably, linked to a passion that 
recognises the irreducible difference of the other and takes pleasure in the 
encounter with the unknowable. This passion arises as a result of the interval. 
While it was desire that occupied the place of the interval, passion will never 
allow the interval to be crossed. Irigaray wants to bring this pure passion back in 
to the relations of sexual difference. This would be a passion between the sexes 
which is also wonder: 
Wonder might allow them to retain an autonomy based on their difference. 
The interval would never be crossed. There would be no consummation. 
Ibid. p. 129. 
The Irigaroy Reader, p. 167. 
Ibid., p. 167. 
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Such an idea is a delusion. One sex is never entirely consummated or 
consumed by another. There is always a residue. 7 
For higaray this is necessarily a residue of relationship which reflects the 
irreducibility of sexual difference. However, it also demands mediation while 
maintaining difference between heterogenous subjects. For higaray it is love and 
passion that does the work of the 'between'. Another useful parallel with 
Benjamin can be seen in this thinking in which love will always leave a 
(mucousic) residue. I made reference in chapter 2 to the notion of fulfilment that 
can be derived from Benjamin's messianic model and that this can be related to 
the pleasure of sexual gratification. Is this then, Irigaray's version of a fulfilled 
temporality that is based on the fulfilment of carnal love? Can we rethink the 
mucousic residue of mediation in terms of the explosive catalyst of Benjamin's 
Jetztzeit which would blast apart the continuum of history by filling it to bursting? 
Again, there is a danger in ignoring the tensions at work in such similarities. 
Because Irigaray's revolution demands mediation it will not sit comfortably with 
Benjamin's interruption. The mucous is not only related to the residue of 
irreducibility, it is also related to the mediation between the irreducibles. 
Benjamin's version of the middle is, on the other hand, constructed around 
disjunction. Benjamin's concern with modernity rather than sexual difference 
leads to the necessity of a thinking of the present and thus to Jetztzeit as a 
revolutionary thinking of the now. Such a thinking cannot avoid immediacy. A 
properly revolutionary alternative for Benjamin must also be without mediation. 
Ibid., p. 172. 
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As we have seen from the analysis of his version of the dialectic in chapter 2 and 
the significance of Ideas as constellations in chapter 3, the tensions between the 
various elements and extremes of dialectical images are not mediated, but are 
instead in direct correspondence. Because Benjamin's philosophy of history 
operates on a principle of disjunction, what is between or in the middle is a break, 
rather than a mediated exchange between irreducible differences. 
It is the purity and the immediate nature of Benjamin's alternative that would 
provide a criticism of Irigaray's more complicitous altemative of a culture of 
intersubjective communication exemplified in more recent writing. Such a 
criticism would draw attention to Irigaray's failure to construct a philosophy of 
history appropriate to modernity. I have extrapolated the philosophy of history 
that has emerged from Irigaray's work throughout this thesis from her theory of 
sexual difference. However, as such, it can be seen to be lacking in a rigorous 
thinking of the present and its disjunctive immediacy in favour of a more organic 
conception of history as the legacy of an original matricide. 
However the absolute purity of Benjamin's position is also problematic. We have 
seen that both Benjamin and Irigaray criticise absolutist methods of philosophy 
(universal history and monolithic maleness respectively). The call for a non- 
complicitous revolution can then be construed as too absolute a conception of 
revolution and therefore impossible to accomplish on the concrete, everyday 
level. The problem arises from trying to make the particularities of revolution fit a 
universal concept. Benjamin and Irigaray both share a philosophical methodology 
that no longer requires the particular to come under the concept in such a 
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dictatorial fashion. Benjamin's Jetztzeit is precisely derived from an attention to 
the nunc stans. Irigaray's reversal of the dialectic flows from her omnitemporal 
insistence on the hic et nunc of every individual as other, as well as the necessity 
of their interaction and communication. The ordering of absolute, non- 
complicitous revolution would not only deny the significance of particularity, it 
would also shut down the avenues of communication and mutuality between 
individuals and communities. On the other hand Irigaray is most useful in helping 
us to think of an open coexistence of recognisably different agents by bringing us 
back to the body as the site of the concrete particularity of everyday life. This 
would be a concrete revolution which brings justice to embodied subjects of 
history, time and power. 
As well as a Benjaminian criticism of Irigaray in terms of complicity, we can also 
discover an Irigarayan criticism of Benjamin in terms of nihilism. In chapter 21 
described the aspects of nihilism at work in Benjamin's theory as active nihilism, 
and this was done in order to distance him from interpretations that would 
describe him as adhering to a metaphysics of pure destruction. While the theme of 
destruction is clearly important in his philosophy of history it is a destruction that 
when related to tradition becomes 'a destruction of destruction' 8. Another parallel 
and another tension comes into view when Benjamin's destruction of destruction 
is considered beside Irigaray's pacific revolution. Her critique of the philosophical 
tradition can be interpreted as an attempt to destroy a tradition of destruction as 
8 See Alexander Garcfa DiRtmann, 'Tradition and Destruction' in Walter Benjamin's Philosophy, 
for a detailed reading of Benjamin's position on destruction and tradition. What is most pertinent 
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can Benjamin's destruction. However Benjamin's target is, more specifically. 
fascism9 not the dominant trends of Western philosophy. Indeed Irigaray's 
characterisation of the tradition of Western philosophy as inherently destructive 
would have to include Benjamin, especially as he is explicitly concerned with 
destruction. As I have stated in chapter 4, it is this apparently monolithic view of 
the history of Western philosophy and culture that is one of the weakest moments 
of Irigaray's work; but even if we reject her own totalisation of history in favour 
of a view that allows moments of dissent and construction to appear, there is still 
indisputably, a destructive aspect to Benjamin's thought. 
I have drawn attention to the numerous examples of nihilism in Benjamin's work 
as well as his own explicit self-identification as a nihilist. It is his construction of 
historical time as the time of ruination, and messianic time as a time of transience 
that best exhibit his nihilistic tendencies. On the other hand it is the historical 
focus of this nihilism that also contributes to its activity. Benjamin's criticism of 
what he considered to be Nietzsche's too passive nihilism was that it was not 
accompanied by a rigorous enough historical analysis. What this means is that an 
active nihilism is not a denial of meaning due to the transience of history, but that 
all meaning is historical and will only become fulfilled at the revolutionary 
moment in which it will be 'citable in all its moments'10. 
in this reading is that Dattmann regards Benjamin's destruction as productive and revolutionary in 
which 'revolution is tradition's memory' (p. 47). 
9 It is Dattmann who makes this more specific claim. [bid, p. 39. 
" Illuminations p. 246. 
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As I have argued in chapter 6, Irigaray is an eminently 'earthly' thinker who 
eschews the nihilism that Nietzsche would have attributed to 'afterworldsmen. 
Her parousia and sensible transcendental are to be found in and through living 
beings and their fleshy materiality. Benjamin's messianic model does, however 
retain enough exteriority to be in danger of eoming under a Nietzschean 
description of nihilism. Even Benjamin's happiness is nihilistic, both on his own, 
and on Nietzsche's terms, because it is seeking the downfall of the earthly. 
Irigaray's revolution is not nihilistic because it is not setting out to destroy one 
position in order to set up another. Instead she transfigures one position by 
recognising other positions. It is the recognition of sexual difference and the 
multiplication of perspectives that are entailed in that, and can be extrapolated 
from it, that will lead to the transfiguration of the dominant patriarchal models. 
What I am arguing is that such a revolutionary transformation of patriarchy does 
not have to be construed as destructive because it will still maintain modes of 
male/masculine becoming and identity. In other words, Irigaray is not setting out 
to murder the father in order to re-instate the mother, she is wanting to re-instate 
the mother in order to open up whole new worlds and space-times for everyone. 
The tension between Benjamin and Irigaray's different takes on the tradition of 
destruction can best be been seen in terms of their dialectics. Irigaray"s dialectic is 
not only a reversal of the (Hegelian) dialectic, it is a multiplication of the 
dialectic. As a reversal it does indeed work backwards. opening up superseded 
oppositions in order to affirm their difference and maintain the space-time 
between them (which is also the space-time of the between). Irigaray's critique of 
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Hegel's dialectic as absolute process adheres to a non-nihilistic, insuperable 
negativity of difference that, rather than working in a progressive and linear 
manner in order to bring subject and object together, works backwards in order to 
draw attention not only to the space-time between subject and object, but also 
between subjects. Hers is a futural undoing of the dialectic in which its tightly 
woven fabric is unpicked in order to appreciate the individual threads in all their 
difference. 
Although Benjamin's is also not an absolute process or a progressive elimination 
of difference, it is a violently destructive gesture which operates on the basis of 
bringing various elements together in order to harness the ruinous potential of 
their tensions. The question of nihilism would tempt us to try and substitute the 
afformativity and destruction of Benjamin's dialectics at a standstill with the more 
fluid negativity of a reversal of the dialectic. However, as has been stressed 
throughout, Benjamin's notion of dialectics at a standstill and the revolutionary 
and active nihilistic consequences of this are inseparable from his analysis of the 
disjunction, disruption and discontinuity at the heart of modernity. To replace this 
aspect of his theory with a more continuous model would be to render his theory 
unrecognisable and to eliminate what has been shown to be the most helpful 
aspects in attempting to create alternative temporalities of revolution. 
Continuity and Discontinuity 
Benjamin's lack of complicity and his active nihilism have both been shown to be 
attributable to his rigorous thinking of the discontinuity of,, and as, modernity. 
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Irigaray's mediated and non-nihilistic thinking can, on the other hand be related to 
her mucousic thinking of fluidity and its reversed developmental dialectic. 
Through an examination of the fluid, rhythmic and musical aspects of the 
question of continuity and discontinuity these two models can be made to work 
together through their similarities and differences. 
In terms of their similarities we can note a certain coincidence if we turn back to 
Benjamin's notion of origin. Revolution is also concerned with new beginnings 
so it would be appropriate to appropriate this term in order to think of revolution 
not only as a destructive event, but also as an originating one. What is of 
particular concern here is that Benjamin's construction of origin presents us with 
more fluid aspects of his thinking. 
Benjamin discusses the dialectic of destruction and origin in terms of citation, and 
we are justified in applying this model to history by recalling that the redemptive 
or revolutionary moment of history is also the time when the past has 'become 
citable in all its moments'. The revolutionary destructive citation 
summons the word by its name, wrenches it destructively from its context, 
but precisely thereby calls it back to its origin... In quotation the two 
realms - of origin and destruction - justify themselves before language. 
And conversely, only where they interpenetrate - in quotation - is 
language consummated. " 
In terms of history then, redemption will only take place when the past is 
destructively ripped from its context in order to be returned to its origin. This is 
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precisely how the dialectical image operates. The 'then' is destructively repeated 
in the 'now', and this both creates tensions with the origins of the 'then' as well 
as originating a new 'now'. This is also why Benjamin's nihilism is an active 
nihilism; because destruction is inseparable from origin and it is only through 
realms acting in direct correspondence that revolutionary temporalities will 
emerge. 
The destructive aspect of these temporalities are most closely associated with the 
commitment to disjunction and discontinuity. However the originating moments 
also suggest a fluid emergence of novelty from becoming. 
The term origin is not intended to describe the process by which the 
existent came into being, but rather to describe that which emerges from 
the process of becoming and disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the 
stream of becoming, and in its rhythmic movement (Rhythmik) it 
swallows the material involved in the process of genesis. That which is 
original is never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of the 
factual; its rhythm (Rhythmik) is open (offen) only to a dual insight. On the 
one hand it needs to be recognised as a process of restoration and 
reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of this, as 
something imperfect and incomplete. 12 
This is an incomplete and dual process of becoming and disappearance, 
restoration and imperfection. As an eddy origin disrupts the regular flow of the 
strewn of becoming. It is not a fixed entity but only recognisable as a cyclical 
One Wav Street and Other Writings, p. 286. 
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disturbance that will change its position and properties according to the volume 
and rate of flow. 
This embryonic thinking of fluidity in Benjamin's origin could be developed 
through the application of Irigaray's exemplary employment of fluidity. This 
revolutionary fluid origin which is inextricably linked with destruction can be 
likened to the fluidity that would jam the machinery of the solidity and regularity 
of patriarchal discourse. That it is also a necessarily incomplete origin suggests 
that it would be comfortable in an affirmatively aqueous environment. The 
explicit fluidity of Benjamin's origin allows us to move towards a position in 
which Irigaray's fluid continuity can be disturbed by turbulence and vortexes. 
Fluid mechanics would enable us to construct a model in which turbulence can 
also create gaps or disjunctions within a chaotic, multidirectional, and yet 
continuous flow. 
That these aquatically situated movements are described as rhythmic does not 
necessarily mean that they adhere to the regular repetitive movements of 
mechanical time. Because they are water-based rhythmic movements they are 
more likely to be conducive to the irregular 'natural' rhythms of the ffigarayan 
swimmer. It could also be the case that Irigaray's cosmic rhythms are also echoes 
of the happy messianic rhythms described in Benjamin's Theologico-Political 
Fragment as the rhythms of transient nature: 
12 The Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 45. translation modified. 
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the rhythm of Messianic nature is happiness. For nature is Messianic by 
reason of its eternal and total passing away. 13 
But even though both of these can be contrasted with the regular, mechanical 
beats of culture, we should be wary of completely homogenising different fluid 
rhythms and timings. Indeed because Benjamin is so concerned with modernity 
there would need to be room for the mechanical and technological rhythms of 
modem culture alongside the ambient irregularities of 'nature'. Neither is Irigaray 
completely blind to the revolutionary potential of some technology, yet she would 
stress that any use must be carried out in a culture that also pays due attention to 
the natural and the cosmic. 
All true insight forms an eddy. To swim in time against the direction of 
the swirling stream. Just as in art, the decisive thing is: to brush nature 
against the grain 
14 
Here we have another example of the emergent fluidity of Benjamin's thought as 
well as an attempt to put it to critical use in order to discover different and 
revealing perspectives. Time being likened to a swirling stream is fluid and 
flowing, yet able to be resisted through a brushing of nature against the grain 
which would cause disruptive and disjunctive eddies. The decision which leads to 
insight is what disturbs the flow and causes erratic, rhythmic vortexes. This 
aphorism can be read to show how Benjamin and Irigaray share similar 
movements in which their times will also overlap. But they will only meet in 
passing. The encounter will involve Irigaray drifting with and through the natural 
13 One Way Street and Other Writings, p. 156. 
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and irregular currents, while Benjamin will be striving against the flow. What 
should we make of this meeting in the waters? Their different times and 
movement will only be productive if they are left to swim around each other in 
their highly different styles. To try to synthesise these two thinkers would only 
produce a blatantly contrived and choreographed synchronised swimming. 
However a musical model of multiple tempos and temporalities is helpful in 
conveying the power of this fluvial encounter. A musical reading of Benjamin 
would allow us to see the time of the destructive and originating revolution as 
both fluid and static. Indeed, as we saw in chapter 3, Benjamin diagnosed the 
language of Trauerspiel as moving towards the condition of music. Not only can 
music provide a model for the heterogeneity and disjunction of time through 
devices such as irregular rhythms, rubato and fermata, it also expresses a more 
radical heterogeneity through its non-representational gestures. Music's gestures 
towards an unrepresentable otherness can also give expression to more radical 
forms of alterity present within modem forms of time. It is in this musical 
moment that Benjamin and Irigaray sit most comfortably together. To listen to 
their polytemporal music would be to not only experience the different and 
discontinuous temporalities of modernity, but also to hear the voices of repressed 
others who have been struggling over different representations of time. 
Music is also a process of becoming in which there is no fixed state of being. 
However, even though music can be understood as temporal becoming, this does 
not mean that it has to be given the status of an absolute process, or even a linear 
W Benjamin G', -10, First 
Sketches in Arcades Project, p. 843. 
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progression. It is the moments of silence that produce disjunctive breaks as do 
repetitions variations and omamentations. What I arn proposing here is a 
revolutionary fusion of musical genres: a musical montage. Rather than thinking 
of such fertile fusions in terms of the dilution or betrayal of a tradition or genre, 
they can be viewed as the instigation of a completely new genre. In this case it 
will be the production of revolutionary temporalities of history that can 
accommodate revolutionary disjunctions within a new culture of pacific 
mucousity. One that recognises the important differences between the models of 
revolution and time at work in Irigaray and Benjamin while also producing a new 
revolutionary genre that can make use of the discontinuity of Benjamin's timing 
within the inclusive continuity of Irigaray's irenic dialectic. There is room for the 
disjunctive operation of Jetztzeit within a mucousic multidirectional history that is 
open to sexual difference. The purpose of proposing this as a fusion is to 
emphasise the heterogeneity of revolutionary times as well as the different modes 
of fulfillment that will be engendered. 
Irigaray's continuous, organic becoming of fluid continuity - the ambient rubato 
of corporeal and cosmic water music can be criticised in terms of a purely 
Benjaminian framework 15 . Although 
I have identified the similarities to a 
Christian temporality of teleological expectation through the promise of new era 
' 5AIthough there are arguments for describing Irigaray's temporalities as disjunctive they miss the 
more organic nature of Irigaray's corporeal language. See Ewa Plonowski Ziarek 'Toward a 
Radical Female Imaginary: Temporality and Embodiment in Irigaray's Ethics', Diacritics, 28: 1, 
Spring 1998, pp. 60-75 for one such reading which insists on a 'disjunctive temporality of history' 
through a reading of the temporality of the body. However I would argue that Ziarek has failed to 
fully think through the mucous in her concentration on a body that is fragmented into scraps and 
debris rather than a more organic conception of a body of multiple and yet interrelated parts. I 
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and parousia as able to be interpreted as coming too close to an Hegelian 
Christology, it is what I consider to be her musical utopianism that holds open the 
space for a more radical alterity. This can be seen most clearly in her earlier works 
in which the struggle for the representation of time was also linked with a 
recognition of real otherness. 16 
While there are important differences in the rhythms of becoming in the two 
models we can more easily supplement Benjamin's embryonic fluidity with 
Irigaray's more comprehensive mucous logic. The beauty of this supplementation 
is that it does not have to contradict the disjunctive and discontinuous basis of his 
temporalities of revolution. This is a thinking of fluidity and the mucous which 
can also allow for disjunction and discontinuity by paying attention not only to the 
differences between the rhythms of fluid and solid mechanical movements, but 
also to the turbulences, eddies, gaps, blocks, dams, floods and deluges. If 
Irigaray's revolution is a flood and Benjamin's is an explosive interruption we can 
bring the two together in an explosion that will not only reveal the disjunctive 
temporalities of history and thereby bring justice to all those hidden by the 
progressive and continuous logic of history, it will also release a flood of fluid 
new relations between irreducibly different others. 
Part 11: New Historicism and the Philosophy of History 
There are many areas of the philosophy of history in which this tense conjunction 
of Benjamin and Irigaray will be able to make useful contribution. Not least with 
16 
see Specidum pp. 353-55. 
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respect to debates about the 'end of history'. Benjamin's messianism and 
Irigaray's parousia both provide different models of ends which could be cashed 
out in terms of difference. One interesting avenue of research would be to explore 
the plural and non-teleological ends of history opened up by such a pairing. 
However the tensions between continuity and discontinuity discussed above will 
prove most immediately helpful in contributing to the current debates on the role 
of 'new historicism' or 'new historiography' 17 in the philosophy of history. I will 
conclude by showing briefly how the Benjamin/Irigaray constellation is able to 
contribute to these discussions and, more importantly, move them beyond 
questions of pure historiography, and beyond new historicism. 
New historicism is a term associated with a critical movement which rejected 
what it saw as a the positivist belief of earlier historicists that the historical past 
could be represented objectively. Along with this came a rejection of a monolithic 
view of history and the introduction of different and dissonant voices as well as a 
recognition of the historicity of the historian, philosopher or writer's own 
position. 18 In recent debates concerning historiography it has also come to be used 
in conjunction with practices that are often gathered together under the label of 
'postmodemism'. 19 
17 The term 'new historiography' was coined by Frank Ankersmit, in his History and Tropology: 
The Rise and Fall ofMetaphor, Berkeley, 1994. 
" See John Brannigan, New Historicism and Cultural Materialism, London, 1998, for a 
comprehensive survey of the positions set out for new historicism by Stephen Greenblatt, Louis 
Montrose and others. 
'9 For example see, Mrgen Pieters, 'New Historicism: Postinodern Historiography between 
Narrativism and Heterology', in Histotý, and Theory, 39, pp. 21-38. 
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The current arguments about new historicism, or postmodern historiography focus 
on the problems of representing the past and are often reduced to purely 
epistemological concerns about how it is possible to have knowledge of past 
events or whether we are able to represent those events accurately. While there is 
a great deal of agonising over the necessary selectivity and processes of exclusion 
of historiography, the discussion is often reduced to the depressingly familiar 
choice of relativism and 'realism'. It is the opponents of new historicism who 
often identify themselves as 'realists' 20 What is assumed by this position is that 
the appropriate methodological rigour applied to the requisite amount of primary 
sources will in the end reveal history the 'way it really was'. Rather than repeating 
the arguments against the naYve historicism of the realist school, I will show how 
the kind of thinking that has emerged from the conjunction of Benjamin and 
Irigaray's revolutionary times can move beyond such an opposition. 
Although I will be showing how Benjamin and higaray can help us through such 
an impasse, it is important to note that they can also both be closely associated 
with the new historicist movement. Indeed Benjamin's theses On the Concept of 
History appear under the heading of 'Sources' in at least one textbook on the new 
20 This can be seen in the exchange between Perez Zagorin and Keith Jenkins in the Journal 
History and Theory. Perez Zagorin, 'History, the Referent, and Narrative: Reflections on 
Postmodernism Now', History and Theory, February 1999, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1-24. Keith Jenkins, 
'A Postmodem Reply to Perez Zagorin', History and Theon), May 2000, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 18 1- 
200. Perez Zagorin, 'Rejoinder to a Postmodernist'. Histotý, and Theory, May 2000, vol. 39, no. 2, 
pp. 201-209. Also the debates reprinted from the journals in The Postmodern History Reader, 
ed. Keith Jenkins. London, Routledge. 1997. 
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historicism. 21 This might seem perverse for a thinker who was so vehemently 
critical of historicism. However many of the new historicists criticisms of 'old' 
historicism can indeed be seen to be similar to Benjamin's, and his unparalleled 
historical sense has been put to good use to bolster this genre. It may also seem at 
odds that Benjamin's avowed modernism could be introduced into a genre more 
identifiable as postmodernist. This could be clarified through a tangential 
discussion of postmodemism as either integral to or 'after' modernism, but that is 
not our primary concern here. 22 Irigaray can also be associated with this 
movement as she is more often treated as a 'postmodern feminist' in that she 
shares certain poststructuralist theories of representation and signification such as 
a Lacanian idiom, as well as being actively engaged in trying to promote different 
voices in history. 
In order to convey the productivity of the Benjamin/Irigaray nexus to a thinking of 
new historicism, I will be taking the work of Michel de Certeau as a 
representative example of an increasingly significant theorist of that movement. 
Although he died in 1986, his work is only now being taken up by philosophers of 
history. fndeed his own situation as belonging to a Jesuit tradition which he 
considered to be in need of disruption through a recognition of its racial others 
also illustrates the possibilities of extrapolating the relevance of Benjamin and 
2' This is in New Historicism and Cultural Materialism: A Reader, ed, Kiernan Ryan, London, 
Amold, 1996. 
22 To pursue this question see Jean-Franqois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, David Harvey 
The Condition ofPostmodernity: An Inquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1989, and Frederic Jameson Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism London, Verso, 199 1. 
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Irigaray to other others. Many of the themes of his work are reflected in the 
concerns elaborated throughout this thesis. Issues such as the rupture of history, 
different temporalities, constructions of the body, and musical interpretation. 
While this will enable me to contribute to discussions on these and other themes, 
what is of greater significance is that I will also criticise certain problematic 
historicist tendencies as well as extending the limitations of Certeau's 
historiographical concerns. 
What is most notable about Certeau's approach to history is that it too can be 
described as 'brushing history against the grain'. He uses a heterological method 
, 23 in which 'intelligibility is established through a relation with the other . This 
pays attention to silences and breaks in order to expose the 'other' of history. His 
starting point is the historians' assumption that history and historiography are 
concerned with other times. Historical objects, because they are in the past, are 
treated as absent, which also entails a crucial difference from the present. In order 
to make sense of history, historians use time as an ordering principle. By dividing 
time into past and present, history can be ordered and constructed into a rational 
and intelligible totality. This is a prototypically modem activity in that it too is 
based on a rupture: an essential 'differentiation between the present and the 
past... . This rupture also organises the content of 
history'. 24 
I-" Michel de Certeau, The Writing qfffisforyý trans. Tom Conley, New York, Columbia Univerity 
Press, 1988, p. I 
24 lbid, p. 2. 
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According to Certeau there are also different temporalities at work the modes of 
representation of different historiographies. There are also alternative approaches 
that involve different practices or temporalities. One such practice is that of the 
mystics which can be seen to involve a different relationship to the ordering of 
historical time. 
The mystic is seized by time as by that which irrupts and transforms; 
hence time is for him the question of the subject seized by his other, in a 
present which is incessantly the surprise of a birth and a death. The 
endlessness of instants that are beginnings creates therefore a historicity in 
which continuities lose their relevance, just as institutions do. These 
events... continually contradict the time produced by historiography. 25 
Not only does this suggest alternative temporalities to those of historiography, it 
is also coincidental with the alternative temporalities of revolution that are at play 
in the Benjamin and frigaray conjunction. The irruption, transformation, and 
endless instants of beginning, in which continuities lose their relevance, conform 
with the Benjaminian extremes of the constellation, while the surprise of a birth 
and the loss of institutional relevance can be given an higarayan emphasis. 
Irigaray is also heterological, not least in remembering and uncovering, making 
heard the forgotten of history as well as the forgotten mother, birth and body. Her 
writing explicitly participates in these different practices of time. In the chapter 
entitled 'La Mysterique' of Speculum Irigaray appropriates the mystical voice of 
25 Michel de Certeau, The Aývstic Fable vol. 1: The Strteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, tr. 
Michael B. Smith, London, Chicago University Press, 1992, p. 11. 
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Saint Teresa of Avila in a poetical critique of the ýspecula(risa)tion' of woman. 26 
This is a mimesis of the kind of madness Certeau suggests is repressed by the 
rational pursuit of historiography. Irigaray uses such a heterology primarily to 
disturb the history of philosophy, but it could just as easily be used to aid the 
recovery of other histories. That Certeau also interprets mystical texts in terms of 
bodily expressions also supports a reading such as Irigaray's that would posit the 
body as one of the forgotten elements of history. 
Certeau's own historical sense gives weight to the new historicists' emphasis on 
the historicity of historiography. At any time there will only be a certain range of 
representational possibilities available. These make up the limits of 'what can be 
thought 927 . The role of the 
heterologist then is to run up against, and if possible 
transgress, these limits in order to reveal the 'other of reason, or of the possible'. 28 
Certeau's own method is based on a psychoanalytic framework using a model of 
the unconscious to try and grasp these historical silences. The unconscious here is 
constructed on a Lacanian model where it is to be thought of as the repressed of 
language rather than something buried deep within the psyche. There are, of 
course, other heterological interpretative devices such as deconstruction, or 
Foucauldian genealogy and archaeology. 29 What is of consequence here is that 
26 Speculum pp. 191-202. 
27 Certeau, The Writing of History, p. 44. 
28 Ibid. p. 43. 
29 Indeed Certeau was very influenced by Foucault's archaeological method, and made significant 
use of analyses of power structures in his investigations of racial others, with particular reference 
to the effects of colonial exploitation in South America. 
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Benjaminian dialectical images combined with Irigarayan mimesis can also be 
read as an effective heterological admixture. 
This coincides most clearly with the musical interpretation outlined above. 
Certeau also appropriates music's relation to the inexpressible as a non-rational 
presence within modernity. 30 This directly relates to a musical interpretation of 
Benjamin's critical identification of the expressionless (das Ausdruckslose) which 
he explicitly links to H61derlin's 'counter rhythmic rupture' - the caesura. 
31 This 
can also be the originating eddy in the irregular rhythmic flow. Certeau sees music 
as an unconscious spiritualism in modernity. This interpretation of music will be 
of value in a Benjaminian model, both of allegory as non-instrumental readability, 
and of contributing towards the higher conception of experience as including 
religious experience, as set out in On The Program of the Coming Philosophy 
discussed in chapter 1. 
Certeau's method of interpretation also takes musical cues. Any musical 
performance is an interpretation of a historical object in the present. One way of 
recovering the others of history is to abstract reports, for example of mystics, from 
their own historical context and reintroduce them, or repeat them in ours. These 
reports can be treated as tunes which like the 'airs' of the sean-nos singers will be 
a musical version of Benjamin's historical strategy in which an image of the past 
is to be recognised and repeated in the present in order to alter contemporary 
30 Certeau, The Writing of History, p. 183-4. 
ý'j ý Goethe's Elective Affinities' in, Selected Writings, Fol. 1, p. 340-34 1. 
338 
experience. 32 Musical performance as repetition and interpretation can also be 
applied to Irigaray's mimicry in which she repeats refrains from the history of 
philosophy in a subversive register. Indeed this must also relate to the thinking of 
quotation which renews in the present what has been ripped from the past. 
The mechanism for repeating the alterity of the past in the present, according to 
Certeau, is a fonn of Freud's 'return of the repressed". According to this theory 
the gaps and silences of history are the result of an active forgetting which refuses 
certain aspects and events in order to create an intelligible history. However at 
certain times what has been excluded will re-appear as 'what, at a give moment, 
has become unthinkable in order for a new identity to become thinkable. 33 In 
other words there are certain forms of alterity that will, at certain times, interrupt 
and alter fonns of identity. 
This absent presence of history is the proper historical ob ect for the new j 
historian. Certeau uses the Lacanian psychoanalytic terminology of the 'real' 
(reeý for this object. As such the real is not available to discourse, it is more like 
a 6nature' even though it is always in a dynamic relation with culture. This is why 
it will emerge at the points of strain in historiological. discourse, and can only be 
heard in the silences. The rift beween discourse and the body is a symptom of a 
dualism that also separates the body from discourse and there is a desire in this, 
and other, versions of new historicism to get in touch with the real and to 
somehow make the silent body legible. 
32 see Thesis V, Illuminations, p. 247. 
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Beyond New Historicism 
While this debate,, as it has been conducted in the journals, is primarily concerned 
with historiography and the interpretation of historical texts I would like to add 
the necessary rejoinder that there will always be a more substantive theory of 
history implied by such discussions of its representations. Indeed Certeau's 
discussion of the necessity of the rupture and breakage between the present and 
the past in modem historiography reflect the temporalities of modernist 
constructions of history. More importantly however, as I have stressed throughout 
this thesis both the representation of history and the disputes over its times are 
also necessarily political questions. They are questions about justice, rescue and 
recognition. Any engagement with history, whether historiographical or 
theoretical is a political practice. Although many of the realist camp would deny 
this and argue that we can arrive at an objective account or a umversal history, 
this is in fact another, consciously or unconsciously, concealed conservative 
political position. History is inescapably entangled in the politics of 
representation. Brushing history against the grain is a conscious attempt to re- 
align a narrative that has been given to us by 'the victors'. As such both Benjamin 
and Irigaray can be seen to be accepting the responsibility of historical practice in 
an honest and resolute stance. 
Although it is clear that Benjamin and Irigaray can contribute to new historicism, 
especially in its Certalian variation, there are also many important areas in which 
they can help to explore the problems of such a position. The most significant of 
-1ý1 Certeau. The Writing offfistory, p. 4. 
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these is the new historicists' desire to get 'in touch with the real'. 
34 The problem 
with this is that it appears that the new historicists are lapsing back into the 
positivist approach to history that they had originally criticised. While it is true 
that this involves the production of other histories, my worry is that in resorting to 
reference to the real it becomes merely another version of objectivism or 
4realism'. 
This problem can be seen to arise from the fact that new historicism is generally 
taken to refer to a group of interpretative strategies. Indeed Certeau is certainly 
involved in the production of a theory of interpretation -a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic reading of history. In other words, because it is attempting to 
understand history through interpretation new historicism can be described as a 
hermeneutical method. While many theories of hermeneutics would refuse the 
suggestion of any final interpretation, there are dangers involved in striving 
towards such finality. This is precisely what Benjamin criticises in his rejection of 
Ranke's desire to articulate the past 'the way it really was'. 35 Hermeneutic 
historicism is based on a method of empathy (Einfflh1ung); in particular, empathy 
with the victors. 36 Such an empathetic understanding is in danger of identifying 
with a progressive narrative of the totality of history which is at odds with the 
fragmented image-time at work in this thesis. In the end, the purpose of a 
revolutionary philosophy of history is not to strive for epistemological certainty 
through any sort of empathetic method, it is to create an inclusive culture of 
34 Stephen Greenblatt, 'The Touch of the Real', Representations, 59,1997,14-29. 
35 Thesis V1, Illuminations. p. 247. 
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difference through a materialist engagement with history. While such an 
engagement will necessarily have to take account of the politics of language and 
representation involved its primary role is to intervene by fanning 'the spark of 
hope in the past' in order to recognise 'a revolutionary chance in the fight for the 
oppressed past'. 37 
This enterprise will be much more productive if it refuses to follow the 
empathetic course of new historicism, opting instead for a radical and critical 
hermeneutic which incorporates plural accounts of history. Indeed, as critical 
hermeneutics it will be related to Nietzsche's critical history (see the Introduction) 
by producing pragmatic and concrete histories which are useful for everyday life. 
This is why Irigarays model of production is so helpful in brushing history 
against the grain. It is her use of the imaginary - the dimension of perceived or 
imagined images - which she wrests away from the influence of the real that can 
instigate social transformation. Instead of trying to 'get in touch with the real' we 
can use methods of productive mimesis in conjunction with a revolutionary 
philosophy of history to produce different imaginaries, different histories and 
different times. 
36 For Benjamin empathetic understanding was merely 'an attempt to provide a disguise under 
which idle curiosity masquerades as method. ' (Origin of German Tragic Drama, p. 54. ) 
,, 7 Thesis V1, Illuminations, p. 247, Thesis XVIL Illuminations, p. 254. 
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